PLUTARCH'S LIVES.

Translated from the Greek

WITH

NOTES AND A LIFE OF PLUTARCH.

BY

AUBREY STEWART, M.A.,

Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge,

AND THE LATE

GEORGE LONG, M.A.,

Formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge,.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

LONDON:

GEORGE BELL & SONS, YORK ST., COVENT GARDEN, AND NEW YORK.

1892.

LONDON:

REPRINTED FROM THE STEREOTYPE PLATES BY WM. CLOWES & SONS, LTD.,

STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

CONTENTS.

LIFE OF NIKIAS.1
LIFE OF CRASSUS. (By G. Long.)36
COMPARISON OF NIKIAS AND CRASSUS.89
LIFE OF SERTORIUS. (By G. Long.)94
LIFE OF EUMENES.130
COMPARISON OF SERTORIUS AND EUMENES.150
LIFE OF AGESILAUS.152
LIFE OF POMPEIUS. (By G. Long.)195
COMPARISON OF AGESILAUS AND POMPEIUS.295
LIFE OF ALEXANDER.300
LIFE OF C. CÆSAR. (By G. Long.)379
LIFE OF PHOKION.466
LIFE OF CATO. (By G. Long.)500

[Pg 1]

PLUTARCH'S LIVES.

LIFE OF NIKIAS.

As it appears to me that the life of Nikias forms a good parallel to that of Crassus, and that the misfortunes of the former in Sicily may be well compared with those of the latter in Parthia, I must beg of my readers to believe that in writing upon a subject which has been described by Thucydides with inimitable grace, clearness, and pathos, I have no ambition to imitate Timæus, who, when writing his history, hoped to surpass Thucydides himself in eloquence, and to show that Philistius was but an ignorant bungler, and so plunges into an account of the speeches and battles of his heroes, proving himself not merely one

"Who toils on foot afar
Behind the Lydian car,"

as Pindar has it, but altogether unfit for the office of historian, and, in the words of Diphilus,

"Dull-witted, with Sicilian fat for brains."

He often seeks to shelter himself behind the opinions of Xenarchus, as when he tells us that the Athenians thought it a bad omen that the general whose name was Victory refused to command the expedition to Sicily; and when he says that by the mutilation of the Hennas the gods signified that the Athenians would suffer their chief disasters at the hands of Hermokrates the son of Hermon; or, again, when he observes that Herakles might be expected to take the side of the Syracusans because of Proserpine, the daughter of Demeter, who gave him the dog Kerberus, and to be angry with the [Pg 2]Athenians because they protected the people of Egesta, who were descended from the Trojans, whereas he had been wronged by Laomedon, king of Troy, and had destroyed that city. Timæus was probably led to write this sort of nonsense by the same critical literary spirit which led him to correct the style of Philistius, and to find fault with that of Aristotle and Plato. My own opinion is that to pay too much attention to mere style and to endeavour to surpass that of other writers, is both trifling and pedantic, while any attempt to reproduce that of the unapproachable masterpieces of antiquity springs from a want of power to appreciate their real value. With regard, then, to the actions of Nikias described by Thucydides and Philistius, more especially those which illustrate his true character, having been performed under the stress of terrible disasters, I shall briefly recapitulate them, lest I be thought a careless biographer, adding to them whatever scattered notices I have been able to collect from the writings of other historians and from public documents and inscriptions; and of these latter I shall quote only those which enable us to judge what manner of man he was.

II. The first thing to be noted in describing Nikias is the saying of Aristotle, that there had been in Athens three citizens of great ability and patriotism, namely, Nikias, the son of Nikeratus, Thucydides, the son of Melesias, and Theramenes, the son of Hagnon; though the latter was not equal to the two former, but was reproached with being a foreigner from the island of Keos; and, also, because he was not a stable politician but always inclined to change sides, he was nicknamed Kothornos, which means a large boot which will fit either leg. Of these three statesmen the eldest was Thucydides, who was the leader of the conservative opposition to Perikles; while Nikias, who was a younger man, rose to a certain eminence during the life of Perikles, as he acted as his colleague in the command of a military force, and also filled the office of archon. On the death of Perikles, Nikias at once became the foremost man in Athens, chiefly by the favour of the rich and noble, who wished to make use of him to check the plebeian insolence [Pg 3]of Kleon; yet Nikias had the good-will of the common people, and they were eager to further his interests. Kleon, indeed, became very powerful by caressing the people and giving them opportunities for earning money from the State, but in spite of this, many of the lower classes whose favour he especially strove to obtain, became disgusted with, his greed and insolence, and preferred to attach themselves to Nikias. Indeed, there was nothing harsh or overbearing in the pride of Nikias, which arose chiefly from his fear of being thought to be currying favour with the people. By nature he was downhearted and prone to despair, but in war these qualities were concealed by his invariable success in whatever enterprise he undertook; while in political life his retiring manner and his dread of the vulgar demagogues, by whom he was easily put out of countenance, added to his popularity; for the people fear those who treat them with haughtiness, and favour those who respect and fear them. The reason of this is that the greatest honour which the populace can receive from a great man is not to be treated with contempt by him.

III. Perikles, indeed, used to govern Athens by sheer force of character and eloquence, and required no tricks of manner or plausible speeches to gain him credit with the populace; but Nikias had no natural gifts of this sort, and owed his position merely to his wealth. As he could not vie with Kleon in the versatile and humorous power of speech by which the latter swayed the Athenian masses, he endeavoured to gain the favour of the people by supplying choruses for the public dramatic performances and instituting athletic sports on a scale of lavish expenditure which never before had been equalled by any citizen. The statue of Pallas, erected by him in the Acropolis, is standing at this day, although it has lost the gold with which it was formerly adorned, and also the building which supports the choragic tripods in the temple of Dionysus, for he often gained a victory when choragus, and never was vanquished.

It is said that once during the performance of a play at his expense, a slave of his appeared upon the stage habited as Dionysus; a tall and handsome youth, and still beardless. The Athenians were charmed with his appearance, [Pg 4]and applauded for a long time, at the end of which Nikias rose and said that he did not think it right that one whose body was thus consecrated to a god should be a slave; and consequently he gave him his freedom. Tradition also tells us how magnificently and decorously he arranged the procession at Delos. In former times the choruses sent by the cities of Ionia to sing to the glory of the god used to sail up to the island in a disorderly fashion, and were at once met by a rude mob, who called upon, them to sing, so that they disembarked in a hurry, huddling on their garlands and robes with unseemly haste and confusion. Nikias disembarked with his chorus upon the little island of Rhenea close by, with all their vestments and holy things, and then during the night bridged the strait—which is very narrow—with a bridge of boats which he had had made at Athens expressly, which was beautifully ornamented with gilding and rich tapestry. Next morning at daybreak, he led the procession to the god over this bridge, with his chorus very richly dressed, and singing as they passed over the strait. After the sacrifice, the public games, and the banquet, he set up the brazen palm-tree as an offering to the god, and also set apart an estate which he had bought for ten thousand drachmas, as sacred to the god. With the revenues of this land the people of Delos were to offer sacrifice and to provide themselves with a feast, and were to pray the gods to bestow blessings on Nikias. All these injunctions to the people of Delos were inscribed upon a pillar which he left there to guard his bequest. The palm-tree was afterwards overturned by a high wind, and in its fall destroyed the great statue which had been set up by the people of Naxos.

IV. These acts of Nikias may have been prompted by ambition and desire for display, but when viewed in connection with his superstitious character they seem more probably to have been the outcome of his devotional feelings; for we are told by Thucydides that he was one who stood greatly in awe of the gods, and was wholly devoted to religion. In one of the dialogues of Pasiphon, we read that he offered sacrifice daily, and that he kept a soothsayer in his house, whom he pretended to consult [Pg 5]upon affairs of state, but really sought his advice about his own private concerns, especially about his silver mines. He had extensive mines at Laurium, the working of which afforded him very large profits, but yet was attended with great risks. He maintained a large body of slaves at the works; and most of his property consisted of the silver produced by them. For this reason he was surrounded by hangers-on, and persons who endeavoured to obtain a share of his wealth, and he gave money to all alike, both to those who might do him harm, and to those who really deserved his liberality, for he gave to bad men through fear, and to good men through good nature. We may find proof of this in the writings of the comic poets. Telekleides, speaking of some informer, says:

"Charikles a mina gave him, fearing he might say
Charikles himself was born in a suspicious way;
And Nikias five minas gave. Now, what his reasons were
I know full well, but will not tell, for he's a trusty fere."

Eupolis, too, in his comedy of Marikas has a scene where an informer meets with a poor man who is no politician, and says:

"A. Say where you last with Nikias did meet.
B. Never. Save once I saw him in the street.
A. He owns he saw him. Wherefore should he say
He saw him, if he meant not to betray
His crimes?
C. My friends, you all perceive the fact,
That Nikias is taken in the act.
B. Think you, O fools, that such a man as he
In any wicked act would taken be."

Just so does Kleon threaten him in Aristophanes's play:

"The orators I'll silence, and make Nikias afraid."

Phrynichus, too, sneers at his cowardice and fear of the popular demagogues, when he says:

"An honest citizen indeed he was,
And not a coward like to Nikias."

V. Nikias feared so much to give the mob orators grounds for accusation against him, that he dared not so much as dine with his follow citizens, and pass his time in their society. Nor did he have any leisure at all for such amusements, but when general, he used to spend [Pg 6]the whole day in the War office, and when the Senate met he would be the first to come to the house and the last to leave it. When there was no public business to be transacted, he was hard to meet with, as he shut himself up in his house and seldom stirred abroad. His friends used to tell those who came to his door that they must pardon him for not receiving them, as he was not at leisure, being engaged on public business of great importance. One Hieron, whom he had brought up in his house and educated, assisted him greatly in throwing this air of mystery and haughty exclusiveness over his life. This man gave out that he was the son of Dionysius, called Chalkus, whose poems are still extant, and who was the leader of the expedition to Italy to found the city of Thurii. Hiero used to keep Nikias supplied with prophetic responses from the soothsayers, and gave out to the Athenians that Nikias was toiling night and day on their behalf, saying that when he was in his bath or at his dinner he was constantly being interrupted by some important public business or other, so that, said he, "His night's rest is broken by his labours, and his private affairs are neglected through his devotion to those of the public. He has injured his health, and besides losing his fortune, has been deserted by many of his friends on account of his not being able to entertain them and make himself agreeable to them; while other men find in politics a means of obtaining both friends and fortune, at the expense of the state." In very truth the life of Nikias was such that he might well apply to himself the words of Agamemnon.

"In outward show and stately pomp all others I exceed,
And yet the people's underling I am in very deed."

VI. Perceiving that the Athenian people were willing enough to make use of the talents of men of ability, and yet ever viewed them with suspicion and checked them when in full career, as we may learn from their condemnation of Perikles, their banishment of Damon by ostracism, and their mistrust of Antiphon the Rhamnusian, and especially in their treatment of Paches the conqueror of Lesbos, who while his conduct as general was being [Pg 7]enquired into, stabbed himself in the open court—perceiving this, Nikias always avoided, as far as he could, taking the command in any important military expedition. Whenever he was employed as general, he acted with extreme caution, and was usually successful. He was careful to attribute his success, not to any skill or courage of his own, but to fortune, being willing to lessen his glory to avoid the ill-will of mankind. His good fortune was indeed shown in many remarkable instances: for example, he never was present at any of the great defeats sustained by the Athenians at that time, as in Thrace they were defeated by the Greeks of Chalkidike, but on that occasion Kalliades and Xenophon were acting as generals, while the defeat in Ætolia took place when Demosthenes was in command, and at Delium, where a thousand men were slain, they were led by Hippokrates. For the pestilence Perikles was chiefly blamed, because he shut up the country people in the city, where the change of habits and unusual diet produced disease among them. In all these disasters Nikias alone escaped censure: while he achieved several military successes, such as the capture of Kythera, an island conveniently situated off the coast of Laconia, and inhabited by settlers from that country. He also captured several of the revolted cities in Thrace, and induced others to return to their allegiance. He shut up the people of Megara in their city, and thereby at once made himself master of the island of Minoa, by means of which he shortly afterwards captured the port of Nisæa, while he also landed his troops in the Corinthian territory, and beat a Corinthian army which marched against him, killing many of them, and amongst others Lykophron their general. On this occasion he accidentally neglected to bury the corpses of two of his own men who had fallen. As soon as he discovered this omission, he at once halted his army, and sent a herald to the enemy to demand the bodies for burial, notwithstanding that by Greek custom the party which after a battle demand a truce for the burial of the dead, are understood thereby to admit that they have been defeated, and it is not thought light for them to erect a trophy in commemoration of their victory; for [Pg 8]the victors remain in possession of the field of battle, and of the bodies of the dead, and the vanquished ask for their dead because they are not able to come and take them. Nevertheless, Nikias thought it right to forego all the credit of his victory rather than leave two of his countrymen unburied. He also laid waste the seaboard of Laconia, defeated a Lacedæmonian force which opposed him,and took Thyrea, which was garrisoned by Æginetans, whom he brought prisoners to Athens.

VII. Now when Demosthenes threw up a fortification at Pylos, and after the Peloponnesians had attacked him by sea and by land, some four hundred Spartans wore left on the island of Sphakteria, the Athenians thought that it was a matter of great importance, as indeed it was, to take them prisoners. Yet, as it proved laborious and difficult to blockade them on the island, because the place was desert and waterless, so that provisions had to be brought from a great distance by sea, which was troublesome enough in summer, and would be quite impossible in winter, they began to be weary of the enterprise, and were sorry that they had rejected the proposals for peace which had shortly before been made by the Tasmanians. These proposals were rejected chiefly because Kleon opposed them. Kleon's opposition was due to his personal dislike to Nikias; and when he saw him enthusiastically exerting himself on behalf of the Lacedæmonians, he at once took the other side, and persuaded the people to reject the proffered peace. Now as the blockade dragged on for a long time, and the Athenians learned to what straits their army was reduced, they became angry with Kleon. He threw the blame upon Nikias, asserting that it was through his remissness and want of enterprise that the Spartans still held out, and declaring that, were he himself in chief command they would soon be captured. Upon this the Athenians turned round upon him and said, "Why, then, do not you yourself proceed thither and capture them?" Nikias at once offered to transfer his command to Kleon, and bade him take what troops he thought necessary, and, instead of swaggering at home where there was no danger, go and perform some notable service to the state. At first [Pg 9]Kleon was confused by this unexpected turn of the debate, and declined the command; but as the Athenians insisted upon it, and Nikias urged him to do so, he plucked up spirit, accepted the office of general, and even went so far as to pledge himself within twenty days either to kill the Spartans on the island or to bring them prisoners to Athens. The Athenians were more inclined to laugh at this boast than to believe it; for they were well acquainted with the vainglorious character of the man, and had often amused themselves at his expense. It is said that once the public assembly met early and sat for a long time waiting for Kleon, who came at last very late with a garland on his head, and begged them to put off their debate till the next day. "To-day," said he, "I am not at leisure, as I have just offered a sacrifice, and am about to entertain some strangers at dinner." The Athenians laughed at his assurance, and broke up the assembly.

VIII. However, on this occasion, by good fortune and good generalship, with the help of Demosthenes, he brought home prisoners all those Spartans who had not fallen in the battle, within the time which he had appointed. This was a great reproach to Nikias. It seemed worse even than losing his shield in battle that he should through sheer cowardice and fear of failure give up his office of general, and give his personal enemy such an opportunity of exalting himself at his expense, depriving himself voluntarily of his honourable charge. Aristophanes sneers at him in his play of the 'Birds,' where he says:

"We must not now, like Nikias, delay,
And see the time for action pass away."

And again in the play of the 'Farmers,' where this dialogue occurs:

"A. I want to till my farm.
B.                              And wherefore no?
A. 'Tis you Athenians will not let me go;
A thousand drachmas I would give, to be
From office in the state for ever free.
B. Your offer we accept. The state will have
Two thousand, with what Nikias just gave."

[Pg 10]Moreover, Nikias did Athens much harm by permitting Kleon to attain to such a height of power and reputation, which gave him such exaggerated confidence in himself that he grew quite unmanageable, and caused many terrible disasters, by which Nikias suffered as much as any man. Kleon also was the first to break through the decorum observed by former public speakers, by shouting, throwing back his cloak, slapping his thigh, and walking up and down while speaking, which led to the total disregard of decency and good manners among public speakers, and eventually was the ruin of the state.

IX. About this time Alkibiades began to gain credit in Athens as a public speaker, less licentious than Kleon, and like the soil of Egypt described by Homer, which bears

"A mingled crop of good and bad alike."

Thus Alkibiades, with immense powers both for good and evil, produced great changes in the affairs of Athens. Nikias, even if he had been freed from the opposition of Kleon, could not now have quietly consolidated the power of the state, for as soon as he had arranged matters in a fair way to produce peace and quiet, Alkibiades, to satisfy his own furious ambition, threw them again into confusion and war. This was brought about by the following circumstances. The two chief hindrances to peace were Kleon and Brasidas; as war concealed the baseness of the former, and added to the glory of the latter. Kleon was able to commit many crimes undetected, and Brasidas performed many great exploits while the war lasted; wherefore, when both of these men fell before the walls of Amphipolis, Nikias, perceiving that the Spartans had long been desirous of peace, and that the Athenians no longer hoped to gain anything by continuing the war, and that both parties were weary of it, began to consider how he might reconcile them, and also pacify all the other states of Greece, so as to establish peace upon a durable and prosperous basis. At Athens, the richer classes, the older men, and the country farmers all wished for peace. By constantly arguing with the others he [Pg 11]gradually made them less eager for war, and at length was able to intimate to the Spartans that there were good hopes of coming to terms. They willingly believed him because of his high character for probity, and more especially because he had shown great kindness to the Spartan prisoners taken at Pylos. A truce for one year had already been arranged between them, and during this they conversed freely with one another, and, enjoying a life of leisure and freedom from the restraints and alarms of war, began to long for an unbroken period of peace, and to sing:

"My spear the spider's home shall be,"

remembering with pleasure the proverb that in time of peace men are awakened, not by trumpets, but by crowing cocks. They railed at those who said that it was fated that the war should last thrice nine years, and, having thus accustomed themselves to discuss the whole question, they proceeded to make peace, and thought that now they were indeed free from all their troubles. The name of Nikias was now in every man's mouth, and he was called the favourite of heaven, and the man chosen by the gods for his piety to confer the greatest of blessings upon the Greeks. For they regarded the peace as the work of Nikias, just as the war had been the work of Perikles. The latter, they thought, for no adequate reasons, had involved the Greeks in the greatest miseries, while the former had relieved them of their troubles by persuading them to become friends. For this reason this peace is to this day called the peace of Nikias.

X. The terms of the peace were that each party should restore the cities and territory which it had taken, and that it should be determined by lot which side should restore its conquests first. We are told by Theophrastus that Nikias, by means of bribery, arranged that the lot should fall upon the Lacedæmonians to make restitution first. When, however, the Corinthians and Bœotians, dissatisfied with the whole transaction, seemed likely by their complaints and menaces to rekindle the war, Nikias induced Athens and Sparta to confirm the peace by entering upon an alliance, which enabled them to deal with [Pg 12]the malcontents with more authority, and give them more confidence in one another.

All these transactions greatly displeased Alkibiades, who was naturally disinclined to peace, and who hated the Lacedæmonians because they paid their court to Nikias and disregarded him. For this reason, Alkibiades from the very outset opposed the peace, but ineffectually at first. When, however, he observed that the Lacedæmonians were no longer regarded with favour by the Athenians, and were thought to have wronged them by forming an alliance with the Bœotians, and not restoring to Athens up the cities of Panaktus and Amphipolis, he seized the opportunity of exciting the people by exaggerated accounts of the misdeeds of the Lacedæmonians. Moreover he prevailed upon the people of Argos to send ambassadors to Athens to conclude an alliance. As, however, at the same time ambassadors, with full powers to settle all matters in dispute, came from Lacedæmon, and in a preliminary conference with the Senate were thought to have made very reasonable and just proposals, Alkibiades, fearing that they might create an equally favourable impression when they spoke before the popular assembly, deceived them by solemnly declaring with an oath that he would assist them in every way that he could, provided that they would deny that they came with full powers to decide, saying that by this means alone they would effect their purpose. The ambassadors were deceived by his protestations, and, forsaking Nikias, relied entirely upon him. Upon this Alkibiades brought them into the public assembly, and there asked them if they came with full powers to treat. When they said that they did not, he unexpectedly turned round upon them, and calling both the Senate and the people to witness their words, urged them to pay no attention to men who were such evident liars, and who said one thing in one+ assembly and the opposite in another. The ambassadors, as Alkibiades expected, were thunderstruck, and Nikias could say nothing on their behalf. The people at once called for the ambassadors from Argos to be brought before them, in order to contract an alliance with that city, but an earthquake which was felt at this moment [Pg 13]greatly served Nikias's purpose by causing the assembly to break up. With great difficulty, when the debate was resumed on the following day, he prevailed upon the people to break off the negotiations with Argos, and to send him as ambassador to Sparta, promising that he would bring matters to a prosperous issue. Accordingly he proceeded to Sparta, where he was treated with great respect as a man of eminence and a friend of the Lacedæmonians, but could effect nothing because of the preponderance of the party which inclined to the Bœotian alliance. He was therefore forced to return ingloriously, in great fear of the anger of the Athenians, who had been persuaded by him to deliver up so many and such important prisoners to the Lacedæmonians without receiving any equivalent. For the prisoners taken at Pylos were men of the first families in Sparta, and related to the most powerful statesmen there. The Athenians, however, did not show their dissatisfaction with Nikias by any harsh measures, but they elected Alkibiades general, and they entered into a treaty of alliance with the Argives, and also with the states of Elis and Mantinea, which had revolted from the Lacedæmonians, while they sent out privateers to Pylos to plunder the Lacedæmonian coasts in the neighbourhood of that fortress. These measures soon produced a renewal of the war.

XI. As the quarrel between Nikias and Alkibiades had now reached such a pitch, it was decided that the remedy of ostracism must be applied to them. By this from time to time the people of Athens were wont to banish for ten years any citizen whose renown or wealth rendered him dangerous to the state. Great excitement was caused by this measure, as one or the other must be utterly ruined by its application. The Athenians were disgusted by the licentiousness of Alkibiades, and feared his reckless daring, as has been explained at greater length in his Life, while Nikias was disliked because of his great wealth and his reserved and unpopular mode of life. Moreover he had frequently offended the people by acting in direct opposition to their wishes, forcing them in spite of themselves to do what was best for them. On the one side were arrayed the young men and those who wished for [Pg 14]war, and on the other the older men and the party of peace, who would be sure to vote respectively, one for the banishment of Nikias, the other for that of Alkibiades. Now

"In revolutions bad men rise to fame,"

and it appears that the violence of these factions at Athens gave an opportunity for the lowest and basest citizens to gain reputation. Amongst these was one Hyperbolus, of the township of Peirithois, a man of no ability or power, but who owed his elevation to sheer audacity, and whose influence was felt to be a disgrace to Athens. This man, who never dreamed that ostracism would be applied to him, as the pillory would have been more suitable to his deserts, openly showed his delight at the discord between Nikias and Alkibiades, and excited the people to deal severely with them, because he hoped that if one of them were to be banished, he might succeed to his place, and become a match for the one who was left behind. But the parties which supported Nikias and Alkibiades respectively made a secret compact with one another to suppress this villain, and so arranged matters that neither of their leaders, but Hyperbolus himself was banished by ostracism for ten years. This transaction delighted and amused the people for the moment, but they were afterwards grieved that they had abused this safeguard of their constitution by applying it to an unworthy object, as there was a kind of dignity about the punishment which they had inflicted. Ostracism in the case of men like Thucydides and Aristeides, was a punishment, but when applied to men like Hyperbolus, it became an honour and mark of distinction, as though his crimes had put him on a par with the leading spirits of the age. Plato, the comic poet, wrote of him

"Full worthy to be punished though he be,
Yet ostracism's not for such as he."

The result was that no one was ever again ostracised at Athens, but Hyperbolus was the last, as Hipparchus of Cholargus, who was some relation to the despot of that name, was the first. Thus the ways of fortune are inscrutable, and beyond our finding out. If Nikias had [Pg 15]undergone the trial of ostracism with Alkibiades, he would either have driven him into banishment, and governed Athens well and wisely during his absence, or he would himself have left the city, and avoided the terrible disaster which ended his life, and would have continued to enjoy the reputation of being an excellent general. I am well aware that Theophrastus says that Hyperbolus was ostracised in consequence of a quarrel of Alkibiades with Phæax and not with Nikias; but my account agrees with that given by the best historians.

XII. When ambassadors came to Athens from Egesta and Leontini, inviting the Athenians to commence a campaign in Sicily, Nikias opposed the project, but was overruled by Alkibiades and the war party. Before the assembly met to discuss the matter, men's heads were completely turned with vague hopes of conquest, so that the youths in the gymnasia, and the older men in their places of business or of recreation, did nothing but sketch the outline of the island of Sicily and of the adjacent seas and continents. They regarded Sicily not so much as a prize to be won, but as a stepping-stone to greater conquests, meaning from it to attack Carthage, and make themselves masters of the Mediterranean sea as far as the Columns of Herakles. Public opinion being thus biassed, Nikias could find few to help him in opposing the scheme. The rich feared lest they should be thought to wish to avoid the burden of fitting out ships and the other expensive duties which they would be called upon to fulfil, and disappointed him by remaining silent. Yet Nikias did not relax his exertions, but even after the Athenian people had given their vote for the war, and had elected him to the chief command, with Alkibiades and Lamachus for his colleagues—even then, on the next meeting of the assembly, he made a solemn appeal to them to desist, and at last accused Alkibiades of involving the city in a terrible war in a remote country merely to serve his own ambition and rapacity. However, he gained nothing by this speech, for the Athenians thought that he would be the best man to command the expedition because of his experience in war, and that his caution would serve as a salutary check upon the rashness of Alkibiades and the [Pg 16]easy temper of Lamachus; so that, instead of dissuading them his words rather confirmed them in their intention. For Demostratus, who of all the popular orators was the most eager promoter of the expedition, rose, and said that he would put an end to these excuses of Nikias: and he prevailed upon the people to pass a decree that the generals, both at home and in the field, should be invested with absolute irresponsible power.

XIII. Yet it is said that the expedition met with great opposition from the priests; but Alkibiades found certain soothsayers devoted to his own interests, and quoted an ancient oracle which foretold that the Athenians should one day win great glory in Sicily. Special messengers also came from the shrine of Ammon,[1] bringing an oracular response to the effect that the Athenians would take all the Syracusans. Those oracles which made against the project, people dared not mention, for fear of saying words of ill-omen. Yet even the most obvious portents would not turn them from their purpose, such as the mutilation of all the Hermæ, or statues of Hermes, in Athens, in a single night, except only one, which is called the Hermes of Andokides, which was erected by the tribe Ægeis, and stands before the house in which Andokides lived at that time. A man likewise leaped upon the altar of the Twelve Gods, sat astride upon it, and in that posture mutilated himself with a sharp stone. At Delphi too there is a golden statue of Pallas Athene standing upon a brazen palm tree, an offering made by the city of Athens from the spoils taken in the Persian war. This was for many days pecked at by crows, who at last pecked off and cast upon the ground the golden fruit of the palm tree. This was said to be merely a fable invented by the people of Delphi, who were bribed by the Syracusans. Another oracle bade the Athenians bring to Athens the priestess of Athena at Klazomenae, and accordingly they sent for her. Her name happened to be Hesychia, signifying Repose; and this is probably what the oracle meant that the Athenians had better remain quiet. The astronomer, Meton, who was appointed to some office in the army, either because of these adverse omens and prophecies, or [Pg 17]because he was convinced that the expedition would miscarry, pretended to be mad and to set fire to his house. Some historians relate that he did not feign madness, but that he burned down his house one night, and next morning appeared in the market-place in a miserable plight, and besought his countrymen that, in consideration of the misfortune which had befallen him, they would allow his son, who was about to sail for Sicily in command of a trireme, to remain at home. We are told that Sokrates the philosopher was warned by one of the signs from heaven which he so often received that the expedition would be the ruin of the city. And many were filled with consternation at the time fixed for the departure of the armament. It was during the celebration of the Adonia, or mourning for the death of Adonis, and in all parts of the city were to be seen images of Adonis carried along with funeral rites, and women beating their breasts, so that those who were superstitious enough to notice such matters became alarmed for the fate of the armament, and foretold that it would start forth gloriously, but would wither untimely away.

XIV. The conduct of Nikias in opposing the war when it was being deliberated upon, and his steadfastness of mind in not being dazzled by the hopes which were entertained of its success, or by the splendid position which it offered himself, deserves the utmost praise; but when, in spite of his exertions, he could not persuade the people to desist from the war, or to remove him from the office of general, into which he was as it were driven by main force, his excessive caution and slowness became very much out of place. His childish regrets, his looking back towards Athens, and his unreasonable delays disheartened his colleagues, and spoiled the effect of the expedition, which ought at once to have proceeded to act with vigour, and put its fortune to the test. But although Lamachus begged him to sail at once to Syracuse and fight a battle as near as possible to the city walls, while Alkibiades urged him to detach the other Sicilian states from their alliance with Syracuse, and then attack that place, he dispirited his men by refusing to adopt either plan, and proposed to sail quietly along the coast, displaying the [Pg 18]fleet and army to the Sicilians, and then, after affording some slight assistance to the people of Egesta, to return home to Athens. Shortly after this, the Athenians sent for Alkibiades to return home for his trial on a charge of treason, and Nikias, who was nominally Lamachus's colleague, but really absolute, proceeded to waste time in idle negotiations and languid manœuvres, until his troops had quite lost the high spirits and hopes with which they had arrived at Sicily; while the enemy, who were at first terrified, began to recover their spirits, and despise the Athenians. While Alkibiades was still with them they had sailed to Syracuse with sixty ships, and while the rest remained in line of battle outside, ten of these had entered the harbour to reconnoitre. These ships, approaching the city, made a proclamation by a herald that they were come to restore the people of Leontini to their city, and they also captured a Syracusan vessel, in which they found tables on which were written the names of all the inhabitants of Syracuse, according to their tribes and houses. These tables were kept far away from the city, in the temple of the Olympian Zeus, but at that time the Syracusans had sent for them in order to discover the number of men able to bear arms. These tables were now taken by the Athenians, and carried to their general. When the soothsayers saw this roll of names, they were much alarmed, fearing that this was the fulfilment of the prophecy that the Athenians should capture all the Syracusans. However, some declare that the prophecy was really fulfilled when the Athenian Kallippus slew Dion, and captured Syracuse.

XV. Shortly after this, Alkibiades left Sicily, and the supreme command devolved upon Nikias. For Lamachus, though a brave and honest man, and one who always freely risked his life in battle, was but a plain simple man, and was so excessively poor, that whenever he was appointed general he was forced to ask the Athenians to advance him a small sum of money to provide him with clothes and shoes. Now Nikias was excessively haughty, both on account of his great wealth, and his military renown. It is said that once when the generals were debating some question together, Nikias bade Sophokles [Pg 19]the poet give his opinion first, because he was the eldest man present, to which Sophokles answered, "I am the eldest, but you are the chief." Thus when in Sicily he domineered over Lamachus, although the latter was a far abler soldier, and by sailing about the coast at the point furthest removed from the enemy, gave them confidence, which was turned into contempt, when he was repulsed from Hybla, a little fort in the interior. At last he returned to Katana, without having effected anything, except the reduction of Hykkara, a town of the aborigines, not of the Greeks, from which it is said the celebrated courtezan Lais, then a very young girl, was carried away captive and sent to Peloponnesus.

XVI. As the summer advanced, and Nikias remained inactive, the Syracusans gained so much confidence that they called upon their generals to lead them to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceful citizens in Katana, instead of restoring the Leontines. This unexpected humiliation at length forced Nikias to proceed to Syracuse, and he devised a stratagem by which he was able to approach that city and pitch his camp before it unmolested.

He despatched to Syracuse a citizen of Katana, who informed the Syracusans that if they desired to seize the camp and arms of the Athenians, they would only have to appoint a day and to march in force to Katana. Many of the Athenians, he said, spent all their time within the walls of Katana, and it would be easy for the Syracusan party there to close the gates, assail the Athenians within, and set fire to their ships. A numerous body of Kataneans, he added, were eager to co-operate in the plan now proposed.

This was by far the ablest piece of strategy accomplished by Nikias during all the time that he remained in Sicily. The Syracusans were induced to march out their entire force, leaving their city with scarcely any defenders. Meanwhile, Nikias sailed round from Katana, took possession of the harbour, and encamped his forces on the mainland in a position where he could not be attacked by the [Pg 20]enemy's cavalry. When the Syracusan army returned from Katana, he marched out the Athenians and defeated them, but with little loss on their side, as their cavalry covered their retreat. Nikias now broke down the bridges over the river Anapus, which gave occasion to Hermokrates to say, when he was making a speech to encourage the Syracusans, that it was a ridiculous thing for Nikias to try to avoid fighting, as though it were not for the express purpose of fighting that he had been sent thither. But in spite of all that Hermokrates could say, the Syracusans were very much cast down and disheartened. Instead of the fifteen generals who usually commanded their troops they chose three, upon whom they conferred absolute powers, and swore a solemn oath that they would leave them unfettered in the exercise of those powers.

The Athenians were very anxious to occupy the temple of Olympian Zeus, which was near their camp, and full of offerings of gold and silver. Nikias, however, purposely delayed the attack until a force was sent from Syracuse to defend the temple. He thought that if the soldiers did succeed in plundering it, the state would be none the better for it, and he himself would have to bear all the blame of sacrilege.

Nikias made no use of his boasted victory, and after a short time drew off his forces to Naxos, where he passed the winter, expending an enormous sum of money for the maintenance of so large a force, and effecting little or nothing except the reduction of a few disorderly tribes in the interior. The Syracusans now took heart again, marched into the Katanean territory and laid it waste, and attempted to burn the camp of the Athenians. Upon this all men blamed Nikias for deliberating and taking precautions until the time for action was gone by. No one could find any fault with him when he was actually fighting; but though a bold and energetic man in action, he was slow to form plans and begin an enterprise.

XVII. Thus when he did at length return to Syracuse, he managed the operation so swiftly and so skilfully that he disembarked his troops at Thapsus before the enemy were aware of his approach, took Epipolæ by surprise, took prisoners three hundred of the force of picked men [Pg 21]who endeavoured to recapture that fort, and routed the Syracusan cavalry, which had hitherto been supposed to be invincible. Moreover, what chiefly terrified the Sicilians, and seemed wonderful to all Greeks, was the speed with which he built a wall round Syracuse, a city quite as large as Athens itself, but one which is much more difficult to invest completely, because of the sea being so near to it, and the rough ground and marshes by which it is surrounded on the land side. Yet he all but succeeded in accomplishing this feat, although he was not in a condition of body to superintend such works personally, for he suffered greatly from a disease of the kidneys, to which we must attribute whatever was left undone by his army. For my own part I feel great admiration for the diligence and skill of the general, and for the bravery of the soldiers, which enabled them to gain such successes. The poet Euripides, after their defeat and utter overthrow wrote this elegy upon them:

"Eight times they beat the Syracusan host,
Before the gods themselves declared them lost."

Indeed, they beat the Syracusans far more than eight times, before the gods turned against the Athenians and dashed them to the ground when at the height of their pride.

XVIII. Nikias was present, in spite of his sufferings, at most of these actions; but when his disease grew worse, he was forced to stay in the camp with a small guard, while Lamachus took the command of the army, and fought a battle with the Syracusans, who were endeavouring to build a counter-wall which would obstruct the Athenians in building their wall of circumvallation. The Athenians were victorious, but followed up their success in such a disorderly manner that Lamachus was left alone and exposed to the attacks of the Syracusan cavalry. He at once challenged their leader, a brave man named Kallimachus, to single combat, and both received and inflicted a mortal wound. His dead body and arms fell into the hands of the Syracusans, who at once charged up to the Athenian walls, where Nikias lay helpless. The extremity of the danger roused him, and he ordered his attendants to set fire to a quantity of timber which had been brought thither [Pg 22]to construct military engines, and to some of the engines themselves. This desperate expedient checked the Syracusans, and saved Nikias and the Athenians; for the rest of the Syracusan forces on perceiving so great a body of flame returned in haste to their city.

This affair left Nikias in sole command, and he had great hopes of taking the place; for many cities in Sicily had formed alliances with him, ships laden with corn kept arriving to supply his camp, and all began to be eager to be on his side, and to share in the fruits of his success. The Syracusans themselves sent to propose terms of peace, for they despaired of being able to defend their city any longer against him. At this time Gylippus too, a Lacedæmonian who was sent to assist them, heard during his voyage that they were completely enclosed and reduced to great straits, but held on his voyage notwithstanding, in order that even if, as he imagined, all Sicily had fallen into the hands of the Athenians, he might at any rate defend the Greek cities in Italy from sharing its fate. The air indeed was full of rumours that the Athenians were carrying all before them, and that the good fortune and skill of their general rendered him invincible. Even Nikias himself was so elated by his apparent good fortune, that he forgot his wonted prudence, and imagining from the secret intelligence which he had from his friends within Syracuse that it was on the point of surrender, neglected Gylippus altogether, and kept so bad a watch at the straits of Messina with his fleet, that Gylippus managed to cross there and land in Sicily. Here he at once proceeded to gather an army together, but in a quarter of the island far away from Syracuse, so that the people of Syracuse knew nothing of his arrival. They even appointed a day for the public assembly to meet and discuss terms of surrender with Nikias, and were about to attend it, as they thought that it would be best for them to come to terms before the city was quite surrounded by the wall of the Athenians. There was now only a very small portion of this left to be finished, and all the materials for building it were collected on the spot.

XIX. At this crisis there arrived at Syracuse Gongylus, a Corinthian, in one trireme. All crowded round him, to [Pg 23]hear what news he brought. He informed them that Gylippus would soon come to their aid by land, and that other triremes besides his own were on their way by sea. This intelligence was scarcely believed, until it was confirmed by a message from Gylippus himself, bidding them march out and meet him. They now took courage and prepared for battle. Gylippus marched into the town, and at once led the Syracusans out to attack the Athenians. When Nikias had likewise brought his army out of their camp, Gylippus halted his men, and sent a herald to offer them an armistice for five days, on condition that they would collect their effects and withdraw from Sicily. Nikias disdained to answer this insulting message; but some of his soldiers jeeringly enquired whether the presence of one Spartan cloak and staff had all at once made the Syracusans so strong that they could despise the Athenians, who used to keep three hundred such men, stronger than Gylippus and with longer hair, locked up in prison, and feared them so little that they delivered them up to the Lacedæmonians again. Timæus says that the Sicilian Greeks despised Gylippus for his avaricious and contemptible character, and that when they first saw him, they ridiculed his long hair and Spartan cloak. Afterwards, however, he tells us that as soon as Gylippus appeared they flocked round him as small birds flock round an owl, and were eager to take service under him. This indeed is the more probable story; for they rallied round him, regarding his cloak and staff to be the symbols of the authority of Sparta. And not only Thucydides, but Philistus, a Syracusan citizen by birth, who was an eye-witness of the whole campaign, tells us that nothing could have been done without Gylippus. In the first battle after his arrival, the Athenians were victorious, and slew some few Syracusans, amongst whom was the Corinthian Gongylus, but on the following day Gylippus displayed the qualities of a true general. He used the same arms, horses, and ground as before, but he dealt with them so differently that he defeated the Athenians. Checking the Syracusans, who wished to chase them back to their camp, he ordered them to use the stones and timber which had been collected by the Athenians, to build a counter-wall, reaching beyond [Pg 24]the line of circumvallation, so that the Athenians could no longer hope to surround the city. And now the Syracusans, taking fresh courage, began to man their ships of war, and to cut off the stragglers with their cavalry. Gylippus personally visited many of the Greek cities in Sicily, all of whom eagerly promised their aid, and furnished him with troops; so that Nikias, perceiving that he was losing ground, relapsed into his former desponding condition, and wrote a despatch to Athens, bidding the people either send out another armament, or let the one now in Sicily return to Athens, and especially beseeching them to relieve him from his command, for which he was incapacitated by disease.

XX. The Athenians had long before proposed to send out a reinforcement to the army in Sicily, but as all had gone on prosperously, the enemies of Nikias had contrived to put it off. Now, however, they were eager to send him assistance. It was arranged that Demosthenes should employ himself actively in getting ready a large force, to go to reinforce Nikias in the early spring, while Eurymedon, although it was winter, started immediately with a supply of money, and with a decree naming Euthydemus and Menander, officers already serving in his army, to be joint commanders along with him. Meanwhile, Nikias was suddenly attacked by the Syracusans both by sea and land. His ships were at first thrown into confusion, but rallied and sank many of the enemy, or forced them to run on shore; but on land Gylippus managed at the same time to surprise the fort of Plemmyrium, where there was a magazine of naval stores and war material of all kinds. A considerable number of the garrison, also, were either slain or taken prisoners; but the most serious result was the stoppage of Nikias's supplies, which heretofore had been easily and quickly brought through the Great Harbour, while it remained in the hands of the Athenians, but which now could not reach his camp by sea without a convoy and a battle.[2] Moreover, the Syracusan fleet had not been defeated by any superiority of force of the [Pg 25]Athenians, but by the disorder into which it had been thrown by pursuing the enemy. They therefore determined to renew the conflict with better success.

Nikias, on his part, was unwilling to fight a second time, thinking it was folly to fight with a diminished and disheartened force when he knew that Demosthenes was hurrying to his aid with a large and unbroken armament. However, Menander and Euthydemus, the newly-elected generals, were eager to distinguish themselves by performing some brilliant action before the arrival of Demosthenes, and to eclipse the fame of Nikias himself. The pretext they used was the glory of Athens, which they said would be dishonoured for ever if they should now appear afraid to accept the Syracusans' offer of battle. The battle was fought: and the Athenian left wing, we are told by Thucydides, was utterly defeated by the skilful tactics of the Corinthian steersman Aristion. Many Athenians perished, and Nikias was greatly disheartened, for he had now proved unfortunate both when sole commander and when acting with colleagues.

XXI. Matters were in this posture when Demosthenes was descried in the offing, approaching with a splendid armament which struck terror into the hearts of the enemy. His fleet consisted of seventy-three ships, on board of which were five thousand heavy-armed troops, and three thousand javelin men, archers, and slingers. The glittering arms of the troops, the flaunting banners of the ships of war, and the music of the flutes to which the rowers kept time with their oars, made a gallant display, which delighted the Athenians as much as it depressed the Syracusans. These latter, indeed, were struck with dismay, and thought that their last victory had been won in vain, and that they were labouring to no purpose against a foe whose ranks were continually reinforced.

Nikias was not long allowed to feast his eyes on this welcome spectacle undisturbed. Demosthenes, as soon as he landed, insisted on the necessity of instantly attacking Syracuse, and putting an end to the siege, either by capturing the place, or by returning at once to Athens in case of failure. Against this Nikias, who was alarmed at the idea of such vigorous action, urged that it would be [Pg 26]unwise to run such a risk. Delay, he argued, favoured the besiegers more than the besieged, as their resources must soon fail, in which case their allies would desert them and they would again be brought to the necessity of capitulating. Nikias adopted this view because of what he heard from his secret correspondents within the city, who urged him to continue the siege, telling him that already the Syracusans began to feel the war too great a burden for them to support, and that Gylippus was very unpopular among them, so that in a short time they would utterly refuse to hold out any longer, and would come to terms with the Athenians. Nikias could only hint at these secret sources of information, and so his counsels were thought by his colleagues to be mere cowardice. They declared loudly that the original mistake was about to be repeated, and the first terror-stricken impression of the armament frittered away, until familiarity with the sight of it had bred contempt in the breasts of their enemies. They therefore eagerly seconded the proposal of Demosthenes, and forced Nikias, though sorely against his will, to yield to their representations. Accordingly, Demosthenes with the land force assaulted the outlying fort on the high ground of Epipolæ by night, and took it by surprise, killing part of its garrison and putting the remainder to flight. He did not halt there, but followed up his success by marching further on towards the city, until he was met by some Bœotian heavy-armed troops, who had been the first to rally, and now in a compact mass met the Athenians with their spears levelled, and with loud shouts forced them to give way with severe loss. The whole Athenian army was by this thrown into confusion and panic, as the fugitives broke the formation of those troops who were still marching to the front, so that in some cases they actually fought with one another, each believing the others to be enemies. Thus the Athenians fell into sad disorder and ruin; for they were unable to distinguish friends from foes in the uncertain light, as the moon, now nearly setting, glanced upon spear-points and armour without showing them clearly enough to enable men to see with whom they had to deal. The moon was behind the backs of the Athenians: and this circumstance was greatly [Pg 27]against them, for it made it hard for them to see the numbers of their own friends, but shone plainly on the glittering shields of their antagonists, making them look taller and more terrible than they were. Finally, attacked as they were on every side, they gave way and fled. Some were slain by the enemy, some by their own countrymen, and some were dashed to pieces by falling down the precipices; while the rest, as they straggled about the country, were cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Two thousand men perished, and of the survivors few brought back their arms.

XXII. Nikias, who had expected this reverse, now cast the blame of it upon Demosthenes; and he, admitting his error, besought Nikias to embark his army and sail away as quickly as possible, pointing out that no further reinforcement could be hoped for, and that they could not hope for success with the force now at their disposal. Even had they been victorious, he argued, they had intended to leave their present camp, which was unhealthy at all times, and was now in the hot season becoming pestilential. The time was the beginning of autumn, and many of the Athenians were sick, while all were disheartened. Nikias, however, opposed the idea of retreat, not because he did not fear the Syracusans, but because he feared the Athenians more, and the treatment which as an unsuccessful general he would probably meet with. He declared that he saw no reason for alarm, and that even if there was, that he would rather perish by the hands of the enemy than those of his countrymen. A very different sentiment to that which was afterwards uttered by Leon the Byzantine, who said, "My countrymen, I had rather be put to death by you than to be put to death together with you."

With regard to the place to which it would be best for them to remove their camp, that, Nikias said, was a question which they might take time to discuss.

Demosthenes, seeing that Nikias was thus obstinate, and conscious that his own project, when adopted, had led to a frightful disaster, ceased pressing him to raise the siege, and gave the other generals to understand that Nikias must have secret reasons, from his correspondents [Pg 28]within the city, which led him to persevere thus obstinately in remaining where he was. This caused them also to withdraw their objections to remaining; but when another army came to assist the Syracusans, and the Athenians began to perish from malaria, even Nikias himself agreed that it was time to retreat, and issued orders to his men to hold themselves in readiness to embark.

XXIII. When all was ready, and the enemy off their guard, as they did not expect the Athenians to retreat, an eclipse of the moon took place, which greatly terrified Nikias and some others who, from ignorance or superstition, were in the habit of taking account of such phenomena. That the sun should be sometimes eclipsed even the vulgar understood to be in some way due to the moon intercepting its light: but what body could intercept the moon's light, so that suddenly the full moon should pale its light and alter its colour, they could not explain, but thought that it was a sinister omen and portended some great calamity.

The treatise of Anaxagoras, the first writer who has clearly and boldly explained the phases and eclipses of the moon, was then known only to a few, and had not the credit of antiquity, while even those who understood it were afraid to mention it to their most trusted friends. Men at that time could not endure natural philosophers and those whom they called in derision stargazers, but accused them of degrading the movements of the heavenly bodies by attributing them to necessary physical causes. They drove Protagoras into exile, and cast Anaxagoras into prison, from whence he was with difficulty rescued by Perikles; while Sokrates, who never took any part in these speculations, was nevertheless put to death because he was a philosopher. It was not until after the period of which I am writing that the glorious works of Plato shed their light upon mankind, proving that Nature obeys a higher and divine law, and removing the reproach of impiety which used to attach to those who study these matters, so that all men might thereafter investigate natural phenomena unreproved. Indeed, Plato's companion Dion, although the moon was eclipsed when he was starting from the island of Zakynthus to attack the despot Dionysius, was not in the least disturbed by the omen, but sailed to [Pg 29]Syracuse and drove out the despot. Nikias at this time was without a competent soothsayer, for his intimate friend, Stilbides, who used to check a great deal of his superstition, died shortly before this. Indeed, the omen, if rightly explained, as Philochorus points out, is not a bad one but a very good one for men who are meditating a retreat; for what men are forced to do by fear, requires darkness to conceal it, and light is inimical to them. Moreover men were only wont to wait three days after an eclipse of the moon, or of the sun, as we learn from Autokleides in his book on divination; but Nikias persuaded them to wait for another complete circuit of the moon, because its face would not shine upon them propitiously before that time after its defilement with the gross earthy particles which had intercepted its rays.[3] XXIV. Nikias now put all business aside, and kept offering sacrifices and taking omens, until the enemy attacked him. Their infantry assailed the camp and siege works, while their fleet surrounded the harbour, not in ships of war; but the very boys and children embarked in what boats they could find and jeered at the Athenians, challenging them to come out and fight. One of these boys, named Herakleides, the son of noble parents, ventured too far, and was captured by an Athenian ship. His uncle Pollichus, fearing for his safety, at once advanced with ten triremes which were under his command; and this movement brought forward the rest of the Syracusan fleet to support him. An obstinate battle now took place, in which the Syracusans were victorious, and many of the Athenians perished, amongst whom was their admiral Eurymedon. And now the Athenians refused to remain before Syracuse any longer, and called upon their generals to lead them away by land, for the Syracusans after their victory had at once blockaded the entrance to the harbour, so that no passage was left. Nikias and the other generals refused to agree to this proposal, as they thought it would be a pity to abandon a fleet of so many transports, and nearly two hundred ships of war. They placed the flower of the land force on board the ships, with the best of the slingers and darters, and manned one hundred and ten triremes, for they had not sufficient oars for a larger [Pg 30]number. Nikias now abandoned the great camp and walls of investment, which reached as far as the temple of Herakles, and drew the army up on the beach as spectators of the battle. Thus the Syracusan priests and generals were able for the first time since the siege began to sacrifice to Herakles, as they were wont to do, while the people were manning their fleet.

XXV. The Syracusan soothsayers promised them the victory if they awaited attack and did not begin the attack: for Herakles himself never struck the first blow, but always waited for his enemies to attack him. The sea-fight which now took place was the fiercest and most obstinately contested of all those which took place throughout the war, and its varying fortunes were shared with agonizing interest by the Athenian army and the citizens on the walls of Syracuse, who were able from their respective positions to overlook the whole battle and watch the manœuvres of each ship. The Athenians were placed at a great disadvantage by having all their ships collected into one mass, where they were attacked from all sides by the lighter and more manageable vessels of the enemy. The Syracusans also used stones as missiles, which strike with equal effect, however they are thrown, while the Athenians replied with volleys of arrows and javelins, whose aim was often spoiled by the motion of the vessels, and which are useless unless they fly with the point foremost. All these details had been foreseen and taught to the Syracusans by Aristion the Corinthian steersman, who fell in the moment of victory. The Athenians were finally routed and driven ashore with great slaughter, and their retreat by sea completely cut off. Knowing how difficult it would be to make their way to any place of safety by land, they allowed themselves to be so paralyzed by despair, that they let the Syracusans tow away their ships as prizes, without making an effort to save them, and actually neglected to ask for a truce for the burial of their dead. They seemed to think that the case of the sick and wounded whom they saw amongst them, and whom they must perforce abandon when they left their camp, was even more pitiable than that of the floating corpses, and they actually envied the lot of the slain, knowing well that after a few more days [Pg 31]of suffering they themselves were all destined to share their fate.

XXVI. They were all eager to depart during the night which followed this disastrous day; but Gylippus, perceiving that the people of Syracuse were so given up to feasting and merry-making, celebrating both their victory and the festival of their national hero Herakles, to whom the day was sacred, that they could not be either forced or persuaded into attempting to harass the enemy's retreat, sent some of those men who had formerly been in correspondence with Nikias to tell him not to attempt to retreat that night, as all the roads were occupied by Syracusans lying in wait to attack him. Deceived by this intelligence, Nikias waited to find what he feared in the night turned into a reality on the following day. At daybreak the passes were occupied by the Syracusans, who also threw up entrenchments at all the places where rivers had to be forded, and broke all the bridges, stationing their cavalry upon the level ground, so that the Athenians could not advance a step without fighting. The Athenians remained for all that day and the following night in their camp, and then set out, with such weeping and lamentation that it seemed rather as if they were leaving their native country than a hostile one, so distressed were they to see the miseries of their friends and relatives, and of the sick and wounded who were unable to accompany their march and had to be left to their fate, while they themselves had a presentiment that their present sufferings were nothing in comparison with those which awaited them. Among all these piteous sights, Nikias himself offered a glorious example. Worn out by disease, compelled by the exigencies of the retreat to forego the medicines and treatment which his condition required, he nevertheless, weak as he was, did more than many strong men could do, while all his men knew well that he made those efforts, not from any wish or hope to save his own life, but that it was solely on their behalf that he did not give way to despair. The tears and lamentations of the rest were prompted by their own private sorrows and fears, but the only grief shown by Nikias was that so splendid an expedition should have ended in such miserable failure. Those who watched his noble bearing [Pg 32]and remembered how earnestly he had opposed the whole scheme, were filled with compassion for his undeserved sufferings. They began to despair of the favour of Heaven being shown to themselves, when they reflected that this man, careful as he had always been to perform every religious duty, was now no better off than the humblest or the most wicked soldier in his army.

XXVII. Nikias made heroic efforts by cheerful looks, encouraging speeches, and personal appeals to his followers, to show himself superior to fortune. Throughout the retreat, although for eight days in succession he was constantly harassed by the attacks of the enemy, he nevertheless kept the division under his command unbroken and undefeated, until the other part of the army under Demosthenes was forced to surrender, being completely surrounded in an enclosed olive-ground, the property of Polyzelus, brother of the despot Gelon. Demosthenes himself drew his sword and stabbed himself, but not mortally, for the Syracusans quickly interposed and forced him to desist. When the Syracusans told Nikias of this disaster, and allowed him to send horsemen to convince him of its truth, he proposed terms to Gylippus, which were that the Athenians should be allowed to leave Sicily, on condition of the repayment of the whole expenses of the war, for which he offered to give hostages. These terms were refused, and the enemy with insulting cries and threats proceeded to shoot with missiles of all kinds at the Athenians, who were now completely without food or drink. Yet Nikias prevailed upon them to hold out during that night, and on the following day he led them, still under fire from the enemy, across the plain leading to the river Asinarus. There some were forced into the stream by the enemy, while others cast themselves in to quench their thirst. A most dreadful slaughter now took place, the Athenians being wild with thirst, and the Syracusans killing them as they drank, until Nikias surrendered himself to Gylippus, saying, "I beseech you, now that you are victorious, to show some mercy, not to me, but to the Athenian troops. Consider how changeful is the fortune of war, and how gently the Athenians dealt with your men in their hour of victory."

Gylippus was visibly affected by the words, and by the [Pg 33]sight of Nikias; for he knew how well the Spartan prisoners had been treated by him, when the peace was made with Athens; moreover, he thought that it would be a great honour to him if he could carry home the enemy's commander-in-chief as a prisoner. He received Nikias with kindness, and gave orders to take the rest of the Athenians alive. It was long, however, before these orders were understood and obeyed, so that more Athenians were slain than survived, although many were spared by the Syracusans in order that they might be sold for slaves.

The prisoners were now assembled together, and their arms and armour hung upon the trees by the river side, as a trophy of the victory. The victors next crowned themselves with garlands, decorated their horses, cut off the manes and tails of the captured horses, and marched back into their own city, having by their courage and skill won the most complete victory ever gained by one Greek state over another.

XXVIII. At a public assembly of the Syracusans and their allies which was shortly afterwards held, the orator Eurykles proposed that the day on which Nikias was taken should be kept as a festival for ever, upon which no work should be done, and sacrifice should be offered to the gods, and that the feast should be called the Asinaria, from the name of the river where the victory was won. The day was the twenty-sixth of the Dorian month Karneius, which the Athenians call Metageitnion (September 21st). Furthermore, he proposed that the Athenian slaves and allies should be sold, that the Athenians themselves, with what native Sicilians had joined them, should be confined in the stone quarries within the city of Syracuse, and that their generals should be put to death.

These propositions wore accepted by the Syracusans, who treated Hermokrates with contempt when he urged that to be merciful in victory would be more honourable to them than the victory itself. Gylippus too, when he begged that he might carry the Athenian generals alive to Sparta, was shamefully insulted by the excited Syracusans, who had long disliked the irritating Spartan airs of superiority natural to Gylippus, and now, flushed with victory, no longer cared to conceal their feelings. Timæus [Pg 34]tells us that they accused him of avarice and peculation, a hereditary vice, it appears, in his family since his father Kleandrides was banished from Sparta for taking bribes, while he himself afterwards stole thirty of the hundred talents which Lysander sent home to Sparta, and hid them under the roof of his house, but was informed against, and exiled in disgrace. This will be found described at greater length in the Life of Lysander.

In his account of the death of Nikias and Demosthenes, Timæus does not exactly follow the narrative of Thucydides and Philistus, as he informs us that while the assembly was still sitting, Hermokrates sent to their prison to inform them that they were condemned to death, and to afford them the means of dying by their own hands, while the other historians state that the Syracusans put them to death.[4] Be this as it may, their dead bodies were exposed before the gates of Syracuse as a spectacle for the citizens. I have heard also that at the present day a shield is shown in one of the temples at Syracuse, which is said to be that of Nikias, and which is beautifully adorned with woven coverings of purple and gold.

XXIX. Of the Athenians, the most part perished in the stone quarries of disease and insufficient food, for they received only a pint of barley-meal and half-a-pint of water each day. Not a few, however, were sold into slavery, being stolen for that purpose by Syracusans, or having escaped disguised as slaves. The rest were at length branded upon their foreheads with the figure of a horse, and sold into slavery. Yet even in this extremity their well-bred and dignified behaviour came to their aid; for they soon either obtained their freedom, or gained the confidence and respect of their masters. Some gained their freedom by their knowledge of Euripides. It appears that the dramas of Euripides were especially popular in Sicily, but that only a few fragments of his works had hitherto reached the Greek cities in that island. We are told that many of these captives on their return to Athens affec[Pg 35]tionately embraced Euripides, and told him how some of them had been sold into slavery, but had been set free after they had taught their masters as much of his poetry as they could remember, while others, when wandering about the country as fugitives after the battle, had obtained food and drink by reciting passages from his plays. We need not then wonder at the tale of the people of Kaunus, who, when a ship pursued by pirates was making for their harbour at first refused to admit it, but afterwards enquired whether any on board knew the plays of Euripides; and on hearing that they did, allowed them to enter the harbour and save themselves.

XXX. At Athens the news of the catastrophe was at first disbelieved, because of the unsatisfactory way in which it reached the city. A stranger, it is said, disembarked at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop, and began to converse about what had happened as upon a theme which must be uppermost in every man's mind. The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons, and to the public in the market-place. All were shocked and astonished at hearing this, and the archons immediately convoked the public assembly, and brought the barber before it. When he was asked to explain from whom he had heard this intelligence, as he could give no satisfactory account, he was regarded as a disturber of the public tranquillity by fabricating idle tales, and was even put to the torture. Soon, however, men arrived who confirmed his tale, and described all the details of the catastrophe as far as they had witnessed them. Then at last the countrymen of Nikias believed, after his death, what he had so often foretold to them during his life.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] In North Africa, the modern oasis of Siwah.

[2] Plemmyrium on one side, and the city of Syracuse on the other, command the entrance of the gulf known as the Great Harbour, inside of which lay the Athenian fleet and camp.

[3] Grote.

[4] Grote, Part II. ch. lx, points out that there is no real contradiction between the statement cited from Timæus, and the accounts gives of the transaction by Thucydides and Philistus.


[Pg 36]

LIFE OF CRASSUS.

I. Marcus Crassus[5] was the son of a father who had been censor, and enjoyed a triumph; but he was brought up with his two brothers in a small house. His brothers were married in the lifetime of their parents, and all had a common table, which seems to have been the chief reason that Crassus was a temperate and moderate man in his way of living. Upon the death of one of his brothers, Crassus married the widow,[6] and she became the mother of his children; for in these matters also he lived as regular a life as any Roman. However, as he grew older, he was charged with criminal intercourse with Licinia,[7] one of the [Pg 37]Vestal Virgins, who was brought to trial; the prosecutor was one Plotinus. Licinia had a pleasant estate in the suburbs, which Crassus wished to get at a small price, and with this view he was continually about the woman and paying his court to her, which brought on him the suspicion of a criminal intercourse; but he was acquitted by the judices, being indebted in some degree to his love of money for his acquittal from the charge of debauching the vestal. But he never remitted his attentions to Licinia till he got possession of the property.

II. Now, the Romans say that the many good qualities of Crassus were obscured by one vice, avarice; but the fact appears to be that one vice, which was more predominant in his character than all the rest hid his other vices. They allege, as the chief proof of his avarice, the mode in which he got his money and the amount of his property. Though he did not at first possess above three hundred talents, and during his first consulship he dedicated the tenth part of his property to Hercules,[8] and feasted the people, and gave every Roman out of his own means enough to maintain him for three months; yet, before the Parthian expedition, upon making an estimate of his property, he found it amount to seven thousand one hundred talents. The greatest part of this, if one must tell the truth, though it be a scandalous story, he got together out of the fire and the war, making the public misfortunes the source of his wealth; for, when Sulla took the city, and sold the property of those whom he put to death, considering it and calling it spoil, and wishing to attach the infamy of the deed to as many of the most powerful men as he could, Crassus was never tired of receiving or buying. Besides this, observing the accidents that were indigenous and familiar at Rome, conflagrations, and tumbling down of houses owing to their [Pg 38]weight and crowded state, he bought slaves, who were architects and builders. Having got these slaves to the number of more than five hundred, it was his practice to buy up houses on fire, and the houses which were adjoining to those on fire; for the owners, owing to fear and uncertainty, would sell them at a low price; and thus the greatest part of Rome fell into the hands of Crassus: but, though he had so many artizans, he built no house except his own; for he used to say that those who were fond of building were ruined by themselves, without the aid of any opponent. Though he had many silver mines, and much valuable land, and many labourers on it, still one would suppose that all this was of little value, compared with the value of his slaves: so many excellent slaves he possessed,—readers, clerks, assayers of silver,[9] house-managers, and table-servants; and he himself superintended their education, and paid attention to it and taught them, and, in short, he considered that a master was mainly concerned in looking after his slaves, who were the living implements of domestic economy. And here Crassus was right, if, as he used to say, it was his opinion that he ought to effect everything by the instrumentality of slaves, and that he himself should direct the slaves; for, we observe, that what is economical with respect to things lifeless is political with respect to men. But he was not right in thinking and saying that nobody was rich who could not maintain an army out of his substance; for war feeds not by a fixed allowance, according to Archidamus;[10] and, consequently, the wealth that is required for war is unlimited; and this opinion of Crassus was very different from the opinion of Marius; for when Marius, after giving to each man fourteen jugera of land, found that they wanted more, he said, "May there never be a Roman who thinks that too little which is enough to maintain him."

[Pg 39]III. Besides this, Crassus was hospitable to strangers, for his house was open to all, and he used to lend money to his friends without interest; but he would demand it back immediately on the expiration of the time of the borrower, which made the gratuitous loan more burdensome than heavy interest. In his entertainments the invitation was usually to persons of the plebeian class, and general: and the frugality of the banquet, which was accompanied with neatness and a friendly welcome, made it more agreeable than a sumptuous feast. In his literary pursuits he mainly studied oratory,[11] and that kind which was of practical use; and, having attained an ability in speaking equal to the first among the Romans, he surpassed in care and labour those who had the greatest talents; for they say, there was no case, however mean and contemptible, which he approached without preparation; and often, when Pompeius, and Cæsar, and Cicero, were unwilling to get up to speak, he would perform all the duties of an advocate: and for this reason he became more popular, being considered a careful man, and always ready to give his help. He pleased people, also, by his friendly and affable manner in taking them by the hand, and addressing them; for Crassus never met a Roman, however low and humble his condition might be, without returning his salute,[12] and addressing him by his name. He is also said to have been well versed in history, and to [Pg 40]have paid some attention to philosophy by studying the writings of Aristoteles, in which he had for his teacher Alexander, a man who gave a proof of his moderation and easy temper in his intercourse with Crassus; for it was not easy to say whether he was poorer when he became acquainted with Crassus, or after the acquaintance was made. He was, indeed, the only friend of Crassus, who always accompanied him when he travelled abroad; and he used to wear a cloak,[13] lent him for the purpose, which on his return he was asked to give back. Oh, the submission[14] of the man! for the poor fellow did not consider poverty among the things that are indifferent. But this belongs to a later period.

IV. When Marius and Cinna had got the upper hand, and it was soon apparent that they would reinstate themselves in Rome, not for the benefit of their country, but plainly for the destruction and ruin of the nobles, those who were caught in the city were put to death: among whom were the father and brother of Crassus. Crassus, being very young, escaped immediate danger; but, seeing that he was hemmed in on all sides, and hunted by the tyrants, he took with him three friends and ten slaves; and, using wonderful expedition, made his escape to Iberia, having been there before, when his father was Prætor,[15] and having made himself friends. Finding all in [Pg 41]great alarm and trembling at the cruelty of Marius, as if he were close at hand, he did not venture to make himself known, but sought refuge in a tract bordering on the sea, belonging to Vibius Pacianus,[16] where he hid himself in a large cave. He sent a slave to Vibius to sound his disposition; for the provisions that Crassus brought with him were now exhausted. On hearing the news, Vibius was pleased that Crassus had escaped; and inquiring about the number of persons with him, and where the place was, he did not go himself to see them, but he took his villicus near the spot, and ordered him to have food daily prepared, and to carry it and place it near the rock, and to go away without speaking a word, and not to be curious about the matter, or make any inquiries; and he gave him notice, that if he did meddle at all he should be put to death, but if he faithfully helped in the matter he should have his freedom. The cave is not far from the sea, and the precipices which shut it in leave a small and hardly perceptible path[17] which leads into the cave; but when you have entered, it opens to a wonderful height, and spreads out wide, with recesses which open into one another, and are of a large circuit. It is also neither without water nor light: for a spring of the purest water oozes out at the base of the precipice; and there are [Pg 42]natural clefts about that part where the rock closes, by which the external light is admitted, and in the daytime the spot is fully illuminated. The air within is free from all moisture caused by dropping, and is quite pure, owing to the compactness of the rock, which diverts all the wet and droppings to the spring.

V. While Crassus stayed in the cave, the slave came daily to bring provisions; but he did not see the persons who were concealed, or know who they were; though he was seen by them, inasmuch as they knew, and watched the times of his coming. Now, the provision that was made for their meals was ample enough even for luxury, and not merely sufficient for their necessities. But Vibius determined to show Crassus every kind of friendly attention; and it occurred to him to consider the youth of Crassus, that he was a very young man, and that provision should be made in some degree also for the pleasures suitable to his age, and that merely to supply his wants would argue that he was serving Crassus as little as he could, rather than with hearty zeal; accordingly, he took with him two handsome female slaves, and went down to the sea-coast. When he came to the place, he pointed to the road that led up to it, and told them to go in boldly. Crassus, seeing them approach, was afraid that the spot was known, and had been discovered; and, accordingly, he asked them what they wanted, and who they were. The women replied, as they had been instructed, that they were looking for their master, who was concealed there; on which Crassus perceived the joke which Vibius was playing off upon him, and his kind attentions, and received the women; and they stayed with him for the rest of the time, telling and reporting to Vibius what he requested them. Fenestella[18] says, that he saw one of these slaves when she was an old woman, and that he had often heard her mention this, and tell the story with pleasure.

VI. In this way Crassus spent eight months in conceal[Pg 43]ment; but as soon as he heard of Cinna's end, he showed himself, and out of the numbers that flocked to him he selected two thousand five hundred, with whom he went round to the cities; and one city, Malaca,[19] he plundered, according to the testimony of many authors, though they say that he denied the fact, and contradicted those who affirmed it. After this he got together some vessels, and crossed over to Libya, to Metellus Pius,[20] a man of reputation who had collected a force by no means contemptible. But he stayed no long time there; for he quarrelled with Metellus, and then set out to join Sulla, by whom he was treated with particular respect. When Sulla had passed over the sea to Italy, he wished all the young men who were with him to aid him actively, and he appointed them to different duties. Crassus, on being sent into the country of the Marsi to raise troops, asked for a guard, because the road lay through a tract which was occupied by the enemy; Sulla replied to him in passion and with vehemence, "I give thee as guards thy father, thy brother, thy friends, thy kinsmen, who were cut off illegally and wrongfully, and whose murderers I am now pursuing." Stung by these words, and pricked on to the undertaking, Crassus immediately set out, and, vigorously making his way through the enemy, he got together a strong force, and showed himself active in the battles of Sulla. The events of that war, it is said, first excited him to rivalry and competition with Pompeius for distinction. Pompeius was younger than Crassus, and his father had a bad repute at Rome, and had been bitterly hated by the citizens; but still Pompeius shone conspicuous in the events of that period and proved himself to be a great man, so that Sulla showed him marks of respect which he did not very often show to others of more advanced years [Pg 44]and of his own rank, by rising from his seat when Pompeius approached, and uncovering his head, and addressing him by the title of Imperator. All this set Crassus in a flame, and goaded him, inasmuch as he was thus slighted in comparison with Pompeius; and with good reason; Crassus was deficient in experience, and the credit that he got by his military exploits was lost by his innate vices,—love of gain and meanness; for, upon taking Tudertia,[21] a city of the Umbri, it was suspected that he appropriated to himself most of the spoil, and this was made a matter of charge against him to Sulla. However, in the battle near Rome,[22] which was the greatest in all the war, and the last, Sulla was defeated, the soldiers under his command being put to flight, and some of them trampled down in the pursuit: Crassus, who commanded the right wing, was victorious, and, after continuing the pursuit till nightfall, he sent to Sulla to ask for something for his soldiers to eat, and to report his success. But, during the proscriptions and confiscations, on the other hand, he got a bad name, by buying at low prices large properties, and asking for grants. It is said that, in the country of the Bruttii, he also proscribed a person, not pursuant to Sulla's orders, but merely to enrich himself thereby, and that, on this account, Sulla, who disapproved of his conduct, never employed him again in any public business. However, Crassus was most expert in gaining over everybody by flattery; and, on the other hand, he was easily taken in by flattery from any person. It is further mentioned as a peculiarity in his character, that, though very greedy of gain,[23] he hated and abused those most who were like himself.

VII. But Crassus was most annoyed at the military success of Pompeius, and his enjoying a triumph before he became a senator, and being called by the citizens Magnus, which means Great. On one occasion, when somebody observed that Pompeius the Great was approach[Pg 45]ing, Crassus smiled, and asked, How great he was? But, as Crassus despaired of equalling Pompeius in military reputation, he entered upon a political career, and, by his activity, by pleading in the courts, and lending money, and by canvassing for candidates, and subjecting himself to all kinds of scrutiny in conjunction with those who wanted anything of the people, he acquired a power and reputation equal to what Pompeius had got by his many and great military services. And the result to each of them was something unusual; for, when Pompeius was absent from Rome, his name and his influence in the State, by reason of his military exploits, was superior to that of Crassus; but when Pompeius was at Rome, he often fell short of Crassus in influence, for his haughty temper and habitual pride made him avoid crowds and retire from the Forum, and seldom give his aid to those who sought it, and then not readily; his object being to keep his power at a higher pitch, by exercising it only on his own behalf. But Crassus was always ready to make himself useful, and he did not keep himself retired, nor was he difficult of access, but he was always busy in everything that was going on, and by the general kindness of his behaviour he got the advantage over the proud bearing of Pompeius. In personal dignity, in persuasive speech, and attractive expression of countenance it is said they were both equally fortunate. However, this rivalry did not hurry Crassus into any personal enmity or ill-will, and though, he was annoyed at Pompeius and Cæsar receiving greater honour than himself, he never allowed this jealous feeling to be associated with any hostility or ill disposition. It is true that when Cæsar was taken and detained by the pirates, he cried out, "What pleasure you will have, Crassus, when you hear of my capture!" But afterwards, at least, they were on friendly terms, and, when Cæsar was going to Iberia, as prætor,[24] and had no money in consequence of his creditors having come upon him and seizing all his outfit, Crassus did not leave him in this difficulty, but got him released, by becoming security for him to the amount of eight hundred and thirty talents. When all Rome became [Pg 46]divided into three parties,—that of Pompeius, Cæsar and Crassus,—(for Cato[25] had more reputation than power, and was more admired than followed), the sober and conservative part of the citizens adhered to Pompeius; the violent and those who were lightly moved, were led by the hopes that they had from Cæsar; Crassus, by keeping a middle position, used both parties for his purposes, and, as he very often changed in his political views, he was neither a firm friend nor an irreconcilable enemy, but he would readily give up either his friendship or his enmity on calculation of interest; so that within a short interval, he often came forward to speak both for and against the same men and the same measures. He had also great influence, both because he was liked and feared, but mainly because he was feared. Accordingly Sicinius,[26] who was the most violent in his attacks on the magistrates and popular leaders of the day, in reply to one who asked, "Why Crassus was the only person whom he did not worry, and why he let him alone?" said, "That he had hay on his horn:" now, the Romans were accustomed to tie some hay round the horn of an ox that butted, as a warning to those who might meet it.

VIII. The insurrection of the gladiators and their devastation of Italy, which is generally called the war of Spartacus,[27] originated as follows:—One Lentulus Batiates kept gladiators in Capua, of whom the majority, who were Gauls and Thracians, had been closely confined, not for [Pg 47]any misbehaviour on their part, but through the villainy of their purchaser, for the purpose of fighting in the games. Two hundred of these resolved to make their escape; but their design being betrayed, those who had notice of the discovery, and succeeded in getting away, to the number of seventy-eight, took knives and spits out of a cook's shop, and sallied out. Meeting on the way with some waggons that were conveying gladiators' arms to another city, they plundered the waggons, and armed themselves. Seizing on a strong position, they chose three leaders, of whom the first was Spartacus, a Thracian of nomadic race, a man not only of great courage and strength, but, in judgment and mildness of character, superior to his condition, and more like a Greek than one would expect from his nation. They say that when Spartacus was first taken to Rome to be sold, a snake was seen folded over his face while he was sleeping, and a woman, of the same tribe with Spartacus, who was skilled in divination, and possessed by the mysterious rites of Dionysus, declared that this was a sign of a great and formidable power which would attend him to a happy termination. This woman was at that time cohabiting with Spartacus, and she made her escape with him.

IX. The gladiators began by repelling those who came against them from Capua and getting a stock of military weapons, for which they gladly exchanged their gladiators' arms, which they threw away as a badge of dishonour, and as barbaric. Clodius[28] the prætor was next sent against them from Rome, with three thousand men, and he blockaded them on a mountain which had only one ascent, and that was difficult and narrow, and Clodius had possession of it; on all other sides there were steep smooth-faced precipices. On the top of the hill there grew a great quantity of wild vines, and the men of Spartacus cutting off all the shoots that were adapted to their purpose, and, intertwining them, made strong and long ladders, so [Pg 48]that when fastened above, they reached along the face of the precipice to the level ground, and they all safely descended by them except one man, who stayed to take care of the arms; and, when all the rest had descended, he let the arms down, and, having done this, he got down safe himself. The Romans did not know what was going on; and accordingly, when the gladiators surrounded them, they were put in alarm by the surprise, and fled, on which the enemy took their camp. Many of the herdsmen and shepherds in those parts also joined the gladiators, men ever ready for a quarrel, and light of foot, some of whom the gladiators armed, and others they employed as scouts and light troops. Publius Barinus[29] the prætor was next sent against them, whose legatus, one Furius, at the head of two thousand soldiers, the gladiators engaged and put to flight. Cossinus was then despatched, with a large force, to advise with Barinus, and to be associated in the command; but Spartacus, watching his opportunity, while Cossinus was bathing at Salenæ,[30] was very near seizing him. Cossinus made his escape with great difficulty, and Spartacus, seizing the baggage, closely followed up the pursuit, with great slaughter of the Romans, and he took the camp. Cossinus also fell. Spartacus, after defeating the prætor himself in many other battles, and at last seizing his lictors and his horse, now became great and formidable: but still he formed a just judgment of the state of affairs and, not expecting to get the advantage over the power of the Romans, he designed to lead his forces to the Alps; thinking that it was advisable for them to cross the mountains and to go to their several homes, some to Thrace and some to Gaul. But the gladiators being strong in numbers, and confident, would not listen to him, and they went about ravaging Italy. The Senate were now no longer troubled merely at the humiliation and disgrace that they suffered by the revolt; but, moved by [Pg 49]fear and the danger, they sent out both the consuls[31] as to a war of the utmost difficulty and importance. Gellius, suddenly falling on the Germans, who, by reason of their arrogance and self-confidence, had separated from the troops of Spartacus, destroyed the whole body; and after Lentulus had hemmed in Spartacus with large armies, Spartacus, rushing upon them and joining battle, defeated the legates and got all the baggage. Spartacus now attempted to force his way towards the Alps; and Cassius[32] who "was the governor of Gaul upon the Padus, met him with ten thousand men, and a battle was fought, in which Cassius was defeated with great lose, and with difficulty made his escape.

X. The Senate, on receiving this news, angrily bade the consuls keep quiet, and they appointed Crassus to the command of the war, whose reputation and popularity induced many of the nobles to serve under him. Crassus took his station on the frontiers of Picenum, with the view of waiting for Spartacus, who was moving in that direction; and he sent Mummius, his legatus, at the head of two legions, to make a circuit, and with orders to follow the enemy, but not to engage with them, nor come to close quarters. But Mummius, as soon as he got what he thought a favourable opportunity, fought a battle, and was defeated; many of his men fell, and many, flying without their arms, made their escape. Crassus received Mummius himself roughly, and arming the soldiers again, he required of them security for their arms, that they would keep them; and five hundred, who had been the first to run, and had shown most cowardice, he distributed into [Pg 50]fifty decades,[33] and out of each decade he took one man, by lot, and put him to death; thus inflicting on the soldiers this ancient mode of punishment which had long fallen into disuse; for disgrace also is added to the manner of death, and many things horrible and dreadful to see accompany the punishment, in the presence of all the spectators. After inflicting this punishment, he made his men again face about and march against the enemy. Spartacus, however, avoided Crassus, and made his way through Lucania to the sea, and, falling in with some Cilician piratical vessels, in the Straits, he formed a design to seize Sicily, and by throwing two thousand men into the island, to kindle again the servile war there, the flames of which had not long since been quenched, and required only a few sparks to set it again in a blaze. The Cilicians[34] came to terms with Spartacus, and received his presents; but they deceived him, and sailed off. Under these circumstances, he marched back from the coast, and fixed his army in the peninsula of the Rhegine territory. Crassus now came up, and observing that the nature of the ground suggested what was to be done, he resolved to build a wall across the isthmus, for the purpose of keeping his soldiers employed, and cutting off the supplies of the enemy. Though the undertaking was great and difficult, he accomplished it, and completed the work, contrary to all expectation, in a short time, by digging a ditch[35] from sea to sea, through the neck of land, three hundred stadia in length, fifteen feet deep, and as many wide; and above the ditch he raised a rampart of surprising height and [Pg 51]strength. At first Spartacus paid no attention to what was going on, and treated it with contempt; but when forage began to fail, and he wanted to advance further into the interior, he discovered the lines of Crassus; and as there was nothing to be got in the peninsula, taking advantage of a night when there was a fall of snow and a wintry storm, he filled up a small part of the ditch with earth, and wood, and the branches of trees, and so carried over a third part of his army.

XI. Now Crassus was afraid that Spartacus might form a design to march against Rome; but he was encouraged by many of the followers of Spartacus quitting their leader, in consequence of some disputes, and encamping by themselves upon the banks of the lake Lucanis,[36] which they say is subject to changes, at certain intervals becoming sweet, and then again salt, and not potable. Crassus coming upon this band, drove them from the lake; but he was prevented from cutting them to pieces and pursuing them, by the sudden appearance of Spartacus, who checked the flight. Crassus had, before this, written to the Senate, to say that they ought to summon Lucullus[37] from Thrace, and Pompeius from Iberia; but he now changed his mind, and made every effort to put an end to the war before they [Pg 52]arrived, knowing that the success would be attributed to him who came last, and brought help, and not to himself. Accordingly, he determined to attack first those who had separated from the main body, and were carrying on the campaign by themselves, under the command of Caius Cannicius and Castus; and he dispatched six thousand men, with orders to occupy a certain hill, and keep themselves concealed. The men of Crassus endeavoured to escape notice by covering their helmets; but, being seen by two women, who were sacrificing for the enemy, they would have been in danger, if Crassus had not quickly appeared, and fought a battle, the most severely contested of all in this war, in which he destroyed twelve thousand three hundred men, of whom he found only two wounded in the back: all the rest died in the ranks, fighting against the Romans. After the defeat of this body, Spartacus retired to the mountains of Petilia,[38] followed by Quintius,[39] one of the generals of Crassus, and Scrofas, his quæstor, who hung close on his rear. But, upon Spartacus facing about, the Romans were thrown into disorderly flight, and made their escape, after having with difficulty rescued their quæstor, who was wounded. This success was the ruin of Spartacus, in consequence of the self-confidence which it infused into the slaves: they would not now consent to avoid a battle, nor yet would they obey their commanders, whom they surrounded, with arms in their hands, on the march, and compelled to lead them back through Lucania against the Romans, wherein they did the very thing that Crassus desired; for it was reported that Pompeius was now approaching, and there were not a few who openly said that the victory in this war belonged to him; for he would fight as soon as he arrived, and put an end to the campaign. While Crassus, therefore, who was eager to decide the affair by a battle, and to fix his camp near the enemy, was engaged in digging his trenches, [Pg 53]the slaves came up to them and attacked the men who were at work. As fresh men from both sides kept coming up to help their comrades, Spartacus, seeing that he must fight, arranged all his army in order of battle. When his horse was brought to him, he drew his sword and said, that if he won the battle he should have plenty of fine horses from the enemy, and if he was defeated he should not want one; upon which he killed his horse, and then he made his way towards Crassus himself, through many men, and inflicting many wounds; but he did not succeed in reaching Crassus, though he engaged with and killed two centurions. At last, after those about him had fled, he kept his ground, and, being surrounded by a great number, he fought till he was cut down. But, though Crassus had been successful, and had displayed the skill of a great general, and had exposed his person to danger, yet the credit of the victory did not escape being appropriated to Pompeius; for those who fled from the battle were destroyed by him, and Pompeius wrote to the Senate that Crassus had defeated the slaves in the open field, but he had cut up the war by the roots.[40] Now Pompeius had a splendid triumph for his victory over Sertorius and his exploits in Iberia; but Crassus did not venture to ask for the greater triumph; and even as to the foot triumph called the ovation, which he did enjoy, it was considered but a mean thing, and below his dignity that he had a triumph for a servile war. But how the ovation differs from the other triumph, and about the name, I have spoken in the 'Life of Marcellus.'[41] XII. After these events, Pompeius was forthwith in[Pg 54]vited to the consulship,[42] and, though Crassus had hopes of becoming his colleague, still he did not hesitate to solicit the assistance of Pompeius. Pompeius gladly listened to his proposal, for he was desirous in any way always to have Crassus his debtor for some obligation, and he actively exerted himself on behalf of Crassus; and finally he said, in his address to the public assembly, that he should feel no less grateful for the return of Crassus as his colleague than for his own election. They did not, however, continue in this harmony after entering on their office, but they differed on almost every subject, and quarrelled about everything, and by their disputes rendered their consulship unfruitful in all political measures, and ineffectual: however, Crassus made a great festival in honour of Hercules, and feasted the people at ten thousand tables, and gave them an allowance of corn for three months. It was at the close of their consulship, when Pompeius and Crassus happened to be addressing the public assembly, that a man, not of any distinction, a Roman eques, a rustic in his mode of life, and one who did not meddle with public affairs, Onatius Aurelius,[43] got up on the rostra, and, coming forward, told a dream which he had had. "Jupiter," he said, "appeared to me, and bade me tell the citizens not to let the consuls lay down their office before they have become friends." Upon the man saying this, and the assembly bidding the consuls be reconciled, Pompeius stood silent; but Crassus offering his right hand first, said, "Citizens, I do not consider that I am humbling myself or doing anything unworthy of me when I make the advance towards good-will and friendship to Pompeius, to whom you gave the name of Magnus before he had a beard, and voted a triumph before he was a senator."

XIII. These were the things worthy of commemoration in the consulship of Crassus. But his censorship[44] passed [Pg 55]over altogether without results, and without any active measures; for he neither revised the senate, nor inspected the equites, nor made a census of the citizens, though he had for his colleague Lutatius Catulus, the mildest of the Romans. But it is said that Crassus designed a shameful and violent measure, to make Egypt tributary to the Romans, and that Catulus opposed him vigorously, on which a difference arising between them, they voluntarily laid down their office. In the affair of Catiline,[45] which was a serious matter, and one that came near overthrowing Rome, some suspicion, it is true, attached to Crassus, and a man came forward to name him as implicated in the conspiracy, but nobody believed him. However, Cicero, in one of his orations, evidently imputed to Crassus and Cæsar participation in the plot; but this oration was not published till after the death of both of them. But in the oration on his consulship, Cicero says that Crassus came to him by night and brought a letter[46] which contained information on the affair of Catiline, as if his object was to establish the truth of the conspiracy. Now Crassus always hated Cicero for this, but his son stood in the way [Pg 56]of his doing Cicero any open injury. For Publius,[47] who was fond of oratory and of improving himself, was much attached to Cicero, and went so far as to change his dress when Cicero did at the time of his trial, and he induced the other young men to do the same. At last he prevailed upon his father, and reconciled him to Cicero.

XIV. When Cæsar returned from his province,[48] he made preparations to be a candidate for the consulship; but, observing that Crassus and Pompeius were again at enmity, he did not choose by applying to one of them for his help to have the other for his enemy, and he did not think that he could succeed if neither of them assisted him. Accordingly, he set about reconciling them, by continually urging upon them, and showing that by their attempts to ruin one another they would increase the power of the Ciceros, and Catuli, and Catos, who would lose all their influence if they would unite their friends and adherents, and so direct the administration with combined strength, and one purpose. By persuasion and effecting a reconciliation, he brought them together, and he formed out of the union of all three an irresistible power by which he put down the Roman senate and the people, though he did not make Pompeius and Crassus more powerful, one through the other, but by means of the two he made himself most powerful; for immediately on being supported by Pompeius and Crassus, he was elected consul by a great majority. While Cæsar was ably discharging the business of the consulship, Crassus and Pompeius, by procuring for him the command of armies, and by delivering Gaul into his hands, fixed him in a kind of acropolis, thinking that they should administer the rest of the State as they mutually agreed, after securing to Cæsar the authority which the lot had [Pg 57]given him. Now Pompeius did all this through unbounded love of power; but to the old vice of Crassus, his avarice, there was now added a new passion, ambition for trophies and triumphs excited by the great exploits of Cæsar, since it was in this alone that he was Cæsar's inferior; for he had the superiority in everything else; and his passion remitted not nor diminished till it resulted in an inglorious death and public misfortunes. Cæsar had come down from Gaul to the city of Luca, and many of the Romans went to him there, and Pompeius and Crassus had private conferences with him, in which they agreed to take affairs in hand more vigorously, and to hold the whole power of the State at their disposal, to which end Cæsar was to remain in his military command, and Pompeius and Crassus were to have other provinces and armies. To this object there was only one road, which was to ask for a second consulship, and Cæsar was to assist them in their canvass by writing to his friends and sending many of his soldiers to support them at the comitia.

XV. As soon as Crassus and Pompeius[49] returned to Rome, suspicion was excited, and there was much talk through the whole city that their meeting had been held for no good. In the Senate Marcellinus and Domitius asked Pompeius if he intended to be a candidate for the consulship, to which Pompeius replied that perhaps he should, and perhaps he should not; being asked again, he said that he was a candidate for the votes of the good citizens, but not a candidate for the votes of the bad. It was considered that Pompeius had made a haughty and arrogant answer; but Crassus said, in a more modest tone, that he would be a candidate, if it was for the interest of the State; if it was not, he would decline. This encouraged certain persons to become candidates, among [Pg 58]whom was Domitius. However, when Pompeius and Crassus had openly declared themselves candidates, the rest were afraid and withdrew; but Domitius was encouraged by Cato, who was his kinsman and friend, and stimulated and urged him to stick to his hopes, with the view of defending the common liberties; he said "it was not the consulship that Pompeius and Crassus wanted, but a tyranny; that their conduct showed they were not asking for the consulship, but aiming to seize on the provinces and the armies." By such arguments, which were also his real opinions, Cato, all but by force, brought Domitius to the Forum, and many sided with them. And those who were surprised at the canvassing of Pompeius and Crassus were no small number. "Why then do they want a second consulship? And why do they wish to be colleagues again? And why will they not have the consulship with other colleagues? There are many men among us who are surely not unworthy to be colleagues with Crassus and Pompeius." This alarmed the partizans of Pompeius, who now abstained from no proceeding, however disorderly and violent; but, in addition to all the rest, they placed a body of men to lie in wait and attack Domitius as he was going down to the Forum, while it was still dark, with his partizans, and they killed the man that held the light, and wounded many, among whom was Cato. After putting the party of Domitius to flight, and driving them back to the house,[50] Pompeius and Crassus were proclaimed consuls. Shortly after, they again surrounded the Senate-house with armed men, and, after driving Cato out of the Forum, and killing some persons who opposed them, they procured another five years[51] of [Pg 59]administration to be added to Cæsar's term, and the two provinces of Syria and Iberia to be given to them. When the lots were cast, Crassus got Syria, and Pompeius had Iberia.

XVI. The result of the lot was not universally disliked; for the majority wished Pompeius not to be far from the city, and Pompeius, who was much attached to his wife,[52] intended to spend his time chiefly in Rome. Crassus showed by his joy, immediately on the falling out of the lot, that he considered no greater good fortune had ever befallen him, and he could scarcely keep quiet before strangers and in public; to his friends he uttered many foolish and puerile expressions quite inconsistent with his years and temper, for he had never before shown himself in the least degree a braggart or arrogant. But now, being mightily elated, and his head completely turned, he was not for making Syria or Palestine the limit of his victories; but, designing to make the exploits of Lucullus against Tigranes, and those of Pompeius against Mithridates appear mere child's play, he extended his hopes as far as to the Bactrians, and the Indians, and the external sea. And yet there was no mention of a Parthian war in the law[53] that was drawn up on this occasion. But every[Pg 60]body knew that Crassus was passionately bent on a Parthian war, and Cæsar wrote to him from Gaul, approving of his design, and urging him to it. When it was known that Ateius,[54] the tribune, intended to offer some opposition to his leaving the city, and many persons joined him who complained that Crassus was going to make war upon a people who were doing the Romans no wrong, and had a treaty with them, Crassus in alarm prayed Pompeius to accompany him, and escort him out of the city. Now, the reputation of Pompeius with the multitude was great, and, by showing himself in front of Crassus, with cheerful looks and countenance, he tranquillized a numerous body of people who were prepared to obstruct Crassus, and to raise a shout against him, so that they made way and let him pass through them quietly. But Ateius met Crassus, and, first of all, endeavoured to stop him by words, and he protested against his marching out: in the next place, he ordered his attendant to lay hold of Crassus, and to detain him; but, as the rest of the tribunes would not allow this, the attendant quitted his hold of Crassus, and Ateius running to the gate, placed there a burning brazier, and, as soon as Crassus arrived, he threw incense and poured libations upon it, and, at the same time, he denounced against Crassus curses, in themselves dreadful and terrific, and, in addition thereto, he uttered the names of certain awful and inauspicious deities. The Romans say that these mysterious and ancient curses have great efficacy, that no man can escape upon whom they are laid, and that he who utters them also has an unlucky end, and, accordingly, they are not denounced either on ordinary occasions, or by many persons. Ateius was blamed for letting loose such imprecations and religious fears upon a State, on behalf of which he was hostile to Crassus.

XVII. When Crassus arrived at Brundisium, though [Pg 61]the sea was still rough owing to the wintry weather, he would not wait, but he set sail, and so lost many of his vessels. After getting together the remnant of his forces, he marched through Galatia.[55] Finding King Deiotarus, who was now a very old man, founding a new city, Crassus said sarcastically, "King, you are beginning to build at the twelfth hour." The Galatian, with a smile, replied, "You, too, Imperator, I observe, are not very early with your Parthian expedition." Now Crassus was past sixty, and he looked older than he was. On his arrival, matters at first turned out fully equal to his expectation; for he easily threw a bridge over the Euphrates, and got his army across safely, and he also obtained possession of many cities in Mesopotamia which surrendered. Before one of them, of which Apollonius was tyrant, he lost a hundred men, upon which he brought his force against the place, and, having got possession of it, he made plunder of all the property, and sold the people: the Greeks called the city Zenodotia.[56] On the capture of the city, Crassus allowed his soldiers to proclaim him Imperator, wherein he greatly disgraced himself, and showed the meanness of his spirit, and that he had no good hopes of greater things, as he was content with so slight a success. Having put garrisons in the cities that had surrendered, to the amount of seven thousand infantry and a thousand cavalry, he retired to winter in Syria, and there to await his son,[57] who was coming from Cæsar in Gaul, with the decorations that he had gained by his valour, and with a thousand picked [Pg 62]horsemen. This seemed to be the first blunder of Crassus, or at least, it was the greatest blunder that he committed next to the expedition itself; for he ought to have advanced and to have secured Babylon and Seleukeia,[58] two cities which were always hostile to the Parthians; instead of which, he gave his enemies time to make preparation. The next thing the people blamed was his waste of time in Syria, which was employed more for purposes of money profit than for military purposes; for he did not occupy himself in reviewing the numbers of his troops, nor establishing games to keep the soldiers in exercise, but he busied himself about estimating the revenues of cities, and he was for many days with weights and scales in his hands among the treasures of the goddess in Hierapolis,[59] and, after requiring from the towns and princes contingents of men, he would remit his requisitions for a sum of money; by all which he lost his reputation, and fell into contempt. The first sign that happened to him proceeded from this goddess herself, whom some consider to be Aphrodite (Venus); and others Hera (Juno); others again believe her to be the cause that has supplied from moisture the seeds for all things, and nature, and the power that has pointed out the source of all good things for men; for, as they were going out of the temple, young Crassus first stumbled at the gate, and then his father fell upon him.

XVIII. While Crassus was getting together his forces out of the winter quarter, there came ambassadors from Arsakes[60] with a short message. They said, if the army [Pg 63]was sent by the Romans, there was nothing but war without truce, and without any terms; but if Crassus, contrary to the wish of his country, as they heard, had brought arms against the Parthians and occupied territory for his private profit, Arsakes would act with moderation, and would take pity on the old age of Crassus, and give up to the Romans the men whom he had in his power, and who were rather under guard themselves than keeping guard over others. Crassus haughtily replied, that he would give an answer in Seleukeia; on which Vagises, the oldest of the ambassadors, smiled, and, showing the palm of his hand, said, "From here, Crassus, hair will grow before you see Seleukeia." The ambassadors now returned to Hyrodes, to inform him that he must be ready for war. From the cities of Mesopotamia, in which there were Roman garrisons, some soldiers, who made their escape at great hazard, brought reports that caused much anxiety, having been eye-witnesses of the numbers of the enemy, and of their mode of attacking the cities; and, as is usual, they magnified everything which they reported. "When the enemy pursued," they said, "no man could escape from them, and when they fled, they could not be overtaken; that strange missiles preceded the appearance of the enemy, and before one could see who sent them, they pierced [Pg 64]through everything that they struck; and as to the arms of the mailed[61] soldiers, some were made to push through every obstacle, and others to give way to nothing." When the soldiers heard this their courage sank; for they had been led to believe that the Parthians did not differ at all from the Armenians and Cappadocians, whom Lucullus plundered and robbed till he was weary, and they thought that the hardest part of the war would be a long march, and the pursuit of men who would not come to close quarters; but now, contrary to their hopes, they were in expectation of a contest and great danger, so that some of the officers thought that Crassus ought to stop, and again submit to their deliberation the general state of affairs. Among these was Cassius[62] the quæstor. The seers, also, in gentle terms showed that bad and unfavourable signs were always prognosticated to Crassus by the victims. But Crassus paid no attention to them, nor to those who advised anything else except to move on.

XIX. But Crassus was in no small degree encouraged by Artabazes[63] the king of the Armenians, who came to the camp with six thousand horsemen. These were said to be the guards and attendants of the king; and he promised ten thousand men clothed in mail and thirty thousand infantry, who were to be maintained at his own cost. He attempted to persuade Crassus to invade Parthia through Armenia; for, he said, the army would not only have abundance of provision in its march through the country by reason of him supplying them, but would also advance safely, having in their front many mountains and continuous hills, and ground unfavourable for cavalry, in which alone lay the strength of the Parthians. Crassus was well enough satisfied with the zeal of the king and the splendour of the proffered aid; but he said he would march through Mesopotamia, where he had left many brave Romans; upon this the Armenian went away. As [Pg 65]Crassus was taking his army over at the Zeugma,[64] many extraordinary claps of thunder broke around, and many flashes of lightning came right in front of the army; and a wind, mingled with cloud and hurricane,[65] falling on the raft, broke up and crushed to pieces a large part of it. The spot also, on which Crassus intended to encamp, was [Pg 66]struck with two thunderbolts.[66] A horse, belonging to the general, which was caparisoned in splendid style, violently dragged along the man who held the reins, and plunging into the stream, disappeared. It is said also, that the first eagle which was raised, turned round spontaneously. Added to this, it happened that, as they were giving out the rations to the soldiers after crossing the river, lentils and salt were given first, which the Romans consider to be symbols of lamentation, and are accustomed to place before the dead; and, as Crassus was haranguing the soldiers, an expression escaped him which greatly alarmed the army. He said he would destroy the raft over the river, that no one among them might return; and though he ought, upon seeing the imprudence of his words, to have recalled what he had said and explained it to the soldiers, he neglected to do so, through his arrogant temper. Finally, when he was offering the usual expiatory sacrifice, and the priest had put the viscera into his hands, he threw them away, on which, observing that the standers-by were greatly disturbed, he said with a smile, "Such is old age; but no arms at least shall drop from its hands."

XX. After this he advanced along the river, with seven legions and nearly four thousand horsemen, and almost as many light-armed troops as horsemen. Some of the scouts now returned from their exploration and reported that the country was clear of men, and that they had fallen in with the tracks of many horses, which indicated that [Pg 67]they had turned about and were retreating. This gave Crassus still better hopes, and made the soldiers completely despise the Parthians, who, as they supposed, would not come to close quarters. However, Cassius again had some conversation with Crassus, and advised him at least to give his troops rest in some of the garrisoned cities, till he should get some certain information about the enemy; but if he would not do this, to advance towards Seleukeia along the river. He urged that the boats which carried the provisions would furnish them with supplies by stopping at the places of encampment, and that, by having the river as a protection against being hemmed in by the enemy, they would always be able to fight them on fair terms.

XXI. While Crassus was considering and reflecting on these matters, there comes an Arab chieftain, Ariamnes[67] by name, a cunning and faithless man, and of all the misfortunes that were by chance combined to ruin the Romans the chief and crowning mischief. Some of them who had served with Pompeius knew him as one who had received favours from Pompeius, and was supposed to be a friend to the Romans; but he now came to Crassus with a treacherous intent, and with the privity of the royal generals, to try if he could draw him far away from the river and the foot of the hills, into a boundless plain, where he might be surrounded by the enemy; for nothing was further from the intentions of the Parthians than to attack the Romans right in front. Accordingly, the barbarian coming to Crassus (and he was a plausible talker), spake in high terms of Pompeius as his benefactor, and praised the force of Crassus; but he blamed him for his tardiness, inasmuch as he was delaying and making preparation, as if he would have occasion to employ arms instead of hands and the most active feet, against an enemy who had long been trying to get together, as quick as they could, their most valuable property and their best slaves, and to move off to the Scythians or Hyrkanians. "And yet," he said, "if you intend to fight, you ought to press on before the king recovers his courage and all his forces are [Pg 68]concentrated; for now Surena and Sillakes have been thrown in your way to stand the attack, and the king is no where to be seen." But all this was false. For Hyrodes had at first divided his forces into two parts, and he was himself ravaging Armenia to take vengeance on Artavasdes; but he sent Surena against the Romans, not because he despised them, as some say, for it was not consistent for him to disdain Crassus as an antagonist, the first of the Romans, and to war against Artavasdes and take the villages of Armenia; but it seems that he really feared the danger, and that he was on the watch to await the result, and that he put Surena in the front to try the fortune of a battle, and so to divert the enemy. For Surena was no person of mean estate: in wealth, birth, and consideration, he was next to the king; but, in courage and ability, the first of the Parthians of his time; and, besides all this, in stature and beauty of person he had no equal. He used always to travel, when he was on his own business, with a thousand camels to carry his baggage, and he had following him two hundred carriages for concubines; and a thousand mailed horsemen, with a larger number of light cavalry, escorted him; and he had in all, horsemen, clients,[68] and slaves, no less than ten thousand. Now by hereditary right he had the privilege of first placing the diadem on the head of him who became king of the Parthians;[69] and this very Hyrodes, who had been driven out, he restored to the Parthian empire, and took for him Seleukeia the Great, being the first to mount the wall and to put to flight with his own hand those [Pg 69]who opposed him. Though he was not yet thirty years of age at that time, he had the first reputation for prudent counsel and judgment, by which qualities particularly he caused the ruin of Crassus, who through his confidence and pride in the first place, and next through his fears and his misfortunes, became a most easy victim to fraud.

XXII. The barbarian, after persuading Crassus, drew him away from the river, and led him through the plains by a track at first convenient and easy, but which soon became toilsome; for it was succeeded by deep sand, and plains treeless and waterless, not bounded in any direction by any object that the eye could reach, so that, not only through thirst and the difficulty of the march, was the army exhausted, but even the aspect of all around caused the soldiers to despond past all comfort, seeing neither plant, nor stream, nor top of sloping hill, nor blade of grass sprouting or rising through the earth, but a bare sea-like wave of desert heaps of sand environing the army. Now this of itself made the Romans suspect treachery. Messengers also came from Artavasdes the Armenian, with a message that he was engaged in a heavy struggle since Hyrodes had fallen upon him, and that he could not send Crassus aid; but he advised Crassus above all things to change his route immediately, and, by joining the Armenians, to bring the contest with Hyrodes to a close: but, if he would not do this, he recommended him to advance, and always to avoid encamping in such places as were adapted for the movements of cavalry, and to keep close to the mountainous parts: to all which Crassus sent no written answer, but, under the influence of passion and perverse disposition, he answered, that he had no leisure at present to deal with the Armenians, but he would come at another time to punish Artavasdes for his treachery. Cassius was again much dissatisfied: but he gave over advising Crassus, who was out of humour with him, though Cassius himself abused the barbarian. "What evil dæmon," he said, "vilest of men, brought you to us, and by what drugs and witchcraft have you persuaded Crassus to plunge his army into a boundless wilderness and an abyss, and to pursue a path more fit for a nomadic chief of robbers than for a Roman Imperator?" But the [Pg 70]barbarian, who was a cunning follow, with abject servility, prayed him to endure a little longer; and, while running along with the soldiers and giving them his help, he would jeer at them in a laughing mood, and say, "I suppose you think that you are marching through Campania, and you long for the fountains, and streams, and shades, and baths, and taverns? Have you forgotten that you are crossing the confines of the Arabs and Assyrians?" Thus the barbarian amused the Romans, and before his treachery was discovered he rode off, not, however, without the knowledge of Crassus, after making him believe that he would serve the Roman army, and put the affairs of the enemy in confusion.

XXIII. It is said that on that day Crassus did not appear, as is the custom of Roman generals, in a purple dress, but in black, which he immediately changed on observing what he had done: and it is also said that the men who carried the standards had much difficulty in raising some of them up, for they stuck in the ground as if they were firmly rooted there. Crassus ridiculed all these omens, and quickened his march, urging the infantry to follow after the cavalry, till at last a few of those who had been sent forward as scouts came up, and reported that the rest of them had been cut off by the enemy, and they had escaped with difficulty, and that the Parthians were advancing with a large force, and full of confidence. This threw all the army into confusion, and Crassus was completely confounded, and began to put his men in order hastily, and with no great presence of mind: at first, as Cassius recommended, he extended the line of the legionary soldiers as far as possible in the plain, and making it of small depth, in order to prevent the enemy from attacking them on the flank, he distributed the cavalry on the wings; but he changed his plan and, drawing his men together, formed them into a deep square of four fronts, with twelve cohorts on each side. By the side of each cohort he placed a body of horse, in order that no part of the army might be without the aid of the cavalry, but might make the attack equally protected on all sides. He gave one of the wings to Cassius, and the other to young Crassus; he himself took his station in the centre. Thus [Pg 71]advancing, they came to a stream called Balissus,[70] which was neither large nor copious; but it was a joyful sight to the soldiers in the midst of the drought and heat, and by comparison with the rest of their laborious march through a country without water. Now most of the commanders thought that they ought to encamp and spend the night there, and learn what was the number of the enemy, and the nature and disposition of their force, and so advance against them at daybreak; but Crassus, being prevailed upon by the importunity of his son, and the cavalry with him, to advance immediately, and engage with the enemy, gave orders for the men who required it to eat and drink in their ranks. And before this could be well accomplished all through the ranks, he led on his men, not slowly, nor halting at intervals, as is usual when men are marching to battle, but he kept them up to a quick, unbroken pace, until the enemy were in sight, who, contrary to expectation, did not appear to the Romans to be either numerous or formidable; for Surena disguised his numbers by placing the mass of his force behind the front ranks, and he prevented their bright armour from being seen by ordering his men to cover themselves with cloaks and skins. But when they were near the Romans, and the standard was raised by the general, first of all they filled the plain with a deep sound and a terrific noise; for the Parthians do not excite themselves to battle with horns or trumpets, but they have hollow instruments,[71] made of skin, and furnished with brass bells, on which they strike at the same time in various parts; and these instruments produce a kind of deep and dismal sound, compounded of the roaring of wild beasts and the harsh crash [Pg 72]of thunder; for the Parthians rightly judge that of all the senses the hearing is that which causes the greatest alarm in the mind, and that, when this sense is affected, there is the speediest and greatest disturbance in the judgment.

XXIV. The Romans were startled at the noise, when all of a sudden throwing off the covering of their armour the Parthians appeared, with their helmets and breastplates flashing like flame, the Margian steel[72] glittering sharp and bright, and the horses equipped in mail of brass and iron; but Surena was most conspicuous of all, being the tallest and handsomest man among them, though his personal appearance, owing to his feminine beauty, did not correspond to his reputation for courage, for he was dressed more in the Median fashion, with his face painted[73] and his hair parted, while the rest of the Parthians, still keeping to the Scythian fashion, wore their hair long and bushy to make themselves more formidable. At first the Parthians intended to fall upon them with their long spears, and to drive the front ranks from their ground; but when they saw the depth of their close-locked ranks, and the firmness and stability of the men, they drew back; and while they seemed to be at the same time dispersing themselves and breaking their ranks, they threw themselves around the square before the Romans were aware of it. Crassus ordered the light-armed troops to spring forward; but they had not advanced far before they were met by a shower of arrows, which galled them, and they ran back for shelter among the legionary soldiers, and caused the beginning of disorder and alarm among the Romans, who saw the vigour with which the arrows were discharged and their strength, for they tore the armour and made their way through everything alike, whether hard or [Pg 73]soft defence. The Parthians, dispersing themselves at considerable distances from one another, began to discharge their arrows from all points at once, not taking any very exact aim (for the close and compact ranks of the Romans did not give a man the opportunity of missing if he wished it), but sending their arrows with vigorous and forcible effect from bows which were strong and large, and, owing to their great degree of bending, discharged the missiles with violence. Now the condition of the Romans was pitiable from the beginning: for, if they kept their position, they were exposed to be wounded, and if they attempted to close with the enemy, they were just as far from doing the enemy any harm, and they suffered just as much; for the Parthians while retreating[74] still discharged their arrows, and they do this most effectually next to the Scythians: and it is a most subtle device to make their escape from danger while they are still fighting, and to take away the disgrace of flight.

XXV.[75] The Romans endured so long as they had hopes that the Parthians would withdraw from the contest when they had discharged their arrows, or would come to close quarters; but when they perceived that there were many camels standing there, loaded with arrows, and that the Parthians who had first shot all their arrows, turned round to the camels for a fresh supply, Crassus, seeing no end to this, began to lose heart, and he sent messengers to his son with orders to force the enemy to engage before he was surrounded, for the Parthians were mainly attacking and surrounding with their cavalry the wing commanded by young Crassus, with the view of getting in his rear. Accordingly, the young man taking thirteen hundred horsemen,—a thou[Pg 74]sand of whom he had brought from Cæsar,—and five hundred archers, and eight cohorts of the legionary soldiers, who were nearest to him, wheeled about to attack the Parthians. But the Parthians, who were manœuvring about Crassus, either because they fell in with some marshes,[76] as some say, or because it was their design to attack Crassus when they had drawn him as far as they could from his father, turned round and fled. On this Crassus, calling out that the Parthians did not stand their ground, advanced with Censorinus and Megabacchus,[77] of whom Megabacchus was distinguished for courage and strength, and Censorinus[78] was a senator and a powerful speaker, both of them companions of Crassus, and about the same age. The cavalry pursued the enemy, nor did the infantry allow themselves to be left behind, being full of alacrity and hope of victory; for they thought that they were victorious and in pursuit: but they had not gone far before they perceived the stratagem; for the Parthians, who were supposed to be flying, began to face about, and others, in greater numbers, joined them. Upon this the Romans halted, thinking that the enemy would come to close quarters with them, as they were only few in number. But the Parthians placing their mailed horsemen in the front, to oppose the Romans, rode about them with the rest of the cavalry dispersed, and, by trampling the ground, they raised from the bottom heaps of sand, which threw up such an immense cloud of dust that the Romans could neither see clearly nor speak; and, being driven into a narrow compass, and falling one on another, they were wounded and died no easy nor yet a speedy death, for tortured with violent [Pg 75]convulsions and pain, and writhing with the arrows in them, they broke them in the wounds, and, by trying to pull out by force the barbed points, which had pierced through their veins and nerves, they increased the evil by breaking the arrows, and thus injured themselves. Many thus fell, and the survivors also were unable to fight; for, when Publius encouraged them to attack the mailed horsemen, they showed him that their hands were nailed to their shields, and their feet fastened right through to the ground, so that they were unable either to fly or to defend themselves. However, Publius cheering the cavalry, made a vigorous attack with them, and closed with the enemy; but the Romans were under a disadvantage, both as to attack and defence, striking with small and feeble spears against breastplates of raw hide and iron, and receiving the blows of long spears on the lightly-equipped and bare bodies of the Gauls, for Crassus trusted most to them, and with them indeed he did wonderful feats; for the Gauls, laying hold of the long spears, and closing with the Parthians, pushed them from their horses, the men, owing to the weight of their armour, being unable to stir themselves; and many of the Gauls, quitting their own horses, and slipping under those of the enemy, wounded them in the belly, and the horses springing up through pain, and, at the same time, trampling on their riders and the enemy, fell dead. The Gauls were most oppressed by the heat and thirst, being unaccustomed to both, and they had lost most of their horses by driving them against the long spears. They were, therefore, compelled to retreat to the legionary soldiers, taking with them Publius, who was badly wounded. Seeing a sandy eminence near, they retreated to it, and fastened their horses in the middle, and closing in their front by close-locking their shields, they thought they could thus more easily repel the enemy: but it turned out just the other way; for, while they were on the level ground, the front ranks did, in some sort, give relief to those who were behind; but on this spot, which raised the men one above another, by reason of the inequality of the ground, and placed every one who was in the rear above the man in front of him, there was no one who could escape, and they [Pg 76]were all alike exposed to the missiles, lamenting their inglorious and unresisting death. There were with Publius two Greeks, who belonged to the dwellers in those parts in Carrhæ,[79] Hieronymus and Nikomachus, both of whom attempted to persuade Publius to retire with them, and to make his escape to Ichnæ[80] a city which had taken the side of the Romans, and was not far off. But he replied that no death was so dreadful as to make Publius, through fear of it, desert those who were losing their lives for his sake, and bade them save themselves, and taking leave of them, he allowed them to go: himself being unable to use his hand effectually, for it was pierced by an arrow, presented his side to his shield-bearer[81] and ordered him to despatch him with his sword. They say that Censorinus perished in the same way, and that Megabacchus killed himself, and all the rest of the most distinguished men. The Parthians, ascending the hill, transfixed with their spears the survivors; and it is said that not more than five hundred were taken prisoners. The Parthians, cutting off the head of Publius, immediately rode off to attack Crassus.

XXVI. With Crassus matters were thus. After ordering his son to make an attack on the Parthians, and receiving intelligence that they were routed to a great distance, and were hotly pursued; seeing also that the enemy in front were no longer pressing on him so much as before, for most of them had crowded to the place where young Crassus was, he recovered his courage a little, and drawing his forces together, posted them on a sloping ground, being in immediate expectation that his son would return from the pursuit. Of those who were sent by Publius to his father, when he began to be in danger, the first fell [Pg 77]into the hands of the enemy and were killed; and the next, after escaping with great difficulty, reported that Publius was lost, if he did not receive speedy and sufficient aid from his father. Now, Crassus was affected by many contending feelings at once, and he no longer viewed anything with sober judgment. Distracted by alarm for the whole army, and love of his son at the same time, he was urged by one motive to go to his aid, and by the other not to go: but finally he began to move in advance. In the mean time the enemy came up, making themselves more formidable by their shouts and pæans, and many of the drums again bellowed around the Romans, who were in expectation of a second attack. The Parthians, carrying the head of Publius fixed on a spear, rode close up to the Romans, and, displaying it insultingly, asked who were his parents and family, for it was not decent to suppose that so noble and brave a youth was the son of so cowardly and mean a man as Crassus. The sight of this broke and unstrung the spirit of the Romans more than all the rest of their dangers; and it did not fill them with a spirit for revenge, as one might have supposed, but with shuddering and trembling. Yet they say that the courage of Crassus on that dreadful occasion shone forth more brightly than ever before; for he went along the ranks, crying out, "Mine alone, Romans, is this misfortune: but the great fortune and glory of Rome abide in you, if your lives are saved, unbroken and unvanquishcd: and, if you have any pity on me, who have been deprived of the noblest of sons, show this in your fury against the enemy. Take from them their rejoicing, avenge their cruelty: be not cast down at what has happened, for it is the law that those who aim at great things must also endure. Neither did Lucullus vanquish Tigranes without loss of blood, nor Scipio Antiochus; and our ancestors of old lost a thousand ships on the coast of Sicily, and in Italy many Imperatores and generals, not one of whom, by being first vanquished, prevented them from vanquishing the victors; for it is not by good fortune that the Roman state has advanced to such a height of power, but by the endurance and courage of those who meet danger."

[Pg 78]XXVII. Though Crassus used such words to encourage them, he did not see many eager to follow his exhortations: but, by ordering them to shout the battle cry, he discovered the dispirited condition of his men, so weak, and feeble, and irregular a shout they made; while the cries on the side of the enemy were clear and bold. When the Parthians began the attack, their slaves and clients, riding about on the flanks of the Romans, galled them with their arrows: and the horsemen in front, using their long spears, kept driving the Romans into a narrow compass, except those who, to avoid death from the arrows, made a desperate attempt to rush upon the Parthians; wherein they did the enemy little damage, but met with a speedy death by great and mortal wounds; for the Parthians drove their spears, heavy with iron, against the horsemen; and, from the force of the blow, they often went even through two men. After thus fighting, as dark came on the Parthians retired, saying, that they allowed Crassus a single night to lament his son, unless he should take better counsel for himself, and choose rather to come to King Arsakes than to be taken. The Parthians encamped near the Romans, in high hopes. A painful night followed to the Romans, who neither paid any attention to the interment of the dead, nor care to the wounded, and those who were in the agonies of death; but every man was severally lamenting his own fate; for it appeared that they could not escape, either if they waited there till daybreak, or if they plunged by night into a boundless plain. And the wounded caused a great difficulty; for they would be an obstacle to the quickness of their flight if they attempted to carry them off: and, if they should leave them, their shouts would betray the attempt to escape unobserved. Though they considered Crassus to be the cause of all their sufferings, the soldiers still wished to see him and hear his voice. But Crassus, wrapping himself up in his cloak, lay concealed in the dark, an example to the many of fortune's reverses, and to the wise of want of judgment and of ambition, which made him dissatisfied unless he was the first and greatest among so many thousands, and think that he lacked everything because he was judged to be inferior [Pg 79]to two men only. However, Octavius the legate, and Cassius, endeavoured to rouse and comfort him; but, finding that he had entirely given himself up to despair, they called together the centurions and tribunes, and, after deliberating, they resolved not to stay on the ground, and they made an attempt at first to put the army in motion without the sound of the trumpet, and in silence. But when the soldiers who were disabled, perceived that they were going to be deserted, terrible disorder and confusion, mingled with groans and shouts, filled the camp; and this was followed by disorder and panic as they began to advance, for they thought that the enemy was coming upon them. After frequently turning from their route, and frequently putting themselves in order of battle, and taking up the wounded who followed, and then laying them down again, they lost much time on the march, with the exception of three hundred horsemen, with Ignatius[82] at their head, who reached Carrhæ about midnight. Ignatius, calling out in the Roman language to the watch upon the walls, and making them hear, told them to tell Coponius, the commander, that there had been a great battle between Crassus and the Parthians; and, without saying more or who he was, he rode off to the Zeugma, and saved all his men; but he got a bad name for deserting his general. However, the information thus conveyed to Coponius was some advantage to Crassus; for Coponius concluded that this hasty and confused message indicated that he who brought it had no good news to report: and, accordingly, he immediately ordered the soldiers to arm; and, as soon as he learned that Crassus was on his march, he went out to meet him, and, taking charge of him and his army, conducted them into the city.

XXVIII. Though the Parthians during the night discovered that the Romans were making their escape, they did not pursue, but at daybreak they came upon those who were left in the camp, to the number of four thousand, and massacred them; and they rode about the plain and overtook many who were there rambling about. Four complete cohorts, while it was still dark, under the command of Varguntinus the legate, got separated from the rest [Pg 80]and lost their way, and, being surrounded by the Parthians on an eminence, they fought till they were all killed, with the exception of twenty men. The Parthians, admiring the courage of these twenty men, who were endeavouring to push through them with their bare swords, made way and allowed them a passage through their ranks, and to march slowly to Carrhæ. A false report reached Surena, that Crassus and all the men of rank had made their escape, and that those who had fled to Carrhæ were a mingled rabble not worth notice. Thinking, then, that he had lost the end of his victory, but being still doubtful and wishing to know the truth, in order that he might either stay there and besiege the town, or leave the people of Carrhæ behind and pursue Crassus, he sends one of the men with him, who could speak both languages, with instructions to approach the walls, and in the Roman language to call out for Crassus himself or Cassius, and to say that Surena wished to have a conference with them. The man did as he was ordered; and when it was reported to Crassus, he accepted the invitation, and soon after there came from the barbarians some Arabs who well knew Crassus and Cassius by sight, having been in the camp before the battle. The Arabs, observing Cassius on the wall, said that Surena proposed a truce, and offered, if they would become friends to the king, to let them go safe, if they would leave Mesopotamia; for he considered this proposal advantageous to both sides, rather than to let matters come to extremities. Cassius accepted the proposal, and asked for a place and time to be fixed where Surena and Crassus should meet: the men replied that this should be done, and rode off.

XXIX. Now Surena was delighted at the Romans being besieged, and at daybreak he led the Parthians against the city, who, with many insulting expressions, bade the Romans, if they wished to have a truce, deliver up to them Crassus and Cassius[83] in chains. The Romans were [Pg 81]vexed at being deceived; and, telling Crassus to give up all hopes of aid from the Armenians as too remote and groundless, they prepared to make their escape by stealth; and none of the people of Carrhæ were to know this before the time came. But Andromachus, that most faithless wretch, heard of it from Crassus, who confided to him the secret, and also the guidance on the route. Accordingly, all was known to the Parthians; for Andromachus reported to them every particular. But as it is not the custom of the Parthians to fight in the dark, and indeed they cannot easily do it, and Crassus had left the city by night, Andromachus contrived that the Parthians should not be far behind in the pursuit, by leading the Romans first by one route and then by another, till at last he brought them out of their course into deep marshes and ground full of ditches, and thus made the march difficult and circuitous to all who followed him; for there were some who suspected that Andromachus had no honest object in turning and twisting about, and therefore did not follow. Cassius, indeed, returned to Carrhæ; and when the guides, who were Arabs, advised him to wait till the moon had passed the Scorpion, he replied, "I fear the Archer more than the Scorpion," and, saying this, he rode off to Syria, with five hundred horsemen. Others, who had faithful guides, got into a mountainous country, called Sinnaca,[84] and were in a safe position before daybreak: they were about five thousand in number, and were commanded by a brave man, Octavius. But daybreak found Crassus exposed to the treachery of Andromachus in the unfavourable ground and the marshes. Crassus had with him four cohorts of the legionary soldiers, and a very few horsemen, and five lictors, with whom he got upon the road with great difficulty just as the enemy was falling upon him; and now being about twelve stadia short of joining Octavius, he fled to another hill not so difficult for cavalry nor yet so strong, [Pg 82]but one that lay below Sinnaca, and was connected with it by a long ridge, which stretched through the middle of the plain. His danger was apparent to Octavius, who ran before any one else with a few men, from the higher ground to aid Crassus, upon which the rest of the men, abusing themselves for cowards, rushed forward, and, falling on the enemy, and repulsing them from the hill, put Crassus in the midst of them, and threw their shields before him, proudly exclaiming that there was no Parthian missile which should strike the Imperator until all of them had fallen in defence of him.

XXX. Surena observing that the spirit of the Parthians was somewhat dulled towards the contest, and, if the night should come on and the Romans get among the mountains, they could not by any means be overtaken, employed the following stratagem against Crassus. Some of the captives were let loose, who, in the Parthian camp, had heard the barbarians saying to one another, in pursuance of a concerted plan, that the king did not wish the war with the Romans to be carried to extremities, but desired to have their friendship again, by doing them the favour of treating Crassus kindly. Accordingly the barbarians stopped fighting; and Surena, with his chief officers, riding gently up to the hill, unstrung his bow, and holding out his right hand, invited Crassus to come to terms, saying, that Crassus had put the king's courage and power to the test, though the king did not wish it, and yet the king of his own free will made the Romans an offer of mercy and friendship by being ready to make a truce with them if they would retire, and by giving them the opportunity of a safe retreat. Upon Surena saying this the Romans eagerly accepted his proposal, and were overjoyed; though Crassus, having been always over-reached by their fraud, and considering the suddenness of the change to be inexplicable, would not listen to them and hesitated. But the soldiers began to call out and urge him to accept the terms, and they fell to abusing and reproaching him, for wishing to expose them to the risk of fighting with those whom he did not venture to go to a conference with, even when they laid aside their arms. Crassus at first attempted to prevail on them by entreaty, [Pg 83]and he said that, if they would hold out for the rest of the day, they would be able to march by night through the rough and mountain country, and he pointed out to them the route, and entreated them not to throw away their hopes when safety was so near; but, as the soldiers began to be exasperated and to clatter their arms and threaten him, he was alarmed, and advanced towards Surena, after first turning round and merely saying, "Octavius and Petronius, and you Roman officers who are here, you see that I go under compulsion, and you are witnesses that I am treated in a shameful way and am under constraint; but, if you get safe home, tell all the world, that Crassus lost his life through the treachery of the enemy, and was not surrendered by his fellow-citizens."

XXXI. Yet Octavius and those about him did not stay behind, but descended the hill with Crassus. However, Crassus made the lictors who were following him turn back. The first who met them, on the part of the barbarians, were two Greeks of half-breed, who, leaping down from their horses, made their obeisance to Crassus, and, addressing him in the Greek language, urged him to send forward some persons, who, as they said, would see that Surena himself and those about him were advancing without armour and without their weapons. Crassus replied, that if he had the least concern about his life, he should not have put himself into their hands; however, he sent two Roscii, brothers, to inquire upon what terms they should meet, and how many of them. Surena immediately seized and detained the two brothers, and he himself advanced on horseback with the chief officers, and said, "What is this? the Roman Imperator on foot while we are riding!" and he ordered them to bring a horse to Crassus. Crassus observed that neither himself nor Surena was acting wrong in coming to the conference according to the fashion of their respective countries; on which Surena said that from that moment there was a truce and peace between king Hyrodes and the Romans; but that it was requisite to advance to the river,[85] and there have the agreement put in writing; "for you Romans," he said, "have not a very good memory about contracts;" [Pg 84]and he held out his right hand to Crassus. When Crassus was going to send for a horse, Surena said there was no occasion; "for the king gives you this." At the same time a horse with golden bits stood close by Crassus, and the grooms raised him up and mounted him, and then followed, quickening the horse's pace with blows. Octavius first laid hold of the bridle of the horse, and, after him, Petronius, one of the tribunes, and then the rest got round the horse of Crassus, endeavouring to stop it, and dragging away those who pressed close upon Crassus on each side. This led to a struggle and tumult, and finally to blows; Octavius drew his sword and killed the groom of one of the barbarians, and another struck Octavius from behind and killed him. Petronius had no weapon, and, being struck on the breastplate, he leapt down from the horse unwounded; and a Parthian, named Pomaxathres, killed Crassus.[86] Some say that it was not Pomaxathres, but another, who killed Crassus, and that Pomaxathres cut off the head and right hand when Crassus was lying on the ground. But these are rather matters of conjecture than of certain knowledge; for of those who were present some fell there fighting about Crassus, and the rest immediately fled back to the hill. Upon this the Parthians came and said, that Crassus had been punished as he deserved, but Surena invited the rest to come down and fear nothing: whereupon, some of the Romans came down and surrendered, and the rest dispersed themselves under cover of night, of whom a very few escaped; the rest the Arabs hunted out, and put to death when they caught them. It is said that twenty thousand perished in all, and ten thousand were taken alive.

XXXII. Surena sent the head[87] and hand of Crassus to [Pg 85]Hyrodes in Armenia; and, causing a report to be carried by messengers to Seleukeia that he was bringing Crassus alive, he got ready a kind of ridiculous procession which, in mockery, he called a triumph. One of the Roman prisoners who bore the greatest resemblance to Crassus, Caius Paccianus, putting on a barbarian female dress, and being instructed to answer as Crassus and Imperator to those who addressed him, was conducted, seated on a horse, and in front of him trumpeters, and some lictors rode upon camels; and there were purses[88] suspended from the fasces, and, by the side of the axes, heads of Romans newly cut off. Behind these followed courtesans of Seleukeia, singing girls, who chanted many obscene and ridiculous things about the effeminacy and cowardice of Crassus. All this was public. But Surena assembling the Senate of Seleukeia,[89] laid before them certain licentious books of the Milesiaca of Aristeides,[90] and, in this matter, at least, there was no invention on his part; for they were found among the baggage of Rustius,[91] and they gave Surena the opportunity of greatly insulting and ridiculing the Romans, because they could not, even when going to war, abstain from such things and such books. To the Senate of Seleukeia, however, Æsopus[92] ap[Pg 86]peared to be a wise man, when they saw Surena with the wallet of Milesian obscenities in front of him, and dragging behind him a Parthian Sybaris in so many waggons full of concubines, in a manner forming a counterpart to those vipers and skytalæ[93] so much talked of, by presenting the visible and the front parts formidable and terrific, with spears, and bows, and horses, but in the rear of the phalanx, terminating in harlots, and rattling cymbals, and lute-playing, and nocturnal revels with women. Rustius, indeed, merits blame, but the Parthians were shameless in finding fault with the Milesian stories; for many of the kings who have reigned over them, as Arsakidæ, have been the sons of Milesian and Ionian concubines.

XXXIII. While this was going on, Hyrodes happened to have been reconciled to Artavasdes the Armenian, and had agreed to receive the sister of Artavasdes as wife to his son Pacorus: and there were banquets and drinking-parties between them, and representations of many Greek plays; for Hyrodes was not a stranger either to the Greek language or the literature of the Greeks: and Artavasdes used to write tragedies, and speeches, and histories, some of which are preserved. When the head of Crassus was brought to the door, the tables were taken away, and a tragedy actor Jason,[94] by name, a native of Tralles, chanted that part of the Bacchæ[95] of Euripides which relates to [Pg 87]Agave. While he was receiving applause. Sillakes, standing by the door of the apartment, and making a reverence, threw the head of Crassus before the company. The Parthians clapped their hands with shouts of joy and the attendants, at the command of the king, seated Sillakes, while Jason handed over to one of the members of the chorus the dress of Pentheus, and, laying hold of the head of Crassus, and, putting on the air of a bacchant, he sung these verses with great enthusiasm:—

We bring from a mountain
A young one new killed to the house,
A fortunate prey.

This delighted all the company; and, while the following verses were being chanted, which are a dialogue with the chorus,

A. Who killed him?
B. Mine is the honour,

Pomaxathres, springing up (for he happened to be at the banquet), laid hold of the head, as if it was more appropriate for him to say this than for Jason. The king was pleased, and made Pomaxathres a present, according to the fashion of the country, and he gave Jason a talent. In such a farce[96] as this, it is said, that the expedition of Crassus terminated just like a tragedy. However, just punishment overtook Hyrodes for his cruelty, and Surena for his treachery. Not long after, Hyrodes put Surena to death, being jealous of his reputation. Hyrodes also lost his son [Pg 88]Pacorus,[97] who was defeated by the Romans in a battle; and having fallen into an illness which turned out to be dropsy, his son, Phraates,[98] who had a design on his life, gave him aconite.[99] But the poison only operated on the disease, which was thrown off together with it, and Hyrodes thereby relieved; whereupon Phraates took the shortest course and strangled his father.

FOOTNOTES:

[5] Crassus belonged to the Licinia Gens. His name was M. Licinius Crassus Dives. He was the son of P. Licinius Crassus Dives, who was consul B.C. 97, and afterwards governor of the nearer Spain. In B.C. 93 P. Crassus had a triumph. He was afterwards employed in the Marsic war; and in B.C. 89 he was censor with L. Julius Cæsar, who had been consul in B.C. 90.

M. Licinius Crassus, whose life Plutarch has written, was the youngest son of the Censor. The year of his birth is uncertain; but as he was above sixty when he left Rome for his Parthian campaign B.C. 55, he must have been born before B.C. 115. Meyer (Orator. Roman. Fragment.) places the birth of Crassus in B.C. 114.

[6] Kaltwasser makes this passage mean that Crassus merely took his brother's wife and her children to live with him; which is contrary to the usual sense of the Greek words and readers the following sentence unmeaning.

Kaltwasser observes that we do not know that such marriages were in use among the Romans. I know no rule by which they were forbidden. (Gaius, i. 58, &c.)

[7] The punishment of a Vestal Virgin for incontinence was death. She was placed alive in a subterranean vault with a light and some food. (Dionysius, ix. 40: Liv. 8. c. 15; Juvenal, Sat. iv. 8.) The man who debauched a Vestal was also put to death. The Vestal Virgins had full power of disposing of their property; they were emancipated from the paternal power by the fact of being selected to be Vestal Virgins (Gaius, i. 130); and they were not under the same legal disabilities as other women (Gaius, i. 145; according to Dion Cassius, 49. c. 38, Octavia and Livia received privileges like those of the Vestals).

Another Licinia, a Vestal, had broken her vow, and was punished B.C. 113.

[8] See the Life of Crassus, c. 12; and the Life of Sulla, c. 35.

[9] This may hardly be a correct translation of ἀργυρογνωμόνας: but it is something like the meaning.

[10] King Archidamus of Sparta, the second of the name, who commanded the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 431. Plutarch (Life of Demosthenes, c. 17) puts this saying in the mouth of one Krobylus, a demagogue.

[11] Cicero (Brutus, c. 66) speaks of the oratory of Crassus, and commends his care and diligence; but he speaks of his natural parts as not striking. Crassus spoke on the same side as Cicero in the defence of Murena, of Caelius, and of Balbus (Meyer, Orator. Roman. Fragmenta, p. 382).

[12] A Roman who aspired to the highest offices of the State, prepared his way by the magnificence of his public entertainments during his curule ædileship, and by his affable manners. An humble individual is always gratified when a great man addresses him by name, and a shake of the hand secures his devotion. Ovidius (Ars Amat. ii. 253) alludes to this way of winning popular favour, and judiciously observes that it costs nothing, which would certainly recommend it to Crassus. If a man's memory was not so good as that of Crassus, he had only to buy a slave, as Horatius (1 Epist. i. 50) recommends, who could tell him the name of every man whom he met. Such a slave was called Nomenclator. If the nomenclator's memory ever failed him, he would not let his master know it: he gave a person any name that came into his head.

[13] The Greek is στέγαστρου, 'something that covers;' but whether cloak or hat, or covered couch, or sedan, the learned have not yet determined.

[14] These words may not be Plutarch's, and several critics have marked them as spurious. The Peripatetics, of whom Alexander was one, did not consider wealth as one of the things that are indifferent to a philosopher; the Stoics did.

[15] This is Plutarch's word; but the father of Crassus was Proconsul in Spain. When Cinna and Marius returned to Rome, B.C. 87, Crassus and his sons were proscribed. Crassus and one of his sons lost their lives: the circumstances are stated somewhat differently by different writers. (Florius, iii. 21; Appian, Civil Wars, i. 72.)

Drumann correctly remarks that Plutarch and other Greek writers often use the word στρατηγός simply to signify one who has command, and that στρατηγός is incorrectly rendered 'Prætor' by those who write in Latin, when they make use of the Greek historians of Rome. But Plutarch's στρατηγός sometimes means prætor, and it is the word by which he denotes that office; he probably does sometimes mean to say 'prætor,' when the man of whom he speaks was not prætor. Whether στρατηγός in Plutarch is always translated prætor or always Commander, there will be error. To translate it correctly in all cases, a man must know whether the person spoken of was prætor or not; and that cannot always be ascertained. But besides this, the word 'Commander' will not do, for Plutarch sometimes calls a Proconsul στρατηγός, and a Proconsul had not merely a command: he had a government also.

[16] So the name is written by Sintenis, who writes it Paccianus in the Life of Sertorius, c. 9. Some editions read Paciacus; but the termination in Paciacus is hardly Roman, and the termination in Pacianus is common. But the form Paciacus is adopted by Drumann, where he is speaking of L. Junius Paciacus (Geshichte Roms, iv. p. 52).

Drumann observes that the flight of Crassus to Spain must have taken place B.C. 85, for he remained eight months in Spain and returned to Rome on the news of Cinna's death, B.C. 84.

[17] The MSS. have αὖραν, 'breeze,' which Coræs ingeniously corrected to λαύπαν, 'path,' which is undoubtedly right.

[18] If Fenestella died in A.D. 19 at the age of seventy, as it is said, he would be born in B.C. 51, and he might have had this story from the old woman. (Clinton, Fasti, A.D. 14.) See Life of Sulla, c. 28.

[19] Malaca, which still retains its name Malaga, was an old Phœnician settlement on the south coast of Spain. Much fish was salted and cured there; but I know not on what ground Kaltwasser concludes that the word 'Malach' means Salt. It is sometimes asserted that the name is from the Aramaic word Malek, 'King;' but W. Humboldt (Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens) says that it is a Basque word.

[20] The son of Metellus Numidicus. See the Lives of Marius and Sertorius. Sulla lauded in Italy B.C. 83. See the Life of Sulla, c. 27.

[21] This is the town which the Romans called Tuder. It was situated in Umbria on a hill near the Tiber, and is represented by the modern Todi.

[22] See the Life of Sulla, c. 29.

[23] There is nothing peculiar in this. It is common enough for a man to blame in others the faults that he has himself.

[24] See the Life of Cæsar, c. 1. 2. and 11.

[25] M. Porcius Cato, whose Life Plutarch has written.

[26] Cn. Sicinius was Tribunus Plebis B.C. 76. He is mentioned by Cicero (Brutus, c. 60) as a man who had no other oratorical qualification except that of making people laugh. The Roman proverb to which Plutarch alludes occurs in Horatius, 1 Sat. 4. 34:—

"Foenum habet in cornu, longe fuge."

[27] The insurrection of the gladiators commenced B.C. 73, in the consulship of M. Terentius Varo Lucullus, the brother of Lucius Lucullus, and of C. Cassius Longinus Verus. The names of two other leaders, Crixus and Oenomaus, are recorded by Floras (iii. 20) and by Appian (Civil Wars, i. 116). The devastation caused by these marauders was long remembered. The allusion of Horatius (Carm. ii. 14) to their drinking all the wine that they could find,is characteristic.

[28] This Clodius is called Appius CloDius Glaber by Florus (iii. 20). Compare the account of Appian (i. 116). Spartacus commenced the campaign by flying to Mount Vesuvius, which was the scene of the stratagem that is told in this chapter (Frontinus, Stratagem, i. 5) Drumann (Geschichte Roms, iv. 74. M. Licinius Crassus, N. 37) has given a sketch of the campaign with Spartacus.

[29] P. Varinius Glaber who was prætor; and Clodius was his legatus. He seems to be the same person whom Frontinus (Stratagem, i. 5) mentions under the name of L. Varinus Proconsul.

[30] The place is unknown. Probably the true reading is Salinæ, and the place may be the Salinæ Herculeæ, in the neighbourhood of Herculaneum. But this is only a guess.

[31] The consuls were L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Lentulus Clodianus B.C. 72.

[32] This was C. Cassius Longinus Verus, proconsul of Gaul upon the Po (see c. 8). Plutarch calls him στρατηγός. Appian (Civil Wars, i. 117) says that one of the consuls defeated Crixus, who was at the head of 30,000 men, near Garganus, that Spartacus afterwards defeated both the consuls, and meditated advancing upon Rome with 120,000 foot soldiers. Spartacus sacrificed three hundred Roman captives to the manes of Crixus, who had fallen in the battle in which he was defeated; 20,000 of his men had perished with Crixus.

Cassius was defeated in the neighbourhood of Mutina (Modena) as we learn from Florus (iii. 20).

[33] Appian (i. 118) gives two accounts of the decimation, neither of which agrees with the account of Plutarch. This punishment which the Romans called Decimatio, is occasionally mentioned by the Roman writers (Liv. ii. 59).

[34] Kaltwasser with the help of a false reading has mistranslated this passage. He says that Spartacus sent over ten thousand men into Sicily. Drumann has understood the passage as I have translated it.

[35] If the length is rightly given, the ditch was about 38 Roman miles in length. There are no data for determining its position. The circumstance is briefly mentioned by Appian (Civil Wars, i. 118). Frontinus (Stratagem., i. 5) states that Spartacus filled up the ditch, where he crossed it, with the dead bodies of his prisoners and of the beasts which were killed for that purpose.

[36] This lake, which Plutarch spells Leukanis, is placed by Kaltwasser in the vicinity of Paestum or Poseidonia, but on what grounds I do not know. Strabo indeed (p. 251) states that the river makes marshes there, but that will not enable us to identify them. Cramer (Ancient Italy, ii. 366) places here the Stagnum Lucanum, where Plutarch "mentions that Crassus defeated a considerable body of rebels under the command of Spartacus (Plut. Vit. Crass.)": but nothing is given to prove the assertion. He adds, "In this district we must also place the Mons Calamatius and Mons Cathena of which Frontinus speaks in reference to the same event (Stratagem, ii. 4); they are the mountains of Capaccio." This is founded on Cluverius, but Cluverius concludes that the Calamatius of Frontinus (ii. 4, 7), or Calamarcus as the MSS. seem to have it, is the same as the Cathena of Frontinus (ii. 5, 34); for in fact Frontinus tells the same story twice, as he sometimes does. It is a mistake to say that Frontinus is speaking "of the same event," that is, the defeat of the gladiators on the lake. He is speaking of another event, which is described farther on in this chapter, when Crassus attacks Cannicius and Crixus, and "sent," as Frontinus says (ii. 4, 7), " twelve cohorts round behind a mountain."

[37] This was Marcus Lucullus, the brother of Lucius.

[38] 'To the Peteline mountains' in the original. Strabo speaks of a Petelia in Lucania (p. 254), which some critics suppose that he has confounded with the Petilia in the country of the Bruttii. The reasons for this opinion are stated by Cramer (Ancient Italy, ii. 367, 390).

[39] 'Quintus' in the text of Plutarch, which is a common error. 'L. Quintius' in Frontinus (ii. 5, 34).

[40] The same thing is told in the Life of Pompeius, c. 21.

[41] In the Life of Marcellus, c. 22, Plutarch describes the minor triumph, called the Ovatio, which name is from the word 'ovis' a sheep; for a sheep only was sacrificed by the general who had the minor triumph; he who had the greater triumph, sacrificed an ox. In an ovatio the general walked in the procession, instead of riding in a chariot drawn by four horses, as in the Triumphus Curulis; and he wore a crown of myrtle, instead of a crown of bay which was worn on the occasion of the greater triumph. But Plinius (Hist. Nat. xv. 29) says that Crassus wore a crown of bay on the occasion of this ovation.

[42] The first consulship of M. Licinius Crassus and Cn. Pompeius Magnus belongs to B.C. 70.

[43] The story is told again in the Life of Pompeius, c. 23, where Aurelius is called Caius Aurelius, which is probably the true name.

[44] Crassus was censor with Lutatius Catulus in B.C. 65. The duties of the censors are here briefly alluded to by Plutarch. One of the most important was the numbering of the people and the registration of property for the purposes of taxation. This quarrel of the censors is mentioned by Dion Cassius (37. c. 9).

[45] The conspiracy of Catiline was in B.C. 63, the year when Cicero was consul. See the Life of Cicero.

There seems to be no evidence that Crassus was implicated in the affair of Catiline. Dion Cassius (37. c. 31) speaks of anonymous letters about the conspiracy being brought to Crassus and other nobles; and Plutarch states on the authority of Cicero that Crassus communicated the letters to Cicero. Dion Cassius in another passage (37. c. 35) mentions the suspicion against Crassus, and that one of the prisoners informed against him, "but there were not many to believe it." If Dion did not believe it, we need not; for he generally believes anything that is to a man's discredit. Sallustius (Bellum Catilin. c. 48) has given us a statement of the affair, but his own opinion can scarcely be collected from it. He says, however, that he had heard Crassus declare that Cicero was the instigator of this charge. The orations of Cicero which Plutarch refers to are not extant.

[46] The text is corrupt, though the general meaning is plain. See the note of Sintonis.

[47] The son of Crassus, who is introduced abruptly in Plutarch's fashion.

[48] After Cæsar had been prætor in Spain he was elected consul B.C. 59, with M. Calpurnius Bibulus (see the Life of Cæsar, c. 14). After his consulship Cæsar had the Gauls as his province. The meeting at Luca (Lucca), which was on the southern limits of Cæsar's province, took place B.C. 56; and here was formed the coalition which is sometimes, though improperly, called the first Triumvirate.

[49] The second consulship of Pompeius and Crassus was B.C. 55. Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus was one of the consuls of the year B.C. 56, during which the elections for the year 55 took place. This Domitius, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, was consul B.C. 54. In the quarrel between Pompeius and Cæsar, he joined Pompeius, and after various adventures finally he lost his life in the battle of Pharsalus B.C. 48.

[50] The first 'house' (οἰκία) is evidently the house of Domitius. The second house (οἴκημα), which may be more properly rendered 'chamber,' may, as Sintenis says, mean the Senate-house, if the reading is right. Kaltwasser takes the second house to be the same as the first house; and he refers to the Life of Pompeius, c. 51, 52, where the same story is told.

In place of οἴκημα some critics have read βῆμα the Rostra.

[51] Appian (Civil Wars, ii. 18) says that Pompeius received Iberia and Libya. The Romans had now two provinces in the Spanish peninsula, Hispania Citerior or Tarraconensis, and Ulterior or Bætica. This arrangement, by which the whole power of the state was distributed among Pompeius, Crassus and Cæsar, was in effect a revolution, and the immediate cause of the wars which followed.

Appian (Civil Wars, ii. 18) after speaking of Crassus going on his Parthian expedition in which he lost his life, adds, "but the Parthian History will show forth the calamity of Crassus." Appian wrote a Parthian History; but that which is now extant under the name is merely an extract from Plutarch's Life of Crassus, beginning with the sixteenth chapter: which extract is followed by another from Plutarch's Life of Antonius. The compiler of this Parthian History has put at the head of it a few words of introduction. The extract from Crassus is sometimes useful for the various readings which it offers.

[52] This wife was Cæsar's daughter Julia, whom Pompeius married in Cæsar's consulship (Vell. Paterc. ii. 44). She was nearly twenty-three years younger than Pompeius. Julia died B.C. 54, after giving birth to a son, who died soon after her. She possessed beauty and a good disposition. The people, with whom she was a favourite, had her buried in the Field of Mars. See the Lives of Pompeius and Cæsar.

[53] That is the Lex which prolonged Cæsar's government for five years and gave Iberia (Spain) and Syria to Pompeius and Crassus for the same period. The Lex was proposed by the Tribune Titus Trebonius (Livius, Epitome, 105; Dion Cassius, 39. c. 33).

[54] C. Ateius Capito Gallus and his brother tribune P. Aquillius Gallius were strong opponents of Pompeius and Crassus at this critical time. Crassus left Rome for his Parthian campaign at the close of B.C. 55, before the expiration of his consulship (Clinton, Fasti, B.C. 54).

[55] We learn that Crassus sailed from Brundisium (Brindisi), the usual place of embarkation for Asia, but we are told nothing more of his course till we find him in Galatia, talking to old Deiotarus.

[56] Zenodotia or Zenodotium, a city of the district Osrhoene, and near the town of Nikephorium. These were Greek cities founded by the Macedonians. I have mistranslated the first part of this passage of Plutarch from not referring at the time to Dion Cassius (40. c. 13) who tells the story thus:—"The inhabitants of Zenodotium sent for some of the Romans, pretending that they intended to join them like the rest; but when the men were within the city, they cut off their retreat and killed them; and this was the reason why their city was destroyed." The literal version of Plutarch's text will be the true one. "But in one of them, of which Apollonius was tyrant, a hundred of his soldiers were put to death, upon," &c.

[57] This was his son Publius, who is often mentioned in Cæsar's Gallic War.

[58] See Life of Lucullus, c. 22.

[59] Hierapolis or the 'Holy City' was also called Bambyke and Edessa. Strabo places it four schoeni from the west bank of the Euphrates. The goddess who was worshipped here was called Atargatis or Astarte. Lucian speaks of the goddess and her temple and ceremonial in his treatise 'On the Syrian Goddess' (iii. p. 451, ed. Hemsterhuis). Lucian had visited the place. Josephus adds (Jewish Antiq. xiv. 7) that Crassus stripped the temple of Jerusalem of all its valuables to the amount of ten thousand talents. The winter occupation of the Roman general was more profitable than his campaign the following year turned out.

[60] This was a general name of the Parthian kings, and probably was used as a kind of title. The dynasty was called the Arsakidæ. The name Arsakes occurs among the Persian names in the Persæ of Aeschylus. Pott (Etymologische Forschungen, ii. 272) conjectures that the word means 'King of the Arii,' or 'the noble King.' The prefix Ar or Ari is very common in Persian names, as Ariamnes, Ariomardus, and others.

Plutarch in other passages of the Life of Crassus calls this Arsakes, Hyrodes, and other authorities call him Orodes. He is classed as Arsakes XIV. Orodes I. of Parthia, by those who have attempted to form a regular series of the Parthian kings.

Crassus replied that he would give his answer in Seleukeia, the large city on the Tigris, which was nearly pure Greek. The later Parthian capital was Ktesiphon, in the neighbourhood of Seleukeia, on the east bank of the Tigris and about twenty miles from Bagdad. The foundation of Ktesiphon is attributed by Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. 6, ed. Gronov.) to Bardanes, who was a contemporary of the Roman emperor Nero, if he is the Arsakes Bardanes who appears in the list of Parthian kings. But Ktesiphon is mentioned by Polybius in his fifth book, in the wars of Antiochus and Molon, and consequently it existed in the time of Crassus, though it is not mentioned in his Life. Ktesiphon is mentioned by Dion Cassius (40. c. 14) in his history of the campaign of Crassus, but this alone would not prove that Ktesiphon existed at that time.

[61] The Greek word here and at the beginning of ch. xix., translated 'mailed' by Mr. Long, always refers to cuirassed cavalry soldiers.

[62] C. Cassius Longinus, the friend of M. Junius Brutus, and afterwards one of the assassins of the Dictator Cæsar.

[63] He is afterwards called Artavasdes. He was a son of the Tigranes whom Lucullus defeated, and is called Artavasdes I. by Saint-Martin. He is mentioned again in Plutarch's Life of M. Antonius. c. 39, 50.

[64] Zeugma means the Bridge. Seleukus Nikator is said to have established a bridge of boats here, in order to connect the opposite bank with Apameia, a city which he built on the east side of the Euphrates (Plinius, Hist. Nat. v. 24). Zeugma afterwards was a usual place for crossing the river; but a bridge of boats could hardly be permanently kept there, and it appears that Crassus had to construct a raft. Zeugma is either upon or near the site of Bir, which is in about 37° N. Lat.

[65] Probably these great hurricanes are not uncommon on the Euphrates. In the year 1831 a gale sent Colonel Chesney's "little vessel to the bottom of the river;" but a still greater calamity befel the Tigris steamer in the Euphrates expedition which was under the command of Colonel Chesney, in May 1836. A little after one P.M. a storm appeared bringing with it clouds of sand from the west-north-west. The two steam-boats the Tigris and the Euphrates were then passing over the rocks of Es-Geria, which were deeply covered with water. The Euphrates was safely secured; but the Tigris, being directed against the bank, struck with great violence; the wind suddenly veered round and drove her bow off; "this rendered it quite impossible to secure the vessel to the bank, along which she was blown rapidly by the heavy gusts; her head falling off into the stream as she passed close to the Euphrates, which vessel had been backed opportunely to avoid the concussion." The Tigris perished in this violent hurricane and twenty men were lost in her. The storm lasted about eight minutes. Colonel Chesney escaped by swimming to the shore just before the vessel went down: he was fortunate "to take a direction which brought him to the land, without having seen anything whatever to guide him through the darkness worse than that of night."—"For an instant," says Colonel Chesney after getting to land, "I saw the keel of the Tigris uppermost (near the stern); she went down bow foremost, and having struck the bottom in that position, she probably turned round on the bow as a pivot, and thus showed part of her keel for an instant at the other extremity; but her paddle beams, floats, and parts of the sides were already broken up, and actually floated ashore, so speedy and terrific had been the work of destruction." (Letter from Colonel Chesney to Sir J. Hobhouse, 28th May, 1836; Euphrates Expedition Papers printed by order of the House of Commons, 17th July, 1837.)

Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv. 1) speaks of a violent storm at Anatha (Annah) on the Euphrates, during the expedition of the Emperor Julian. It blew down the tents and stretched the soldiers on the ground.

[66] A place struck with lightning was considered religious (religiosus), that is, it could no longer be used for common purposes. "The deity," says Festus (v. Fulguritum), "was supposed to have appropriated it to himself."

Dion Cassius (40. c. 17, &c.) gives the story of the passage of the river. The eagle, according to him, was very obstinate. It stuck fast in the ground, as if it was planted there; and when it was forced up by the soldiers, it went along very unwillingly.

The Roman eagle was fixed at one end of a long shaft of wood, which had a sharp point at the other end for the purpose of fixing it in the ground. The eagle was gold, or gilded metal; and, according to Dion Cassius, it was kept in a small moveable case or consecrated chapel. The eagle was not moved from the winter encampment, unless the whole army was put in motion. The Vexilla (σημεῖα of the Greek writers) were what we call the colours.

(See the note of Reimarus on Dion Cassius, 40. c. 18.)

[67] Dion Cassius (40. c. 20), who tells the story, names the man Augarus. See the note of Reimarus.

[68] This is the translation of Plutarch's word πελάτης, which word πελάτης is used by the Greek writers on Roman history to express the Latin Cliens. It is not here supposed that Parthian clients were the same as Roman clients; but as Plutarch uses the word to express a certain condition among the Parthians, which was not that of slavery, it is proper to retain his word in the translation.

[69] This "very Hyrodes" and his brother Mithridates are said to have murdered their father Arsakes XII. Phraates III., who is spoken of in the Life of Lucullus. The two brothers quarrelled. Mithridates is mentioned by some authorities as the immediate successor of his father under the title of Arsakes XIII. Mithridates III. Mithridates was besieged in Babylon by Hyrodes; and Mithridates, after surrendering to his brother, was put to death. (Dion Cassius, 39. c. 56; Appian, On the Affairs of Syria, c. 51; Justinus, xlii. 4.)

[70] This river is probably the same as the Bilecha, now the Belejik, a small stream which joins the Euphrates on the left bank at Racca, the old Nikephorium. This river is mentioned by Isidorus of Charax and by Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiii. c. 3), who calls it Belias.

[71] Plutarch seems to mean something like drums furnished with bells or rattles; but his description is not very clear, and the passage may be rendered somewhat differently from what I have rendered it: "but they have instruments to beat upon (ῥόπτρα), made of skin, and hollow, which they stretch round brass sounders" (ἠχείοις, whatever the word may mean here). The word ῥόπτρον properly means a thing to strike with; but it seems to have another meaning here. (See Passow's Greek Lexicon.) The context seems to show that a drum is meant.

[72] Margiana was a country east of the Caspian, the position of which seems to be determined by the Murg-aub river, the ancient Margus. Hyrcania joined it on the west. Strabo (p. 516) describes Margiana as a fertile plain surrounded by deserts. He says nothing of its iron. Plinius (Hist. Nat. vi. 16) says that Orodes carried off the Romans who were captured at the time of the defeat of Crassus, to Antiochia, in Margiana.

[73] So Xenophon (Cyropædia, i. 3. 2) represents King Astyages. The king also wore a wig or false locks.

[74] The peculiarity of the Parthian warfare made a lasting impression on the Romans; and it is often alluded to by the Latin writers:—

Fidentemque fuga Parthum versisque sagittis.

Virgil, Georgic iii. 31.

[75] In reading the chapter, it must be remembered that Publius is young Crassus. If there is any apparent confusion between the father and son, it will be removed by reading carefully. I have chosen to translate Plutarch, not to mend him.

[76] The reading of this passage in Appian (Parthica, c. 29) is τέλμασιν ἐντυχόντες, which Sintenis has adopted. The common reading is συντάγμασιν ἐντυχόντες, which various critics variously explain.

[77] In the old Latin translation of Guarini, the name Cn. Plancus occurs in place of Megabacchus. Kaltwasser conjectures that Megabacchus was a Greek, but the context implies that he was a Roman. Orelli (Onomastic. C. Megaboccus) takes him to be the person mentioned by Cicero (Ad Attic. ii. 7), which Gronovius had already observed, and again by Cicero, Pro Scauro, c. 2.

[78] Censorinus was a cognomen of the Marcia Gens, and several of the name are mentioned in the history of Rome; but this Censorinus does not appear to be otherwise known.

[79] Carrhæ was a Mesopotamian town, south of Orfa or Edessa, and about 37° N. lat. It is supposed to be the Haran of Genesis (xi. 31).

[80] Ichnæ was a town on the Bilecha, south of Carrhæ. Dion Cassias (40. c. 12) calls it Ichniæ, and adds that Crassus before taking Nikephorium had been defeated by Talymenus Eilakes. Eilakes is probably a blunder in the copies of Dion; and it is conjectured that he is the Sillakes mentioned by Plutarch (c. 21), Appian, and Orosius (vi. 3).

[81] The death of young Crassus, and the subsequent misfortunes of the Romans, are described by Dion Cassius, 40. c. 21, &c.

[82] Or Egnatius. He is called Gnatius by Appian.

[83] Cassius escaped to Syria, which he successfully defended against the invading Parthians, who lost their commander, Osakes. (Dion Cassius. 40. c. 28, 29; Cicero, Ad Attic. v. 20; Orosius, vi. 13.)

Cicero was proconsul of Cilicia during the Parthian invasion of Syria B.C. 51.

[84] Sinnaca is mentioned by Strabo p. 747, but he says nothing which enables us to fix its position. If Plutarch's narrative is correct; it was not far from Carrhæ; and Carrhæ was considered by the Romans to be the scene of the death of Crassus, probably because it was the nearest known place to the spot where he fell.

[85] 'The river' is the Euphrates.

[86] The stories about the death of Crassus varied, as we might suppose. Dion Cassius (40. c. 27) remarks that, according to one version of the story, Crassus was badly wounded, and was killed by one of his own people to prevent him from being taken alive. He adds that the chief part of the army of Crassus made their escape.

[87] The story of molten gold being poured into the mouth of the head of Crassus is given by Dion Cassius as a report. Floras (iii. 11) has the same story; and he says that it was the right hand of Crassus which was sent to the king, as we might conjecture it would be, if only one was sent.

[88] Kaltwasser asks, "Was this perchance intended as an allusion to the avarice of Crassus, as the female dress was intended to refer to his cowardice?" The probable answer is Yes.

[89] As this was a Greek town, it had a Greek constitution, and was governed by a body which the Romans called a Senate. The Senate of Seleukeia is mentioned by Tacitus (Annal. vi. 42): "Trecenti opibus, aut sapientia delecti, ut Senatus: sua populo vis; et quoties concordes agunt, spernitur Parthus."

[90] This Aristeides wrote lewd stories called Milesiaca, of which there were several books. They were translated into Latin by the historian L. Cornelius Sisenna, a contemporary of Sulla. It is not said whether the original or the translation formed a part of the camp furniture of this unworthy Roman soldier. The work of Aristeides was known to Ovidius (Tristia, ii. 413, 443), who attempts to defend his own amatory poetry by the example of Sisenna, who translated an obscene book.

[91] Probably there is an error in the name: Roscius has been proposed as the probable reading.

[92] Plutarch is alluding to the fable of the two wallets, which every man carries, one in front with his neighbours' faults in it, and the other behind containing his own. Phædrus (iv. 10, ed. Orelli) has pithily told the apologue:—

Peras imposuit Iuppiter nobis duas:
Propriis repletam vitiis post tergum dedit,
Alienis ante pectus suspendit gravem.
Hac re videre nostra mala non possumus:
Alii simul delinquunt, censores sumus.

Two wallets Juppiter has placed upon us:
Our own faults fill the bag we bear behind,
Our neighbour's heavy wallet hangs in front.
And so we cannot see our own ill deeds;
But if another trips, forthwith we censure.

[93] This word means a thick stick; and a snake of like form.

[94] Greek adventurers were always making their way to the courts of these barbarous Asiatic kings to serve in the capacity of physicians, mountebanks, or impostors of some kind. Several instances are mentioned by Herodotus. Tralles was a considerable town near the west coast of Asia Minor, from which this actor came.

[95] Pentheus, king of Thebes, son of Agave; would not recognise the divinity of Bacchus, whereupon Bacchus infuriated the women, and among them Agave, who killed her own son. She is introduced in the Bacchæ with his head in her hand, exulting over the slaughter of the supposed wild beast.

The passage which is cited is from the Bacchæ of Euripides, v. 1168, ed. Elmsley. The exact meaning of the word ἕλικα in the passage is uncertain. See Elmsley's note.

[96] The word is Exodium (ἐξόδιον), a kind of entertainment common among the Romans, though it is a Greek word. Plutarch means that this exhibition before the kings was like the farce which is acted after a tragedy. It seems as if Jason was first playing the part of Agave, and was then going to play that of Pentheus; but on seeing the head he put aside the mask and dress of Pentheus, and recited the words of the frantic mother. Plutarch sometimes leaves things in a kind of mist: he gives his reader opportunity for conjecture.

[97] Pacorus was completely defeated B.C. 38 near the Euphrates by P. Ventidius Bassus, who was the legatus of M. Antonius. Pacorus lost his life in the battle (Dion Cassius, 49. c. 20; Plutarch, Life of Antonius, c. 34). It is said that Pacorus fell on the same day on which Crassus lost his life fifteen years before, the 9th of June (Dion Cassius, 49. c. 21, and the note of Reimarus).

[98] He began his reign under the name of Arsakes XV. Phraates IV., according to some authorities, B.C. 37. He was not satisfied with murdering his father: he murdered his brothers, and many distinguished Parthians. His name occurs again in Plutarch's Life of Antonius. Phraates delivered up to Augustus, B.C. 20, the Roman soldiers, eagles, and standards which had been taken by Crassus; an event which is commemorated by extant medals, and was recorded by Augustus among his other exploits in the Monumentum Ancyranum.

[99] This is the Greek word (ὰκόνιτον): the same name is now given to Monkshood or Wolfsbane, a genus of Ranunculaceae. Aconite is now used as a medicine; "The best forms are either an alcoholic extract of the leaves, or an alcoholic tincture of the root made by displacement." It is a poisonous plant, and death has followed from the careless use of it ("Aconite," Penny Cyclopædia and Supplement to the P. Cyc.).

With this farce, as Plutarch remarks, the history of Crassus terminates. If Plutarch designed to make Crassus contemptible, he has certainly succeeded. And there is nothing in other authorities to induce us to think that he has done Crassus injustice. With some good qualities and his moderate abilities, he might have been a respectable man in a private station. But insatiable avarice, and that curse of many men, ambition without the ability that can ensure success and command respect, made Crassus a fool in his old age, and brought him to an ignominious end.


[Pg 89]

COMPARISON OF NIKIAS AND CRASSUS.

I. In the first place, the wealth of Nikias was much more honestly and creditably obtained than that of Crassus. Generally speaking, one cannot approve of men who make their money from mines, which are as a rule worked by criminals, or savages, labouring in chains in unhealthy subterranean dungeons; but yet this method of amassing a fortune seems much the more honourable, when compared with Crassus's purchase of confiscated lands and his habit of bidding for houses that were on fire. Crassus too used to practise these openly, like a trade: while he was also accused of taking bribes for his speeches in the Senate, of defrauding the allies of Rome, of currying favour with great ladies and assisting them to shield offenders from justice. Nothing of this sort was ever laid to the charge of Nikias, who, however, was ridiculed for giving money to common informers because he feared their tongues. Yet this action of his, though it would have been a disgrace to Perikles, or Aristeides, was a necessity for Nikias, who was naturally of a timid disposition. Thus Lykurgus the orator excused himself when accused of having bought off some informers who threatened him. "I am glad," said he, "that after so long a public life as mine I should have been at last convicted of giving bribes rather than of receiving them."

The expenditure of Nikias was all calculated to increase his popularity in the state, being devoted to offerings to the gods, gymnastic contests and public dramatic performances. But all the money he spent that way, and all that he possessed was but a small part of what Crassus bestowed upon a public feast at Rome for some tens of thousands of guests, whom he even maintained at his own cost for some [Pg 90]time after. So true it is that wickedness and vice argue a want of due balance and proportion in a man's mind, which leads him to acquire wealth dishonestly, and then to squander it uselessly.

II. So much for their riches. Now in their political life, Nikias never did anything bold, daring or unjust, for he was outwitted by Alkibiades, and always stood in fear of the popular assembly. Crassus, on the other hand, is accused of great inconsistency, in lightly changing from one party to another, and he himself never denied that he once obtained the consulship by hiring men to assassinate Cato and Domitius. And in the assembly held for the dividing for the provinces, many were wounded and four men slain in the Forum, while Crassus himself (which I have forgotten to mention in his Life) struck one Lucius Annalius, a speaker on the other side, so violent a blow with his fist that his face was covered with blood. But though Crassus was overbearing and tyrannical in his public life, yet we cannot deny that the shrinking timidity and cowardice of Nikias deserve equally severe censure; and it must be remembered that when Crassus was carrying matters with so high a hand, it was no Kleon or Hyperbolus that he had for an antagonist, but the great Julius Cæsar himself, and Pompeius who had triumphed three several times, and that he gave way to neither of them, but became their equal in power, and even excelled Pompeius in dignity by obtaining the office of censor. A great politician should not try to avoid unpopularity, but to gain such power and reputation as will enable him to rise above it.

Yet if it were true that Nikias preferred quiet and security to anything else, and that he stood in fear of Alkibiades in the assembly, of the Spartans at Pylus, and of Perdikkas in Thrace, he had every opportunity to repose himself in Athens and to "weave the garland of a peaceful life," as some philosopher calls it. He had indeed a true and divine love of peace, and his attempt to bring the Peloponnesian war to an end, was an act of real Hellenic patriotism. In this respect Crassus cannot be compared with Nikias, not though he had carried the frontier of the Roman empire as far as the Caspian and the Indian seas.

[Pg 91]III. Yet a statesman, in a country which appreciates his merits, ought not when at the height of his power to make way for worthless men, and place in office those who have no claim to it, as Nikias did when he laid down his own office of commander-in-chief and gave it to Kleon, a man who possessed no qualification whatever for the post except his brazen effrontery. Neither can I praise Crassus for having so rashly and hurriedly brought the war with Spartacus to a crisis, although he was actuated by an honourable ambition in fearing that Pompeius would arrive and take from him the glory of having completed the war, as Mummius took from Marcellus the glory of winning Corinth. But on the other hand the conduct of Nikias was altogether monstrous and inexcusable. He did not give up his honourable post to his enemy at a time when there was hope of success and little peril. He saw that great danger was likely to be incurred by the general in command at Pylus, and yet he was content to place himself in safety, and let the state run the risk of ruin, by entrusting an incompetent person with the sole management of affairs. Yet Themistokles, rather than allow an ignorant commander to mismanage the war against Persia, bribed him to lay down his office. So also Cato at a most dangerous crisis became a candidate for the office of tribune of the people in order to serve his country. But Nikias, reserving himself to play the general at the expense of the village of Minoa, the island of Kythera, and the miserable inhabitants of Melos,[100] when it came to fighting the Lacedæmonians eagerly stripped off his general's cloak, and entrusted to an inexperienced and reckless man like Kleon, the conduct of an enterprise involving the safety of a large Athenian fleet and army, showing himself no less neglectful of his own honour than he was of the interests of his country. After this he was forced against his will into the war with Syracuse, in which he seems to have imagined that his army would capture the city by remaining before it doing nothing, and not by vigorous attacks. No doubt it is a great testimony to the esteem in which he was held [Pg 92]by his countrymen, that he was always opposed to war and unwilling to act as general, and was nevertheless always forced by them to undertake that office: whereas Crassus, who always wished for an independent command, never obtained one except in the servile war, and then only because all the other generals, Pompeius, Metellus, and Lucullus, were absent. Yet at that time Crassus was at the height of his power and reputation: but his friends seem to have thought him, as the comic poet has it,

"Most excellent, save in the battle-field."

And in his case also, the Romans gained no advantage from his ambitious desire of command. The Athenians sent Nikias to Sicily against his will, and Crassus led the Romans to Parthia against their will. Nikias suffered by the actions of the Athenians, while Rome suffered by the actions of Crassus.

IV. However, in their last moments we incline rather to praise Nikias than to blame Crassus. Nikias, a skilful and experienced commander, did not share the rash hopes of his countrymen, but never thought that Sicily could be conquered, and dissuaded them from making the attempt. Crassus, on the other hand, urged the Romans to undertake the war with Parthia, representing the conquest of that country as an easy operation, which he nevertheless failed to effect. His ambition was vast. Cæsar had conquered the Gauls, Germans, Britons, and all the west of Europe, and Crassus wished in his turn to march eastward as far as the Indian Ocean, and to conquer all those regions of Asia which Pompeius and Lucullus, two great men and actuated by a like desire for conquest, had previously aspired to subdue. Yet they also met with a like opposition. When Pompeius was given an unlimited command in the East, the appointment was opposed by the Senate, and when Cæsar routed thirty thousand Germans, Cato proposed that he should be delivered up to the vanquished, and that thus the anger of the gods should be turned away from the city upon the author of so great a crime as he had committed by breaking his word. Yet the Romans slighted Cato's [Pg 93]proposals and held a solemn thanksgiving for fifteen days to show their joy at the news. How many days then must we imagine they would have spent in rejoicing if Crassus had sent despatches announcing the capture of Babylon, and then had reduced Media, Persia, Hyrkania, Susa, and Bactria to the condition of Roman provinces. "If a man must do wrong," as Euripides says of those who cannot live in peace, and be contented when they are well off, they should do it on a grand scale like this, not capture contemptible places like Skandeia or Mende, or chase the people of Ægina, like birds who have been turned out of their nests. If we are to do an injustice, let us not do it in a miserable pettifogging way, but imitate such great examples as Crassus and Alexander the Great. Those who praise the one of these great men, and blame the other, do so only because they are unable to see any other distinction between them except that the one failed and the other succeeded.

V. When acting as general, Nikias did many great exploits, for he was many times victorious, all but took Syracuse, and ought not justly to bear the blame of the whole Sicilian disaster, because of his disease, and the ill will which some bore him at Athens. Crassus on the other hand committed so many mistakes as to put it out of the power of fortune to aid him, so that one wonders not so much that his folly was overcome by the Parthians as that it could overcome the good fortune of the Romans. Now as the one never disregarded religious observances and omens, the other despised them all, and yet both alike perished, it is hard to say what inference we ought to draw, as to which acted most wisely, yet we must incline rather to the side of him who followed the established rule in such matters rather than that of him who insolently discarded all such observances. In his death Crassus is more to be commended, because he yielded himself against his will in consequence of the entreaties of his friends, and was most treacherously deceived by the enemy, while Nikias delivered himself up to his enemies through a base and cowardly desire to save his life, and thus made his end more infamous.

FOOTNOTES:

[100] I cannot find that Nikias took any part in the massacre of the people of Melos in 416 B.C.


[Pg 94]

LIFE OF SERTORIUS.

I. It is perhaps not a matter of surprise, if in the lapse of time, which is unlimited, while fortune[101] is continually changing her course, spontaneity should often result in the same incidents; for, if the number of elemental things is not limited, fortune has in the abundance of material a bountiful supply of sameness of results; and, if things are implicated in a dependence upon definite numbers, it is of necessity that the same things must often happen, being effected by the same means. Now, as some are pleased to collect, by inquiry and hearsay, from among [Pg 95]the things which accidentally happen, such as bear some likeness to the works of calculation and forethought: such, for instance, as that there were two celebrated Atteis,[102] the one a Syrian and the other an Arcadian, and that both were killed by a wild boar; that there were two Actæons, one of whom was torn in pieces by his dogs and the other by his lovers; that there were two Scipios,[103] by one of whom the Carthaginians were first conquered, and by the other were cut up root and branch; that Troy was taken by Hercules, on account of the horses of Laomedon, and by Agamemnon by means of the wooden horse, as it is called, and was taken a third time by Charidemus, by reason of the Ilians not being able to close the gates quick enough, owing to a horse having got between them; that there are two cities which have the same name with the most fragrant of plants, Ios[104] and Smyrna, and that Homer was born in one of them and died in the other: I may be allowed to add to these instances, that the most warlike of commanders and those who have accomplished most by a union of daring and cunning, have been one-eyed men, Philippus,[105] Antigonus, [Pg 96]Annibal, and the subject of this Life—Sertorius; he whom one may affirm to have been more continent as to women than Philip, more true to his friends than Antigonus, more merciful to his enemies than Annibal,[106] inferior in understanding to none of them, but in fortune inferior to all; and, though he always found Fortune more hard to deal with than his open enemies, yet he proved himself her equal by opposing the experience of Metellus, the daring of Pompeius, the fortune of Sulla, and the power of the whole Roman state; a fugitive and a stranger putting himself at the head of barbarians. Of all the Greeks, Eumenes[107] of Kardia presents the nearest resemblance to him. Both of them were men qualified to command; both were warlike, and yet full of stratagem; both became exiles from their native land and the commanders of foreign troops; and both had the same violent and unjust fortune in their end, for both of them were the objects of conspiracy, and were cut off by the hands of those with whom they were victorious over their enemies.

II. Quintus Sertorius belonged to a family not among the meanest in Nussa,[108] a Sabine city. He was carefully brought up by a widowed mother, for he had lost his [Pg 97]father, and he appears to have been exceedingly attached to her. His mother's name, they say, was Rhea. He had a competent practical education in the courts of justice, and, as a young man, he attained some influence in the city by his eloquence. But his reputation and success in war diverted all his ambition in that direction.

III. Now, first of all, after the Cimbri and Teutones had invaded Gaul, he was serving under Cæpio[109] at the time when the Romans were defeated and put to flight; and, though he lost his horse and was wounded in the body, he crossed the Rhone swimming in his cuirass and with his shield against the powerful stream—so strong was his body and disciplined by exercise. On a second occasion, when the same barbarians were advancing with many thousand men and dreadful threats, so that for a Roman to stand to his ranks at such a time, and to obey his general, was a great matter, Marius had the command, and Sertorius undertook to be a spy upon the enemy. Putting on a Celtic dress, and making himself master of the most ordinary expressions of the language, for the purpose of conversation when occasion might offer, he mingled with the barbarians, and, either by his own eyes or by inquiry, learning all that was important to know, he returned to Marius. For this he obtained the prize of merit; and in the rest of the campaign, having given many proofs of his judgment and daring, he was honoured and trusted by his general. After the close of the war with the Cimbri and Teutones, he was sent as tribune by Didius[110] [Pg 98]the prætor to Iberia, and he wintered in Castlo,[111] a city of the Celtiberi. The soldiers, being in the midst of abundance, lost all discipline, and were generally drunk, which brought them into contempt with the barbarians, who, by night, sent for aid from their neighbours the Gyrisœni, and, coming on the soldiers in their lodgings, began to slaughter them. Sertorius with a few others stole out, and, collecting the soldiers who made their escape, surrounded the city. Finding the gates open through which the barbarians had secretly entered, he did not make the same mistake that they did, but he set a watch there, and, hemming in the city on all sides, he massacred every man who was of age to bear arms. When the massacre was over, he ordered all his soldiers to lay down their own armour and dress, and, putting on those of the barbarians, to follow him to the city from which the men came who had fallen on them in the night. The barbarians were deceived by the armour, and he found the gates open, and a number of men expecting to meet friends and fellow-citizens, returning from a successful expedition. Accordingly, most of them were killed by the Romans near the gates, and the rest surrendered and were sold as slaves.

IV. This made the name of Sertorius known in Iberia; and as soon as he returned to Rome he was appointed quæstor in Gaul upon the Padus at a critical time; for the Marsic[112] war was threatening. Being commissioned to levy troops and procure arms, he applied so much zeal and expedition to the work, compared with the tardiness and indolence of the other young men, that he got the reputation of being a man likely to run an active career. Yet he remitted nothing of the daring of a soldier after he was promoted to the rank of commander; but he exhibited wonderful feats of courage, and exposed himself without any reserve to danger, whereby he lost one of his eyes [Pg 99]through a wound. But he always prided himself on this. He used to say that others did not always carry about with them the proofs of their valour, but put them aside, at times, as chains and spears, and crowns, while the proofs of his valour always abided with him, and those who saw what he had lost saw at the same time the evidences of his courage. The people also showed him appropriate marks of respect; for, on his entering the theatre, they received him with clapping of hands and expressions of their good wishes—testimonials which even those who were far advanced in age, and high in rank, could with difficulty obtain. However, when he was a candidate for the tribuneship, Sulla raised a party against him, and he failed; and this was, apparently, the reason why he hated Sulla. But when Marius was overpowered by Sulla and fled from Rome, and Sulla had set out to fight with Mithridates, and the consul Octavius adhered to the party of Sulla, while his colleague Cinna, who aimed at a revolution, revived the drooping faction of Marius, Sertorius attached himself to Cinna, especially as he saw that Octavius was deficient in activity, and he distrusted the friends of Marius. A great battle was fought in the Forum between the consuls, in which Octavius got the victory, and Cinna and Sertorius took to flight, having lost nearly ten thousand men. However, they persuaded most of the troops, which were still scattered about Italy, to come over to their side, and they were soon a match for Octavius.

V. When Marius had returned from Libya, and was proposing to join Cinna, himself in a mere private capacity and Cinna as consul, all the rest thought it politic to receive him; but Sertorius was against it: whether it was because he thought that Cinna would pay less respect to him when a general of higher reputation was present, or because he feared the ferocious temper of Marius, and that he would put all in confusion in his passion, which knew no bounds, transgressing the limits of justice in the midst of victory. However this may be, Sertorius observed that there remained little for them to do, as they were now triumphant; but if they received the proposal of Marius, he would appropriate to himself all the glory and all the troops, being a man who could endure no partner in [Pg 100]power, and who was devoid of good faith. Cinna replied that what Sertorius suggested was true, but he felt ashamed and had a difficulty about refusing to receive Marius, after having invited him to join their party; whereupon Sertorius rejoined: "For my part, I thought that Marius had come to Italy on his own adventure, and I was merely considering what was best; but it was not honourable in you to make the thing a matter of deliberation at all after the arrival of the man whom you had thought proper to invite, but you ought to have employed him and received him; for a promise leaves no room for any further consideration." Accordingly Cinna sent for Marius, and the forces being distributed among them, the three had the command. The war being finished, Cinna and Marius were filled with violence and bitterness, so that they made the evils of war as precious gold to the Romans, compared with the new state of affairs. Sertorius alone is said to have put no person to death to gratify his vengeance, nor to have abused his power; but he was much annoyed at the conduct of Marius, and he moderated Cinna by private interviews and entreaties. At last, the slaves whom Marius had used as allies in war, and kept as guards to protect his tyranny, becoming formidable and wealthy, partly from the grants of Marius and his direct permission; partly from their violent and outrageous treatment of their masters, whom they butchered, and then lay with their masters' wives, and violated their children, Sertorius unable to endure any longer, speared the whole of them in their camp, to the number of four thousand.[113] VI. But when Marius[114] had died, and Cinna shortly after [Pg 101]was cut off, and the younger Marius, contrary to the wish of Sertorius, and by illegal means, obtained the consulship, and the Carbos and the Norbani and Scipios were unsuccessfully contending against Sulla on his march to Rome, and affairs were being ruined, partly through the cowardice and laziness of the commanders, and partly through treachery; and there was no use in his staying to see things still go on badly, owing to the want of judgment in those who had more power than himself; and finally, when Sulla, after encamping near Scipio, and holding out friendly proposals, as if peace was going to be made, had corrupted the army, though Sertorius had warned Scipio of this, and given his advice, but without effect—altogether despairing about the city, Sertorius set out for Iberia, in order that if he should anticipate his enemies in strengthening his power there, he might offer protection to such of his friends as were unfortunate at Rome. Sertorius, having fallen in with bad weather in the mountainous parts, was required by the barbarians to pay them a tribute, and to purchase a free passage. His companions were much incensed at this, and declared it to be a great degradation for a Roman proconsul[115] to pay a tribute to wretched barbarians; but Sertorius cared little for what they considered disgrace, and he said that he was buying time, the rarest of things for a man who was aiming at great objects: and so he pacified the barbarians with money, and hurrying into Iberia, got possession of the country. He there found nations strong in numbers and fighting men, but owing to the greediness and tyranny of the governors who had from time to time been sent among them, ill-disposed to the Roman administration in general; however, he regained the good will of the chiefs by his personal intercourse with them, and the favour of the mass by remission of taxes. But he got most popularity by relieving the people from having soldiers quartered on them; for he compelled the soldiers to fix their [Pg 102]winter tents in the suburbs of the towns, and he was the first to set the example. However, Sertorius did not depend altogether on the attachment of the barbarians, but he armed all the Roman settlers in Iberia who were able to bear arms, and by commencing the construction of all kinds of military engines and building ships he kept the cities in check; showing himself mild in all the affairs of civil administration, but formidable by his preparations against the enemy.

VII. Hearing that Sulla was master of Rome,[116] and that the party of Marius and Carbo was on the wane, and being in immediate expectation of an army coming to fight against him under some commander, he sent Julius Salinator to occupy the passes of the Pyrenees, with six thousand heavy armed soldiers. Shortly after this, Caius Annius[117] was sent from Rome by Sulla; but, seeing that the position of Julius could not be attacked, he was perplexed, and seated himself at the base of the mountains. But one Calpurnius, named Lanarius, assassinated Julius, on which the soldiers left the summits of the Pyrenees, and Annius, crossing the mountains, advanced with a large force and drove all before him. Sertorius, being unable to oppose him, fled with three thousand men to New Carthage,[118] and there embarking and crossing the sea, landed in Mauritania, in Libya. His soldiers, while getting water without due precautions, were fallen upon by the barbarians, and many of them were killed, upon which Sertorius sailed again for Iberia. He was, however, driven off the coast, and, being joined by some Cilician [Pg 103]piratical vessels,[119] he attacked the island of Pityussa,[120] and landing there drove out the garrison of Annius. Annius soon arrived with a large fleet and five thousand heavy armed men, and Sertorius ventured on a naval battle with him, though his vessels were light and built for quick sailing and not for fighting; but the sea was disturbed by a strong west wind, which drove most of the vessels of Sertorius upon the reefs, owing to their lightness, and Sertorius, with a few ships, could not get out to sea by reason of the wind, nor land on account of the enemy, and being tossed about for ten days, with the wind and a violent sea against him, he held out with great difficulty.

VIII. As the wind abated he set sail, and put in at some scattered islands, which had no water. Leaving them, and passing through the Straits of Gades,[121] he touched at those parts of Iberia on the right which lie out of the strait, a little beyond the mouths of the Bætis,[122] which flows into the Atlantic Sea,[123] and has given name to those parts of Iberia which lie about it. There he fell in with some sailors, who had returned from a voyage to the Atlantic[124] Islands, which are two in number, separated by [Pg 104]a very narrow channel, and ten thousand stadia from the coast of Libya, and are called the islands of the Happy. These islands have only moderate rains, but generally they enjoy gentle breezes, which bring dews; they have a rich and fertile soil, adapted for arable cultivation and planting; they also produce fruit spontaneously, sufficient in quantity and quality to maintain, without labour and trouble, a population at their ease. The air of the island is agreeable, owing to the temperature of the seasons, and the slightness of the changes; for the winds which blow from our part of the world from the north and east, owing to the great distance, fall upon a boundless space, and are dispersed and fail before they reach these islands; but the winds which blow round them from the ocean, the south and west, bring soft rains at intervals, from the sea, but in general they gently cool the island with moist clear weather, and nourish the plants; so that a firm persuasion has reached the barbarians that here are the Elysian Plains and the abode of the Happy which Homer[125] has celebrated in song.

[Pg 105]IX. Sertorius, hearing this description, was seized with a strong desire to dwell in the islands, and to live in quiet, free from tyranny and never-ending wars. The Cilicians, who did not want peace and leisure, but wealth and spoil, observing this inclination, sailed off to Africa, to restore Ascalis, the son of Iphtha, to the Moorish kingdom.[126] Sertorius, however, did not despond, but he determined to help those who were fighting against Ascalis, in order that his companions, by getting some renewal of hope and opportunity for other deeds, might not disperse through their difficulties. The Moors were well pleased at his arrival, and Sertorius setting himself to work defeated Ascalis, and besieged him. Sulla sent Paccianus to help Ascalis, but Sertorius engaging him with his forces killed Paccianus, and after his victory brought over the army and took Tigennis, to which Ascalis and his brother had fled. It is here that the Libyans say Antæus[127] is buried. Sertorius dug into the mound, as he did not believe what the barbarians said, so enormous was the size. But, finding the body there, sixty cubits in length, as they say, he was confounded, and, after making a sacrifice, he piled up the earth, and added to the repute and fame of the monument. The people of Tigennis have a mythus, that, on the death of Antæus his wife Tinge cohabited with Hercules, that Sophax was the issue of their connexion, and became king of the country, and named a city after his mother; they further say that Sophax had a son, Dio[Pg 106]dorus, whom many of the Libyan nations submitted to, as he had a Greek army of Olbiani and Mycenæi, who were settled in those parts by Hercules. But this may be considered as so much flattery to Juba,[128] of all kings the most devoted to historical inquiry; for they say that Juba's ancestors were the descendants of Diodorus and Sophax. Sertorius, now completely victorious, did no wrong to those who were his suppliants and trusted to him, but he restored to them both property and cities and the administration, receiving only what was fair and just for them to offer.

X. While Sertorius was considering where he should betake himself to, the Lusitani sent ambassadors to invite him to be their leader; for they were much in want of a commander of great reputation and experience, to oppose the formidable power of the Romans, and Sertorius was the only man whom they would trust, as they knew his character from those who had been about him. Now it is said that Sertorius was a man who never yielded either to pleasure or to fear, and while he was naturally unmoved by danger, he could bear prosperity with moderation; in the open field he was equal to any general of his time in enterprise, and as to all military matters that required stealthy manœuvres, the taking advantage of strong positions and rapid movements, and also craft and deception, he was in the moment of need most cunning in device. In rewarding courage he was bountiful, and in punishing for offences he was merciful. And yet, in the last part of his life, his cruel and vindictive treatment of the hostages may be alleged as a proof that his temper was not naturally humane, but that he put on the appearance of mildness through calculation and as a matter of necessity, But it is my opinion that no fortune can ever change to the opposite character a virtue which is genuine and founded on principle; still it is not impossible that good intentions and good natural dispositions, when impaired by great misfortunes[129] contrary to desert, may together with [Pg 107]the dæmon change their habit; and this I think was the case with Sertorius when fortune began to fail him; for as his circumstances became unfavourable, he became harsh to those who had done him wrong.

XI. However, he then set sail from Libya, at the invitation of the Lusitanians,[130] and got them into fighting condition, being immediately made commander with full powers, and he subjected the neighbouring parts of Iberia, most of which, indeed, voluntarily joined him, chiefly by reason of his mild treatment and his activity; but in some cases he availed himself of cunning to beguile and win over the people, the chief of which was in the affair of the deer, which was after this fashion:

Spanos, a native, and one of those who lived on their lands, fell in with a deer[131] which had just brought forth a young one and was flying from the hunters; he missed taking the deer, but he followed the fawn, being struck with its unusual colour (it was completely white), and caught it. It happened that Sertorius was staying in those parts, and when people brought him as presents anything that they had got in hunting, or from their farms, he would readily receive it and make a liberal return to those who showed him such attentions. Accordingly the man brought the fawn and gave it to Sertorius, who accepted the present. At first he took no particular pleasure in the animal, but in course of time, when he had made it so tame and familiar that it would come to him when he called it, accompany him in his walks, and cared not for a crowd and all the noise of the army, by degrees he began to give the thing a supernatural character, saying that the fawn was a gift from Artemis (Diana), and he gave out as a token of this that the fawn showed him many hidden things; for he knew that it is the nature of barbarians to be easily [Pg 108]accessible to superstition. He also resorted to such tricks as these: whenever he had got secret information that the enemy had invaded any part of the country, or were attempting to draw any city away from him, he would pretend that the deer had spoken to him in his sleep, and bid him keep his troops in readiness; and, on the other hand, when he heard that his generals had got a victory, he would keep the messenger concealed, and bring forward the deer crowned with chaplets, as is usual on the occasion of good news, and tell his men to rejoice and sacrifice to the gods, as they would hear of some good luck.

XII. By these means he tamed the people, and had them more manageable for all purposes, as they believed they were led, not by the counsels of a foreigner, but by a deity, and facts also confirmed them in this opinion, inasmuch as the power of Sertorius increased beyond all expectation; for with the two thousand six hundred men whom he called Romans, and four thousand Lusitanian targetiers, and seven hundred horsemen, whom he joined to a motley band of seven hundred Libyans, who crossed over with him to Lusitania, he fought with four Roman generals, who had under them one hundred and twenty thousand foot soldiers, six thousand horsemen, two thousand bowmen and slingers, and cities innumerable, while he had only twenty cities in all under him. But though so feeble and insignificant at first, he not only subdued great nations, and took many cities, but of the generals who were opposed to him he defeated Cotta[132] in a naval engagement in the channel near Mellaria;[133] he put to flight Fufidius,[134] the governor of Bætica, on the banks of the Bætis, with the slaughter of two thousand of his Roman soldiers; Lucius Domitius,[135] proconsul of the other [Pg 109]Iberia,[136] was defeated by his quæstor; Thoranius, another of the commanders of Metellus, who was sent with a force, he destroyed; and on Metellus[137] himself, the greatest man among the Romans in his day, and of the highest repute, he inflicted several discomfitures, and brought him to such straits, that Lucius Manlius[138] came from Narbo,[139] in Gaul, to his relief, and Pompeius Magnus[140] was hastily despatched from Rome with an army; for Metellus was perplexed at having to deal with a daring man, who evaded all fighting in the open field, and could adapt himself to any circumstances by reason of the light and easy equipment and activity of his Iberian army; he who had been disciplined in regular battles fought by men in full armour and commanded a heavy immovable mass of men, who were excellently trained to thrust against their enemies, when they came to close quarters, and to strike them down, but unable to traverse mountains, to be kept always on the alert by the continual pursuing and retreating of light active men, and to endure hunger like them, and to live under the open sky without fire or tent.

XIII. Besides this, Metellus was now growing old, and after so many great battles was somewhat inclined to an easy and luxurious mode of life; and he was opposed to Sertorius, a man full of the vigour of mature age, whose [Pg 110]body was wonderfully furnished with strength, activity, and power of endurance. He was never intoxicated with drink, even in his seasons of relaxation, and he was accustomed to bear great toil, long marches, and continued watchfulness, content with a little food of the meanest quality; and, inasmuch as he was always rambling about and hunting, when he had leisure, he became intimately acquainted with all the spots, both impracticable and practicable, which gave chance of escape if he had to fly, or opportunity of hemming in an enemy if he was in pursuit. Consequently, it happened that Metellus, being prevented from fighting, was damaged as much as men who are beaten in battle, and Sertorius by flying had all the advantage of the pursuer. He used to cut off the supplies of water, and check the foraging; and when Metellus was advancing Sertorius would get out of his way, and when he was encamped he would not let him rest; when Metellus was occupied with a siege, Sertorius would all at once show himself, and put Metellus in his turn in a state of blockade, owing to the want of the necessary supplies, so that the soldiers were quite wearied; and when Sertorius challenged Metellus to a single combat, the men cried out and bid him fight, as it would be a match between a general and a general, and a Roman and a Roman; and when Metellus declined, they jeered him. But he laughed at them, and he did right; for a general, as Theophrastus[141] said, should die the death of a general, not that of a common targetier. Metellus perceiving that the Langobritæ[142] assisted Sertorius in no small degree, and that their town could easily be taken, as it was ill supplied with water, for they had only one well in the city, and any one who blockaded the place would be master of the streams in the suburbs and near the walls, he advanced against the city, expecting to finish the siege in two days, as there was no water; [Pg 111]and accordingly his soldiers received orders to take provisions with them for five days only. But Sertorius quickly coming to their aid, gave orders to fill two thousand skins with water, and he offered for each skin a considerable sum of money. Many Iberians and Moors volunteered for the service, and, selecting the men who were strong and light-footed, he sent them through the mountain parts, with orders, when they had delivered the skins to the people in the city, to bring out of the town all the useless people, that the water might last the longer for those who defended the place. When the news reached Metellus he was much annoyed, for his soldiers had already consumed their provisions; but he sent Aquinius,[143] at the head of six thousand men, to forage. Sertorius got notice of this, and laid an ambush on the road of three thousand men who starting up out of a bushy ravine, fell on Aquinius as he was returning. Sertorius attacked in front and put the Romans to flight, killing some and taking others prisoners. Aquinius returned with the loss of both his armour and horse, and Metellus made a disgraceful retreat amidst the jeers of the Iberians.

XIV. By such acts as these Sertorius gained the admiration and love of the barbarians; and, by introducing among them the Roman armour, and discipline, and signals, he took away the frantic and brutal part of their courage, and transformed them from a huge band of robbers into an efficient regular army. Besides, he employed gold and silver unsparingly for the decoration of their helmets, and he ornamented their shields, and accustomed them to the use of flowered cloaks and tunics, and, by supplying them with money for such purposes, and entering into a kind of honourable rivalry with them, he made himself popular. But they were most gained by what he did for their children. The youths of noblest birth he collected from the several nations at Osca,[144] a large [Pg 112]city, and set over them teachers of Greek and Roman learning; and thus he really had them as hostages under the show of educating them, as if he intended to give them a share in the government and the administration when they attained to man's estate. The fathers were wonderfully pleased at seeing their children dressed in robes with purple borders, and going so orderly to the schools of Sertorius, who paid for their education, and often had examinations into their proficiency, and gave rewards to the deserving, and presented them with golden ornaments for the neck, which the Romans call "bullæ."[145] It was an Iberian usage for those whose station was about the commander to die with him when he fell in battle, which the barbarians in those parts express by a term equivalent to the Greek "devotion."[146] Now only a few shield-bearers and companions followed the rest of the commanders; but many thousands followed Sertorius, and were devoted to die with him. It is said that, when the army of Sertorius was routed near a certain city and the enemy was pressing on them, the Iberians, careless about themselves, saved Sertorius, and, raising him on their shoulders, every one vying with the rest helped him to the walls; and when their general was secure they then betook themselves to flight, each as well as he could.

XV. Sertorius was not beloved by the Iberians only, but also by the soldiers of Italy, who served with him. When Perpenna Vento,[147] who belonged to the same party [Pg 113]as Sertorius, had arrived in Iberia with much money and a large force, and had determined to carry on war against Metellus on his own account, his soldiers were dissatisfied, and there was much talk in the camp about Sertorius, to the great annoyance of Perpenna, who was proud of his noble family and his wealth. However, when the soldiers heard that Pompeius was crossing the Pyrenees, taking their arms and pulling up the standards, they assailed Perpenna with loud cries, and bade him lead them to Sertorius; if he did not, they threatened to leave him, and go of themselves to a man who was able to take care of himself and others too. Perpenna yielded, and led them to join the troops of Sertorius, to the number of fifty-three cohorts.

XVI. All the nations within the Iber river[148] were now joining Sertorius at once, and he was powerful in numbers; for they were continually flocking and crowding to him from all quarters. But he was troubled by the loose discipline and self-confidence of the barbarians, who called on him to attack the enemy, and were impatient of delay, and he attempted to pacify them with reasons. Seeing, however, that they were discontented, and were unwisely pressing him with their demands, he let them have their way, and winked at their engaging with the enemy, in so far as not to be completely crushed, but to get some hard knocks, which he hoped would render them more tractable for the future. Things turning out as he expected, Sertorius came to their aid when they were flying, and brought them back safe to the camp. However, as he wished also to cheer their spirits, a few days after this adventure he had all the army assembled, and introduced before them two horses,[149] one very weak and rather old, the [Pg 114]other of a large size and strong, with a tail remarkable for the thickness and beauty of the hair. There stood by the side of the weak horse a tall strong man, and by the side of the strong horse a little man of mean appearance. On a signal given to them, the strong man began to pull the tail of the horse with all his might towards him, as if he would tear it off; the weak man began to pluck out the hairs from the tail of the strong horse one by one. Now the strong man, after no small labour to himself to no purpose, and causing much mirth to the spectators, at last gave up; but the weak man in a trice, and with no trouble, bared the tail of all its hairs. On which Sertorius getting up, said, "You see, fellow allies, that perseverance will do more than strength, and that many things which cannot be compassed all at once, yield to continued efforts; for endurance is invincible, and it is thus that time in its course assails and vanquishes every power, being a favourable helper to those who with consideration watch the opportunities that it offers, but the greatest of enemies to those who hurry out of season." By contriving from time to time such means as these for pacifying the barbarians, he managed his opportunities as he chose.

XVII. His adventure with the people called Charicatani[150] was not less admired than any of his military exploits. The Charicatani are a people who live beyond the river Tagonius: they do not dwell in cities or villages; but there is a large lofty hill, which contains caves and hollows in the rocks, looking to the north. The whole of the country at the foot of the hill consists of a clayey mud and of light earth, easily broken in pieces, which is not strong enough to bear a man's tread; and if it is only slightly touched will spread all about, like unslaked lime or ashes. Whenever the barbarians through fear of war hid themselves in their caves, and, collecting all their plunder there kept quiet, they could not be taken by any force; and now, [Pg 115]seeing that Sertorius had retired before Metellus, and had encamped near the hill, they despised him as being beaten, on which Sertorius, whether in passion or not wishing to appear to be flying from the enemy, at daybreak rode up to the place and examined it. But he found the mountain unassailable on all sides; and while he was perplexing himself to no purpose and uttering idle threats, he saw a great quantity of dust from this light earth carried by the wind against the barbarians; for the caves are turned, as I have said, to the north, and the wind which blows from that quarter (some call it "caecias") prevails most, and is the strongest of all the winds in those parts, being generated in wet plains and snow-covered mountains; and at that time particularly, it being the height of summer, it was strong, and maintained by the melting of the ice in the sub-arctic regions, and it blew most pleasantly both on the barbarians and their flocks, and refreshed them. Now, Sertorius, thinking on all these things, and also getting information from the country people, ordered his soldiers to take up some of the light ashy earth, and bringing it right opposite to the hill to make a heap of it there; which the barbarians thought to be intended as a mound for the purpose of getting at them, and they mocked him. Sertorius kept his soldiers thus employed till nightfall, when he led them away. At daybreak a gentle breeze at first began to blow, which stirred up the lightest part of the earth that had been heaped together, and scattered it about like chaff; but when the caecias began to blow strong, as the sun got higher, and the hills were all covered with dust, the soldiers got on the heap of earth and stirred it up to the bottom, and broke the clods; and some also rode their horses up and down through the earth, kicking up the light particles and raising them so as to be caught by the wind, which receiving all the earth that was broken and stirred up, drove it against the dwellings of the barbarians, whose doors were open to the caecias. The barbarians, having only the single opening to breathe through, upon which the wind fell, had their vision quickly obscured, and they were speedily overpowered by a suffocating difficulty of breathing, by reason of respiring a thick atmosphere filled with dust. Accordingly, after [Pg 116]holding out with difficulty for two days, they surrendered on the third, and thus added not so much to the power as to the reputation of Sertorius, who had taken by stratagem a place that was impregnable to arms.

XVIII. Now, as long as Sertorius had to oppose Metellus, he was generally considered to owe his success to the old age and natural tardiness of Metellus, who was no match for a daring man, at the head of a force more like a band of robbers than a regular army. But when Pompeius had crossed the Pyrenees, and Sertorius had met him in the field, and he and Pompeius had mutually offered one another every opportunity for a display of generalship, and Sertorius had the advantage in stratagem and caution, his fame was noised abroad as far as Rome, and he was considered the most able general of his age in the conduct of a war: for the reputation of Pompeius was no small one; but at that time particularly he was enjoying the highest repute by reason of his distinguished exploits in the cause of Sulla, for which Sulla gave him the name of Magnus, which means Great, and Pompeius obtained triumphal honours before he had a beard. All this made many of the cities which were subject to Sertorius turn their eyes towards Pompeius, and feel inclined to pass over to him; but their intentions were checked by the loss at Lauron,[151] which happened contrary to all expectation. Sertorius was besieging this town, when Pompeius came with all his force to relieve it. There was a hill, well situated for enabling an enemy to act against the place, which Sertorius made an effort to seize, and Pompeius to prevent its being occupied. Sertorius succeeded in getting possession of the hill, on which Pompeius made his troops stop, and was well pleased at what had happened, thinking that [Pg 117]Sertorius was hemmed in between the city and his own army; and he sent a message to the people in Lauron, bidding them be of good cheer, and to keep to their walls and look on while Sertorius was blockaded. Sertorius smiled when he heard of this, and said he would teach Sulla's pupil (for so he contemptuously called Pompeius) that a general should look behind him rather than before. As he said this he pointed out to his men, who were thus blockaded, that there were six thousand heavy armed soldiers, whom he had left in the encampment, which he had quitted before he seized the hill, in order that if Pompeius should turn against them, the soldiers in camp might attack him in the rear. And Pompeius too saw this when it was too late, and he did not venture to attack Sertorius for fear of being surrounded; and though he could not for shame leave the citizens in their danger, he was obliged to sit there and see them ruined before his eyes; for the barbarians in despair surrendered. Sertorius spared their lives, and let them all go; but he burnt the city, not for revenge or because he was cruel, for of all commanders Sertorius appears to have least given way to passion; but he did it to shame and humble the admirers of Pompeius, and that the barbarians might say that Pompeius did not help his allies, though he was close at hand, and all but warmed with the flames of their city.

XIX. However, Sertorius was now sustaining several defeats, though he always saved himself and those with him from defeat; but his losses were occasioned by the other generals. Yet he gained more credit from the means by which he repaired his defeats than the generals on the other side who won the victories; an instance of which occurred in the battle against Pompeius, on the Sucro, and another in the battle near Tuttia,[152] against [Pg 118]Pompeius[153] and Metellus together. Now the battle on the Sucro is said to have been brought about by the eagerness of Pompeius, who wished Metellus to have no share in the victory. Sertorius, on his part, also wished to engage Pompeius before Metellus arrived; and, drawing out his forces when the evening was coming on, he commenced the battle, thinking that, as the enemy were strangers and unacquainted with the ground, the darkness would be a disadvantage to them, whether they were the pursued or the pursuers. When the battle began, it happened that Sertorius was not engaged with Pompeius, but with Afranius at first, who commanded the left wing of the enemy, while Sertorius commanded his own right. But, hearing that those who were opposed to Pompeius were giving way before his attack and being defeated, Sertorius left the right wing to the care of other generals, and hastened to the support of the wing that was giving way. Bringing together the soldiers who were already flying, and those who were still keeping their ranks, he encouraged them and made a fresh charge upon Pompeius, who was pursuing, and put his men to the rout; on which occasion Pompeius himself nearly lost his life, and had a wonderful escape after being wounded. The Libyans of Sertorius seized the horse of Pompeius, which was decked with golden ornaments and loaded with trappings; but while they were dividing the booty and quarrelling about it, they neglected the pursuit. As soon as Sertorius quitted the right wing to relieve the other part of the army, Afranius[154] put to flight his opponents and drove them to their [Pg 119]camp, which, he entered with the captives, it being now dark, and began to plunder, knowing nothing of the defeat of Pompeius, and being unable to stop his soldiers from seizing the booty. In the mean time Sertorius returned, after defeating the enemy who were opposed to him, and falling on the soldiers of Afranius, who were all in disorder and consequently panic-stricken, he slaughtered many of them. In the morning he again armed his troops and came out to fight; but observing that Metellus was near, he broke up his order of battle, and marched off saying, "If that old woman had not come up, I would have given this boy a good drubbing by way of lesson, and have sent him back to Rome."

XX. About this time Sertorius was much dispirited, because that deer[155] of his could nowhere be found; for he was thus deprived of a great means of cheering the barbarians, who then particularly required consolation. It happened that some men, who were rambling about at night for other purposes, fell in with the deer and caught it, for they knew it by the colour. Sertorius hearing of this, promised to give them a large sum of money if they would mention it to nobody; and, concealing the deer for several days, he came forward with a joyful countenance to the tribunal, and told the barbarian chiefs that the deity prognosticated to him in his sleep some great good fortune. He then ascended the tribunal, and transacted business with those who applied to him. The deer being let loose by those who had charge of it close by, and, seeing Sertorius, bounded joyfully up to the tribunal, and, standing by him, placed its head on his knees, and touched his right hand with its mouth, having been accustomed to do this before. Sertorius cordially returned [Pg 120]the caresses of the animal, and even shed tears. The spectators were at first surprised; then clapping their hands and shouting, they conducted Sertorius to his residence, considering him to be a man superior to other mortals and beloved by the gods; and they were full of good hopes.

XXI. Sertorius, who had reduced the enemy to the greatest straits in the plains about Seguntum[156] was compelled to fight a battle with them when they came down to plunder and forage. The battle was well contested on both sides. Memmius, one of the most skillful of the commanders under Pompeius, fell in the thick of the fight, and Sertorius, who was victorious, and making a great slaughter of those who opposed him, attempted to get at Metellus, who stood his ground with a resolution above his years, and, while fighting bravely, was struck by a spear. This made the Romans who were on the spot, as well as those who heard of it, ashamed to desert their leader, and inspired them with courage against their enemies. After covering Metellus with their shields and rescuing him from danger, by making a vigorous onset they drove the Iberians from their ground; and, as the victory now changed sides, Sertorius, with a view of securing a safe retreat for his men, and contriving the means of getting together another army without any interruption, retired to a strong city in the mountains, and began to repair the walls and strengthen the gates, [Pg 121]though his object was anything rather than to stand a siege: but his design was to deceive the enemy, in which he succeeded; for they sat down before the place, thinking they should take it without difficulty, and in the mean time they let the defeated barbarians escape, and allowed Sertorius to collect a fresh army. It was got together by Sertorius sending officers to the cities, and giving orders that when they had collected a good body of men, they should dispatch a messenger to him. When the messenger came, he broke through the besiegers without any difficulty and joined his troops; and now he again advanced against the enemy in great force, and began to cut off their land supplies by ambuscades, and hemming them in, and showing himself at every point, inasmuch as his attacks were made with great expedition; and he cut off all their maritime supplies by occupying the coast with his piratical vessels, so that the generals opposed to him were obliged to separate, one to march off into Gaul, and Pompeius to winter among the Vaccæi[157] in great distress for want of supplies, and to write to the Senate, that he would lead his army out of Iberia, if they did not send him money, for he had spent all his own in defence of Italy. There was great talk in Rome that Sertorius would come to Italy before Pompeius[158] to such difficulties did Sertorius, by his military abilities, reduce the first and ablest of the generals of that age.

XXII. Metellus also showed, that he feared the man and thought he was powerful; for he made proclamation, that if any Roman killed Sertorius he would give him a hundred talents of silver and twenty thousand jugera of land; and, if he was an exile, permission to return, to Rome: thus declaring that he despaired of being able to defeat Sertorius in the field, and therefore would purchase [Pg 122]his life by treachery. Besides this, Metellus was so elated by a victory which on one occasion he gained over Sertorius, and so well pleased with his success, that he was proclaimed Imperator[159] and the cities received him in his visits to them with sacrifices and altars. It is also said, that he allowed chaplets to be placed on his head, and accepted invitations to sumptuous feasts, at which he wore a triumphal vest; and Victories[160] which were contrived to move by machinery, descended and distributed golden trophies and crowns, and companies of youths and women sang epinician hymns in honour of him. For this he was with good reason ridiculed, for that after calling Sertorius a runaway slave of Sulla, and a remnant of the routed party of Carbo, he was so puffed up and transported with delight because he had gained an advantage over Sertorius, who had been compelled to retire. But it was a proof of the magnanimous character of Sertorius, first, that he gave the name of Senate to the Senators who fled from Rome and joined him, and that he appointed quæstors and generals from among them, and arranged everything of this kind according to Roman usage; and next, that though he availed himself of the arms, the money and the cities of the Iberians, he never yielded to them one *tittle of the Roman supremacy, but he appointed Romans to be their generals and commanders, considering that he was recovering freedom for the Romans, and was not strengthening the Iberians against the Romans; for Sertorius loved his country and had a great desire to return home. Notwithstanding this, in his reverses he behaved like a brave man, and never humbled himself before his enemies; and after his victories he would send to Metellus and to Pompeius, and declare that he was ready to lay down his arms and to live in a private station, if he might be allowed to return home; for, he said, he would rather be the obscurest citizen in Rome than an exile from his country, though he were proclaimed supreme ruler of all other countries in the world. It is said, that he longed to [Pg 123]return home chiefly on account of his mother, who brought him up after his father's death, and to whom he was completely devoted. At the time when his friends in Iberia invited him to take the command, he heard of the death of his mother, and he was near dying of grief. He lay in his tent for seven days without giving the watchword, or being seen by any of his friends; and it was with difficulty that his fellow-generals and those of like rank with himself, who had assembled about his tent, prevailed on him to come out to the soldiers, and take a share in the administration of affairs, which were going on well. This made many people think that Sertorius was naturally a man of mild temper, and well disposed to a quiet life; but that, owing to uncontrollable causes, and contrary to his wishes, he entered on the career of a commander, and then, when he could not ensure his safety, and was driven to arms by his enemies, he had recourse to war as the only means by which he could protect his life.

XXIII. His negociations with Mithridates also were a proof of his magnanimity; for now that Mithridates, rising from the fall that he had from Sulla, as it were, to a second contest, had again attacked Asia, and the fame of Sertorius was great, and had gone abroad to all parts, and those who sailed from the West had filled the Pontus with the reports about him, as if with so many foreign wares, Mithridates was moved to send an embassy to him, being urged thereto mainly by the fulsome exaggerations of his flatterers, who compared Sertorius to Hannibal and Mithridates to Pyrrhus, and said that if the Romans were attacked on both sides, they could not hold out against such great abilities and powers combined, when the most expert of commanders had joined the greatest of kings. Accordingly, Mithridates sent ambassadors to Iberia, with letters to Sertorius and proposals. On his part he offered to supply money and ships for the war, and he asked from Sertorius a confirmation of his title to the whole of Asia, which he had given up to the Romans pursuant to the treaty made with Sulla. Sertorius assembled a council, which he called a senate, and all the members advised to accept the king's proposal, and to be well content with it; they said the king only asked of them a name and an empty [Pg 124]answer touching things that were not in their power, in return for which they were to receive what they happened to stand most in need of. But Sertorius would not listen to this; he said he did not grudge Mithridates having Bithynia and Cappadocia; these were nations that were accustomed to a king, and the Romans had nothing to do with them; but the province which belonged to the Romans by the justest of titles, which Mithridates took from them and kept, from which, after a contest, he was driven out by Fimbria, and which he gave up by treaty with Sulla,[161] -that province he would never allow to fall again into the power of Mithridates; for it was fit that the Roman state should be extended by his success, not that his success should be owing to her humiliation. To a generous mind, victory by honest means was a thing to desire, but life itself was not worth having with dishonour.

XXIV. When this was reported to Mithridates he was amazed, and it is said that he remarked to his friends—what terms, then, will Sertorius impose when he is seated on the Palatium,[162] if now, when he is driven to the shores of the Atlantic, he fixes limits to our kingdom, and threatens us with war if we make any attempt upon Asia? However, a treaty was made, and ratified by oath, on the following terms: Mithridates[163] was to have Cappadocia and Bithynia, and Sertorius was to send him a general and soldiers; and Sertorius was to receive from Mithridates three thousand talents, and forty ships. Sertorius sent as general to Asia Marcus Marius, one of the Senators who had fled to him; and Mithridates, after assisting him to take some of the Asiatic cities,[164] followed Marius as he [Pg 125]entered them with the fasces and axes, voluntarily taking the second place and the character of an inferior. Marius restored some of the cities to liberty, and he wrote to others to announce to them their freedom from taxation through the power of Sertorius; so that Asia, which was much troubled by the Publicani,[165] and oppressed by the rapacity and insolence of the soldiers quartered there, was again raised on the wings of hope, and longed for the expected change of masters.

XXV. In Iberia, the senators and nobles about Sertorius, as soon as they were put into a condition to hope that they were a match for the opposite party, and their fears were over, began to feel envious, and had a foolish jealousy of the power of Sertorius. Perpenna encouraged this feeling, being urged by the empty pride of high birth to aspire to the supreme command, and he secretly held treasonable language to those who were favourable to his designs. "What evil dæmon," he would say, "has got hold of us, and carried us from bad to worse—us who did not brook to stay at home and do the bidding of Sulla, though in a manner he was lord of all the earth and sea at once, but coming here with ill luck, in order to live free, have voluntarily become slaves by making ourselves the guards of Sertorius in his exile, and while we are called a senate, a name jeered at by all who hear it, we submit to insults, and orders, and sufferings as great as the Iberians and Lusitanians endure." Their minds filled with such suggestions as these, the majority did not, indeed, openly desert Sertorius, for they feared his power, but they secretly damaged all his measures, and they oppressed the barbarians by severe treatment and exactions, on the pretext that it was by the order of Sertorius. This caused revolts and disturbances in the cities; and those who were sent to settle and pacify these outbreaks returned after causing more wars, and increasing the existing insubordination; so that Sertorius, contrary to his former [Pg 126]moderation and mildness, did a grievous wrong to the sons of the Iberians, who were educating at Osca,[166] by putting some to death, and selling others as slaves.

XXVI. Now Perpenna, having got several to join him in his conspiracy, gained over Manlius, one of those who were in command. This Manlius was much attached to a beautiful boy, and to give the youth a proof of his attachment he told him of the design, and urged him not to care for his other lovers; but to give his affections to him alone, as he would be a great man in a few days. The youth reported what Manlius said to Aufidius, another of his lovers, to whom he was more attached. On hearing this, Aufidius was startled, for he was engaged in the conspiracy against Sertorius, but he did not know that Manlius was a party to it. But when the youth named Perpenna and Graecinus,[167] and some others whom Aufidius knew to be in the conspiracy, he was confounded, yet he made light of the story to the youth, and told him to despise Manlius for a lying braggart; but he went to Perpenna, and, showing him the critical state of affairs, and the danger, urged him to the deed. The conspirators followed his advice, and having engaged a man to bring letters they introduced him to Sertorius. The letters gave information of a victory gained by one of the generals, and a great slaughter of the enemy. Upon this Sertorius was overjoyed, and offered a sacrifice for the happy tidings; and Perpenna proposed to feast him and his friends (and they were of the number of the conspirators), and after much entreaty he prevailed on Sertorius to come. Now whenever Sertorius was present, an entertainment was conducted with great propriety and decorum; for he would not tolerate any indecent act or expression, but accustomed [Pg 127]his companions to enjoy mirth and merriment with orderly behaviour, and without any excess; but, on this occasion, in the midst of the feast, seeking to begin a quarrel, they openly used obscene language, and, pretending to be drunk, behaved indecently, for the purpose of irritating Sertorius. Whether it was that he was vexed at this disorderly conduct, or had now suspected their design by the flagging of the conversation[168] and their unusual contemptuous manner towards him, he changed his posture on the couch by throwing himself on his back, as if he was paying no attention to them, and not listening. On Perpenna taking a cup of wine, and in the middle of the draught throwing it from him and so making a noise, which was the signal agreed on, Antonius, who lay next to Sertorius, struck him with his sword. On receiving the blow, Sertorius turned himself, and at the same time attempted to rise, but Antonius, throwing himself upon his chest, held his hands, and he was despatched by blows from many of the conspirators, without even making any resistance.

[Pg 128]XXVII.[169] Now most of the Iberians immediately sent ambassadors to Pompeius and Metellus, to make their submission; those who remained Perpenna took under his command, and attempted to do something. After employing the means that Sertorius had got together, just so far as to disgrace himself, and show that he was not suited either to command or to obey, he engaged with Pompeius. Being quickly crushed by him and taken prisoner, he did not behave himself even in this extremity as a commander should do; but having got possession of the papers of Sertorius, he offered to Pompeius to show him autograph letters from consular men and persons of the highest [Pg 129]influence at Rome, in which Sertorius was invited to Italy, and was assured that there were many who were desirous to change the present settlement of affairs, and to alter the constitution. Now Pompeius, by behaving on this occasion, not like a young man, but one whose understanding was well formed and disciplined, relieved Rome from great dangers and revolutions. He got together all those letters, and all the papers of Sertorius, and burnt them, without either reading them himself or letting any one else read them; and he immediately put Perpenna to death, through fear that there might be defection and disturbance if the names were communicated to others. Of the fellow-conspirators of Perpenna, some were brought to Pompeius, and put to death; and others, who fled to Libya, were pierced by the Moorish spears. Not one escaped, except Aufidius, the rival of Manlius, and this happened, either because he escaped notice, or nobody took any trouble about him, and he lived to old age, in some barbarian village, in poverty and contempt.

FOOTNOTES:

[101] If this is obscure, the fault is Plutarch's. His word for Fortune is τύχη which he has often used in the Life of Sulla. The word for Spontaneity is τὸ αὐτόματον, the Self-moved. The word for Elemental things is τὰ ὑποκειμένα. The word ὑποκειμένον is used by Aristotle to signify both the thing of which something is predicated, the Subject of grammarians, and for the Substance, which is as it were the substratum on which actions operate. Aristotle (Metaphys. vi. vii. 3) says "Essence (οὐσία) or Being is predicated, if not in many ways, in four at least; for the formal cause (τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι), and the universal, and genus appear to be the essence of everything; and the fourth of these is the Substance (τὸ ὑποκειμένον). And the Substance is that of which the rest are predicated, but it is not predicated of any other thing. And Essence seems to be especially the first Substance; and such, in a manner, matter (ὕλη) is said to be; and in another manner, form; and in a third, that which is from these. And I mean by matter (ὕλη), copper, for instance; and by form, the figure of the idea; and by that which is from them, the statue in the whole," &c. I have translated τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι by "formal cause," as Thomas Taylor has done, and according to the explanation of Trendelenburg, in his edition of Aristotle On the Soul, i. 1, § 2. It is not my business to explain Aristotle, but to give some clue to the meaning of Plutarch.

The word "accidentally" (κατὰ τύχην) is opposed to "forethought" (προνοία), "design," "providence." How Plutarch conceived Fortune, I do not know; nor do I know what Fortune and Chance mean in any language. But the nature of the contrast which he intends is sufficiently clear for his purpose.

[102] As to Attes, as Pausanias (vii. 17) names him, his history is given by Pausanias. There appears to be some confusion in his story. Herodotus (i. 36) has a story of an Atys, a son of Crœsus, who was killed while hunting a wild boar; and Adonis, the favourite of Venus, was killed by a wild boar. It is not known who this Arcadian Atteus was.

Actæon saw Diana naked while she was bathing, and was turned by her into a deer and devoured by his dogs. (Apollodorus, Biblioth. iii. 4; Ovidius, Metamorph. iii. 155.) The story of the other Actæon is told by Plutarch (Amator. Narrationes, c. 2).

[103] The elder Africanus, P. Cornelius Scipio, who defeated Hannibal B.C. 202, and the younger Africanus, the adopted son of the son of the elder Africanus, who took Carthage B.C. 146. See Life of Tib. Gracchus, c. 1, Notes.

[104] Ios, a small island of the Grecian Archipelago, now Nio, is mentioned among the places where Homer was buried. The name Ios resembles that of the Greek word for violet, (ίον). Smyrna, one of the members of the Ionian confederation, is mentioned among the birth places of Homer. It was an accident that the name of the town Smyrna was the same as the name for myrrh, Smyrna (σμύρνη),x which was not a Greek word. Herodotus (iii. 112) says that it was the Arabians who procured myrrh.

[105] This Philippus was the father of Alexander the Great. He is said to have lost an eye from a wound by an arrow at the siege of Pydna Antigonus, one of the generals of Alexander, was named Cyclops, or the one-eyed. He accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition, and in the division of the empire after Alexander's death he obtained a share and by his vigour and abilities he made himself the most powerful of the successors of Alexander. It is said that Apelles, who painted the portrait of Antigonus, placed him in profile in order to hide the defect of the one eye. Antigonus closed his long career at the battle of Ipsus B.C. 301, where he was defeated and killed. He was then eighty-one years of age.

[106] Plutarch's form is Annibas. I may have sometimes written it Hannibal. Thus we have Anno and Hanno. I don't know which is the true form. [I prefer to write it Hannibal.—A.S.]

[107] Plutarch has written the Life of Eumenes, whom he contrasts with Sertorius. Eumenes was one of the generals of Alexander who accompanied him to Asia. After Alexander's death, he obtained for his government a part of Asia Minor bordering on the Euxine, and extending as far east as Trapezus. The rest of his life is full of adventure. He fell into the hands of Antigonus B.C. 315, who put him to death.

[108] Nursia was in the country of the Sabini among the Apennines, and near the source of the Nar. It is now Norcia. The MSS. of Plutarch have Nussa.

[109] The date is B.C. 105. See the Life of Marius, c. 10, and Notes.

[110] Titus Didius and Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos were consuls B.C. 98. In B.C. 97 Didius was in Spain as Proconsul, and fought against the Celtiberi. Gellius (ii. 27) quotes a passage from the Historiæ of Sallustius, in which mention is made of Sertorius serving under Didius in Spain, and the character of Sertorius is given pretty nearly in the terms of Plutarch, who may have used Sallustius as one of his authorities. Didius is mentioned by Cicero, Pro Cn. Plancio, c. 25; and by Frontinus, i. 8. 5; ii. 10. 1; and by Appian (Iberica, c. 99). The passage in the text should be translated, "he was sent out under Didius as commander, and wintered in Iberia, in Castlo," &c. Plutarch has used the word στρατηγός, which means prætor; but to make the statement correct, we must translate it Proconsul, or commander. See Life of Crassus, c. 4, Notes.

[111] Castlo, Castalo, or Castulo, is placed on the north bank of the Bætis, the Guadalquivir.

[112] See the Life of Marius, c. 32, Notes. The events that are briefly alluded to at the end of this chapter are described in the Lives of Marius and Sulla. The battle in the Forum is spoken of in the Life of Marius, c. 41.

[113] The same story is told in the Life of Marius, c. 44, where it is stated that Cinna and Sertorius combined to put these scoundrels out of the way; but the number that were massacred is not stated there.

[114] Compare the Life of Marius, c. 45, and of Sulla, c. 28, &c. Cinna was murdered by his soldiers two years after the death of Marius, and in his fourth consulship, B.C. 84. The younger Marius was Consul in B.C. 82, with Cn. Papirius Carbo for his colleague. This was Carbo's third consulship. According to Plutarch, Sertorius left Italy after the younger Marius was consul, and therefore not earlier than B.C. 82, unless we understand the passage in Plutarch as referring to the election of Marius, and not to the commencement of his consulship. Appian (Civil Wars, i. 86) places the departure of Sertorius in the year B.C. 83.

[115] Sertorius had not been Consul, and therefore he was not now Proconsul. It is true that a man, who had not been Consul, might receive the government of a Province with the title of Proconsul. (See c. 7.) Sertorius may have assumed the title.

[116] If Sertorius stayed at Rome till the younger Marius was elected Consul, as Plutarch states in the sixth chapter, he probably saw what he is here represented as hearing.

[117] This Annius, surnamed Luscus, served under Q. Metellus in the Jugurthine War B.C. 107. (Sallust, Jug. War, c. 77.) Sulla gave him the command in Spain with the title of Proconsul B.C. 81. An extant medal seems to have been struck in honour of his Proconsulship. (Eckhel, Doct. Num. Vet. v. 134.)

[118] This town, which the Romans called Nova Carthago, was built by the Carthaginians at the close of the first Punic War B.C. 235, and so long as they kept possession of Spain it was their chief city. Livius (26. c. 42), describes the situation of New Carthage, now Cartagena, and one of the best harbours in Spain. Its position on the S.E. coast is favourable for communication with Africa.

[119] The maritime towns of Cilicia were for a long time the resort of a bold set of seamen and adventurers who scoured the Mediterranean and were as formidable to the people of Italy as the Barbary Corsairs were in the middle ages. It was one of the great merits of Cn. Pompeius Magnus that he cleared the seas of these scoundrels. See Lucullus, c. 37.

[120] The two islands of Yviça or Ibiça and Formentera, which belong to the Balearic group, were sometimes comprehended under the name of the Pityussæ or the Pine Islands (Strabo, 167, ed. Casaub.). The Greeks and Romans called Yviça, Ebusus. Iviça is hilly, and the high tracts are well covered with pine and fir.

[121] This is the old name of the Straits of Gibraltar, which is still retained in the modern form Cadiz. Gadeira, which the Romans called Gades, was an old Phœnician town, on the island of Leon, where Cadiz now stands. Strabo (p. 168, ed. Casaub.) says that Gades in his time (the beginning of the reign of Tiberius) was not inferior in population to any city except Rome, and was a place of great trade, as it is now.

[122] This river, now the Guadalquivir, gave the name of Bætica to one of the three provinces into which the Spanish Peninsula was ultimately divided by the Romans for the purposes of administration.

[123] This was the name for so much of the ocean that washes the west coast of Europe and Africa as the Greeks and Romans were acquainted with. The Greeks and Romans had no name for the Mediterranean.

[124] The only islands in the Atlantic that correspond to this description are Madeira and Porto Santo, but Porto Santo is forty miles north-east of Madeira. The distance of Madeira from the coast of Africa is about 400 miles or about 4000 stadia. The climate of Madeira is very temperate: the thermometer seldom sinks below 60°, though it sometimes rises as high as 90° of Fahrenheit. On the high and mountainous parts there are heavy dews, and rain falls at all seasons. Owing to the variety of surface and elevation the island produces both tropical products and those of temperate countries. The fame of this happy region had spread to all parts of the ancient world, though we cannot safely conclude that the islands were known by report to Homer. Horace in his 16th Epode is probably alluding to these islands when he is speaking of the Civil Wars and of flying from their horrors in those beautiful lines:

Nos manet Oceanus circumvagus; arva beata
Petamus arva divites et insulas, &c.

[125] The passage is in the fourth book of the 'Odyssey,' v. 563, and is quoted by Strabo (p. 31):

And there in sooth man's life is easiest;
Nor snow, nor raging storm, nor rain is there,
But ever gently breathing gales of zephyr
Oceanus sends up.

Strabo in another passage expresses an opinion that the Elysian fields were in the southern parts of Spain. That would at least be a good place for them.

[126] This region is the Mauritania of the Roman Geographers, the modern Marocco, and the town of Tigennis is the Roman Tingis, the modern Tangier, which is on the Atlantic coast of Africa, south-south-east of Gades. The circumstance of Tingis being attacked shows that the African campaign of Sertorius was in the north-western part of Marocco. Strabo mentions Tinga (p. 825). See also Plin. H.N. v. 1.

[127] The story of this giant is in the mythographers. Tumuli are found in many parts of the old and new world, and it seems probable that they were all memorials to the dead. The only surprising thing in this story is the size of the body; which each man may explain in his own way. There are various records in antient writers of enormous bones being found. Those found at Tegea under a smithy, which were supposed to be the bones of Orestes, were seven cubits long (Herodotus, i. 68), little more than the ninth part of the dimensions of Antæus: but Antæus was a giant and Orestes was not. See Strabo's remarks on this story (p. 829).

[128] See Life of Sulla, c. 17. I am not sure that I have given the right meaning of this passage. Plutarch may mean to say that he has said so much on this matter in honour of Juba.

[129] I have translated this passage literally and kept the word dæmon, which is the best way of enabling the reader to judge of the meaning; of the text. If the word "dæmon" is here translated "fortune," it may mislead. A like construction to the words τῶ δαιμόνι συμμεταβαλεῖν τὸ ἧθος occurs in the Life of Lucullus, c. 39. The meaning of the whole passage must be considered with reference to the sense of dæmon, which is explained in the notes of the Life of Sulla, c. 6.

[130] The Lusitani occupied a part of the modern kingdom of Portugal.

[131] This story of the deer is told by Frontinus (Stratagem, i. 11, 13), and by Gellius (xv. 22).

[132] He was of the Aurelia Gens.

[133] Is a small town on the coast, east of the mouth of the Bætis (Guadalquivir) and near the Straits of Gibraltar. The channel must be the Straits of Gibraltar.

[134] This is undoubtedly the right name, though it is corrupted in the MSS. See the various readings in Sintenis, and Sulla (c. 31), to which he refers. However, the corrupt readings of some MSS. clearly show what the true reading is.

[135] Sintenis reads Domitius Calvisius. But it should be Calvinus: Calvinus was a cognomen of the Domitii. (See Livius, Epitome, lib. 90.) The person who is meant is L. Domitius Ahenobarbus. He fell in this battle on the Guadiana, where he was defeated by Hirtuleius. (Drumann, Geschichte Roms, Ahenobarbi, 19.)

[136] That is the province which the Romans called Tarraconensis, from the town of Tarraco, Tarragona. The Tarraconensis was the north-eastern part of the Spanish peninsula. The true name of Thoranius is Thorius.

[137] This was Q. Metellus Pius, the son of Numidicus, who was banished through the artifices of C. Marius. (Life of Marius, c. 7, &c.) He was Proconsul in Spain from B.C. 78 to 72, and was sent there in consequence of the success of Sertorius against Cotta and Fufidius.

[138] Some critics read Lucius Lollius. See the various readings in Sintenis: his name was L. Manilius.

[139] I should rather have translated it "Gaul about Narbo." Plutarch means the Roman Province in Gaul, which was called Narbonensis, from the town of Narbo Martius.

[140] Commonly called Pompey the Great, whose name occurs in the Lives of Sulla, Lucullus, and Crassus. Plutarch has written his Life at length.

[141] Probably the philosopher and pupil of Aristotle.

[142] Some writers would connect this name of a people with Langobriga, the name of a place. There were two places of the name, it is said, and one is placed near the mouth of the Douro. It is useless to attempt to fix the position of the Langobritæ from what Plutarch has said.

[143] Or Aquinus or Aquilius. Cornelius Aquinus was his name.

[144] Osca was a town in the north-east of Spain, probably Huesca in Aragon. Mannert observes that this school must have greatly contributed to fix the Latin language in Spain. Spain however already contained Roman settlers, and at a later period it contained numerous Roman colonies: in fact the Peninsula was completely Romanized, of which the Spanish language and the establishment of the Roman Law in Spain are the still existing evidence. The short-lived school of Sertorius could not have done much towards fixing the Latin language in Spain.

[145] The Bulla was of a round form. See the copy of one from the British Museum in Smith's 'Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities.' Kaltwasser refers to Plutarch's Life of Romulus, c. 20, and his 'Roman Questions,' Part 3, in which he explains what the Bulla is.

[146] The Greek word κατάσπεισις signifies a "pouring out." Kaltwasser refers to a passage in Cæsar's 'Gallic War,' iii. 22, in which he speaks of the "devoted" (devoti), whom the Aquitani called Soldurii. As the Aquitani bordered on the Pyrenees, it is not surprising that the like usage prevailed among them and the Iberians.

[147] The orthography is Perperna, as is proved by inscriptions. M. Perperna, the grandfather of this Perperna, was consul B.C. 130. (see Life of Tib. Gracchus, c. 20, Notes.) The son of M. Perperna also was consul B.C. 92: he did not die till B.C. 49, and consequently survived his son, this Perperna of Plutarch. Perperna Vento had been prætor. He associated himself with Lepidus after the death of Sulla, and was like M. Lepidus driven from Rome (Life of Sulla, c. 34, Notes).

[148] This is the Ebro, which the Romans called Iberus, the large river which flows in a south-east direction and enters the Mediterranean.

It seems that Plutarch here means the nations between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, or the modern Aragon, Navarre, and Catalonia.

[149] The story is told by Frontinus, Stratagemata, i. 10, as Kaltwasser observes, and again, in iv. 7, in the very same words. It has been often remarked that Horatius probably alludes to this story (ii. Epist. I, 45).

[150] The Tagonius is either the Tagus (Tajo), or a branch of that large river, on the banks of which the Carpetani are placed by geographers, who also mark Caraca, a position on the Henares, a branch of the Tagus. If Caraca represents the country of the Charicatani, the Tagonius is the Nares or Henares, on which stood Complutum, the modern Alcalá de Henarea. But all this is merely conjecture.

[151] Lauron is placed near the coast, and near the outlet of the Sucro river, the modern Xucar. There was also a town Sucro near the mouth of the Sucro. Appian (Civil Wars, i. 109) says that when the city was captured, a soldier attempted violence on a woman (παρὰ φύσιν), who tore out his eyes with her fingers. Sertorius, who knew that the whole cohort was addicted to infamous practices, put them all to death though they were Romans. Frontinus (Stratagem. ii. 5) has a long account of this affair at Lauron, for which he quotes Livius, who says that Pompeius lost ten thousand men and all his baggage.

Pompeius began his Spanish campaign B.C. 76.

[152] These names are very uncertain in Plutarch. Tuttia may be the Turia, now the Guadalaviar, the river of Valencia, the outlet of which is about twenty-five miles north of the outlet of the Sucro. Other readings are Duria and Dusia (see the notes of Sintenis). If these rivers are properly identified, this campaign was carried on in the plains of the kingdom of Valencia. Tutia is mentioned by Florus (iii. 22) as one of the Spanish towns which surrendered to Pompeius after the death of Sertorius and Perperna.

Kaltwasser refers to Frontinus, who speaks of one Hirtuleius, or Herculeius in some editions, as a general of Sertorius who was defeated by Metellus (Stratagem, ii. 1). In another passage (ii. 7) Frontinus states that Sertorius during a battle being informed by a native that Hirtuleius hod fallen, stabbed the man that he might not carry the news to others, and so dispirit his soldiers. Plutarch (Life of Pompeius c. 18) states that Pompeius defeated Herennius and Perperna near Valentia, and killed above ten thousand of their men. This is apparently the same battle that Plutarch is here speaking of.

[153] See the Life of Pompeius, c. 19; and Appian (Civil Wars, i. 110), who states that the battle took place near the town of Suero (which would be the more correct translation of the text of Plutarch), and that the wing which Perperna commanded was defeated by Metellus.

[154] This L. Afranius is the man whom Cicero calls "Auli filius" (Ad Attic, i. 16), by which he meant that he was of obscure origin. He was consul with Q. Metellus Celer B.C. 60. Afranius and Petreius commanded for Pompeius in Spain B.C. 49, but C. Julius Cæsar compelled them to surrender, and pardoned them on the condition that they should not again serve against him. Afranius broke his promise and again joined Pompeius. He was in the battle of Thapsus in Africa B.C. 46, and after the defeat he attempted to escape into Mauritania, but was caught and given up to Cæsar, and shortly afterwards put to death by the soldiers.

[155] Appian (Civil Wars, i. 110) has the same story about the dear being found.

[156] Seguntum, or Saguntia, as it is written in Appian (i. 110). It is not certain what place is meant. Some critics would read "in the plains of the Saguntini," by which might be meant the neighbourhood of Saguntum, a town on the east coast between the mouths of the Ebro and the Xucar, which was taken by Hannibal in the second Punic War (Liv. 21, c. 15). The maps place a Segontia on the Tagonius, another on the Salo (Xalon), a branch of the Ebro, and a Saguntia in the country of the Vaccæi on the northern branch of the Douro. Pompeius in his letter to the Senate speaks of the capture of the camp of Sertorius near Sucro, his defeat on the Durius, and the capture of Valentia. If the Durius be the Douro, this Segontia may be one of the towns called Segontia in the north-west of Spain. But the Durius may be the Turia, the river of Valentia, and Segontia may be Saguntum. The fact of Pompeius wintering among the Vaccæi is perhaps in favour of a north-west Segontia; but still I think that Saguntum was the battle-field. This battle is mentioned by Appian (Civil Wars, i. 110), who says that Pompeius lost six thousand men, but that Metellus defeated Perperua, who lost about five thousand men.

[157] The Vaccæi occupied part of the country immediately north of the Durius (Douro); but the limits cannot be accurately defined.

[158] Compare the Life of Lucullus, c. 5, and the Life of Crassus, c. 11. The letter of Pompeius to the Senate is in the third book of the Fragments of the Roman History of Sallustius. The letter concludes with the following words, which Plutarch had apparently read: "Ego non rem familiarem modo, verum etiam fidem consumpsi. Reliqui vos estis, qui nisi subvenitis, invito et praedicente me, exercitus hinc et cum eo omne bellum Hispaniae in Italiam transgredientur."

[159] This appears to be the event which is described in the fragment of the Second Book of the History of Sallustius, which is preserved by Macrobius, Saturnalia, ii. 9, in the chapter "De Luxu."

[160] Compare the Life of Sulla, c. 11.

[161] See the Life of Sulla, c. 24.

[162] Kaltwasser quotes Reiske, who observes that Plutarch, who wrote under the Empire, expresses himself after the fashion of his age, when the Roman Cæsars lived on the Palatine.

[163] The treaty with Mithridates was made B.C. 75. This Marius is mentioned in the Life of Lucullus, c. 8. Appian (Mithridatic War, c. 68) calls him Marcus Varius, and also states that Sertorius agreed to give Mithridates, Asia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, and Galatia. In the matter of Asia the narratives of Plutarch and Appian are directly opposed to one another.

[164] This may be literally rendered "Marcus Marius together with whom Mithridates having captured some of the Asiatic cities;" Kaltwasser renders it, "in connection with him (Marcus Marius) Mithrdates conquered some towns in Asia." But the context shows that Marcus Marius was to be considered the principal, and that the towns were not conquered in order to be given to Mithridates.

[165] Compare the Life of Lucullus, c. 20.

[166] Appian (Civil Wars, i. 112) does not mention this massacre of the Iberian boys; but he states that Sertorius had become odious to the Romans whom he now distrusted, and that he employed Iberians instead of the Romans as his body-guard. He also adds that the character of Sertorius was changed, that he gave himself up to wine and women, and was continually sustaining defeats. These circumstances and fear for his own life, according to Appian, led Perperna to conspire against Sertorius (i. 113).

[167] Perhaps Octavius Gracimus, as the name appears in Frontinus (Stratagem. ii. 5, 31).

[168] τῆ βραδυτῆτι τῆς λαλιᾶς The meaning of these words may be doubtful; but what I have given is perhaps consistent with the Greek and with the circumstances. There was some hesitation about beginning the attack, and the flagging of the conversation was a natural consequence.

Sertorius was murdered B.C. 72, in the consulship of L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus, in the eighth year of his command in Spain. (Livius, Epitom. 96.) Accordingly this places the commencement of his command in B.C. 80; but he went to Spain in B.C. 82, or at the end of B.C. 83. See Notes on c. 6. Appian (Civil Wars, i. 114) states that when the will of Sertorius was opened it was discovered that he had placed Perperna among his heredes, a circumstance which throws doubt on the assertion of Appian that Perperna was afraid that Sertorius intended to take his life. Appian adds that when this was known, it created great enmity against Perperna among his followers.

Plutarch's estimate of Sertorius may be a favourable one; yet he does not omit to mention that act of his life which was most blamable, the massacre of the youths at Osca. From the slight indications in Frontinus, who found some material for his work on Military Stratagems in the campaigns of Sertorius, and from other passages, we may collect that, however mild the temper of Sertorius was, circumstances must often have compelled him to acts of severity and even cruelty. The difficulties of his position can only be estimated when we reflect on the nature of a campaign in many parts of Spain and the kind of soldiers he had under him. Promptitude and decision were among his characteristics; and in such a warfare promptitude and decision cannot be exercised at the time when alone they are of any use, if a man is swayed by any other considerations than those of prudence and necessity in the hour of danger. A general who could stab one of his own men in the heat of battle, to prevent him dispiriting the army by news of a loss, proved that his judgment was as clear as his determination was resolved.

Plutarch's narrative is of no value as a campaign, and his apology must be that he was not writing a campaign, but delineating a man's character. Drumann Geschichte Roms, Pompeius, p. 350, &c.) has attempted to give a connected history of this campaign against Sertorius, and he has probably done it as well as it can be done with such materials as we possess. The map of Antient Spain and Portugal published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, will be useful for reading the sketch in Drumann. Plutarch had no good map, and, as already observed, he was not writing a campaign. Some modern historical writers, who have maps, seem to have made very little use of them; and their narrative of military transactions is often us confused as Plutarch's.

The nature of Guerilla warfare in Spain may be learned from the history of the Peninsular War. The difficulties of a campaign in Navarre and the Basque provinces are well shown in the campaigns of Zumalacarregui, the Carlist chief, a modern Sertorius, whose extraordinary career was cut short by a chance ball before the walls of Bilbao, in 1835. (Henningsen, The most striking Events of a Twelve-month's Campaign with Zumalacarregui, London, 1836.)

[169] Metellus marched to another part of Spain, and left Pompeius to deal with Perperna. According to Appian's narrative the decisive action between Pompeius and Perperna took place "on the tenth day," probably the tenth from the death of Sertorius. Pompeius would not see Perperna after he was taken, and prudently put him to death. "The death of Sertorius," says Appian, "was the end of the Spanish war, and it is probable that if Sertorius had lived, it would not have been terminated so soon, or so easily."


[Pg 130]

LIFE OF EUMENES.

I. The historian Douris tells us that the father of Eumenes of Kardia was so poor that he was obliged to act as a waggoner; yet he gave his son a liberal education both in mental and bodily exercises. While Eumenes was yet a lad, Philip, King of Macedon, happened to come to the city of Kardia, where he amused his leisure time by witnessing the gymnastic exercises of the young men. Perceiving that Eumenes was one of the most athletic, and that he was a manly and clever boy, Philip took him away and attached him to his own person. A more probable story is that Philip gave the boy this advancement out of regard for his father, whose friend and guest he was. After the death of Philip, Eumenes continued in the service of his son Alexander, and was thought to be as wise and as faithful as any of that prince's servants. His position was nominally that of chief secretary, but he was treated with as much honour and respect as the king's most intimate friends, and was entrusted with an independent command during the Indian campaign. On the death of Hephæstion, Perdikkas was appointed to succeed him, and Eumenes was given the post of commander of the cavalry, vacated by Perdikkas. Upon this Neoptolemus, the chief of the men-at-arms, sneered at Eumenes, saying that he himself bore a spear and shield in Alexander's service, but that Eumenes bore a pen and writing-tablets. However the Macedonian chiefs laughed him to scorn, as they well knew the worth of Eumenes, and that he was so highly esteemed that Alexander himself had done him the honour to make him his kinsman by marriage. He bestowed upon him Barsine, the sister of that daughter of Artabazus by whom he himself had a son named Herakles, and gave [Pg 131]her other sister Apame to Ptolemæus at the time when he distributed the other Persian ladies among his followers.

II. Eumenes however was often in danger of incurring the displeasure of Alexander, because of his favourite Hephæstion. On one occasion a house was assigned to Evion, Hephæstion's flute-player, which the servants of Eumenes had previously claimed for their master's lodging. Hearing this, Eumenes went to Alexander in a rage, and complained that it was better to be a flute-player than a soldier. At first Alexander agreed with him, and blamed Hephæstion for his conduct. But afterwards he changed his mind, and attributed what Eumenes had done to a desire to insult himself, rather than to vindicate his rights against Hephæstion. At another time, when Alexander was about to despatch Nearchus with a fleet to explore the Atlantic, he asked his friends to subscribe some money, as he had none in his treasury. The sum for which Eumenes was asked was three hundred talents, of which he only paid one hundred, and said that he had had great difficulty in collecting even that amount. Alexander did not reproach him, nor take the money from him; but he ordered his slaves secretly to set the tent of Eumenes on fire, hoping when his property was brought out of it to prove him to have lied in saying that he possessed so little money. However the tent burned quicker than was expected, and Alexander was sorry that he had destroyed all the papers and writings which it contained. There was found in the ruins more than a thousand talents' worth of gold and silver, melted by the heat of the fire. Of this Alexander refused to take any, but sent orders to all the officers of his kingdom to replace the accounts and writings which had been destroyed. Once again too he quarrelled with Hephæstion about some present to which each laid claim. They each abused the other roundly, but Eumenes came off the victor. Shortly afterwards, however, Hephæstion died, to the great grief of Alexander, who was enraged with all those who had disliked Hephæstion when alive, and were pleased at his death. He regarded Eumenes with especial hatred, and frequently referred to his quarrels with Hephæstion. Eumenes, however, being a [Pg 132]shrewd man, determined that what seemed likely to become his ruin should prove his salvation. He won Alexander's favour by inventing new and extravagant modes of showing honour to his friend, and spent money profusely in providing him with a splendid funeral.

III. When Alexander himself died, and the Macedonian army quarrelled with its chiefs, he in reality espoused the cause of the latter, although he declared that he belonged to neither party, modestly observing that it was not for him, a stranger, to interfere in the quarrels of Macedonians with one another. In the general division of Alexander's conquests which then took place, Eumenes obtained Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and the coast of the Euxine sea as far as Trapezus.[170] This country was not yet conquered by the Macedonians, but was ruled by Ariarathes, and Leonnatus and Antigonus were requested by Perdikkas to come with a large army to put Eumenes in possession of his principality. Antigonus took no heed of this command, as he was already revolving immense schemes of conquest, and beginning to despise his colleagues. Leonnatus, however, did begin to march an army towards Phrygia, intending to help Eumenes, but on the way he was met by Hekatæus the despot of Kardia, who besought him to assist the Macedonians under Antipater, who were being besieged in the city of Lamia. Leonnatus on hearing this became eager to cross his army over the straits into Europe; and consequently he sent for Eumenes and reconciled him with Hekatæus. These two men had always been at enmity with one another on political grounds. Eumenes had often endeavoured to use his influence with Alexander to crush Hekatæus, and restore liberty to the oppressed citizens of Kardia, and never ceased accusing him of tyranny and injustice. On this occasion Eumenes refused to take part in the expedition into Europe, stating that he feared Antipater, who had always been his enemy, and who would be very likely to assassinate him to please Hekatæus. In answer to these objections Leonnatus unfolded to him his secret plans. His march to relieve Antipater was merely intended as a pretence to cover his real object, which was to attempt to make himself master of [Pg 133]Macedonia. He also showed Eumenes several letters which he had received from Pella, in which Kleopatra offered to marry him if he would march thither. However Eumenes, either because he feared Antipater, or because he thought Leonnatus to be embarked upon a rash and crazy enterprise, left him by night, taking with him all his property. He was attended by three hundred horsemen, and two hundred armed slaves, and had with him treasure to the amount of five thousand talents. He fled at once to Perdikkas, and betrayed all Leonnatus's plans to him, by which treachery he gained great favour with Perdikkas, and soon afterwards was established in his government of Cappadocia by an army led by Perdikkas himself. Ariarathes was taken prisoner, the country subdued and Eumenes proclaimed satrap over it. He distributed the government of the various cities amongst his friends, established garrisons, courts of justice, and receivers of revenue, as an absolute ruler, without any interference from Perdikkas. But when Perdikkas left the country Eumenes followed him, as he did not wish to be away from the court of that prince.

IV. However, Perdikkas considered that he was well able to carry out his own designs abroad, but required an active and faithful lieutenant to guard what he already possessed at home. Consequently when he reached Cilicia he sent Eumenes back, nominally to his own government, but really to observe Armenia where Neoptolemus was endeavouring to raise a revolt. Eumenes had frequent interviews with this man, who was of a flighty and vainglorious character, and tried to restrain him from any act of open rebellion. Perceiving also that the Macedonian phalanx was grown very strong, and gave itself most insolent airs, he determined to raise up some counterpoise to it, in the shape of a force of cavalry.

He set free from all taxes and state payments whatever those men of his province who were able to serve as horse soldiers, and bestowed fine horses, purchased by himself, upon their officers and those whom he especially trusted. He divided them into regiments, frequently bestowed upon them honours and rewards, and constantly exercised them in the performance of military manœuvres. Some of the [Pg 134]Macedonians were alarmed, but others were delighted to see in how short a time he had raised a force of no less than six thousand three hundred cavalry soldiers.

V. When Kraterus and Antipater, having made themselves masters of Greece, crossed over into Asia to destroy the kingdom of Perdikkas, and were about to invade Cappadocia, Eumenes was appointed by Perdikkas, who was absent on a campaign against Ptolemy, to be commander-in-chief of the forces in Cappadocia and Armenia. He also sent letters, ordering Neoptolemus and Alketas to place themselves under the orders of Eumenes. Alketas at once refused to serve under him, alleging that the Macedonian troops which he commanded would be ashamed to fight against Antipater, and were willing to receive Kraterus as their king. Neoptolemus also no longer concealed the treachery which he had so long meditated, and when summoned by Eumenes to join him, answered by drawing up his men in order of battle. Now did Eumenes reap the fruits of his prudence and foresight; for though his infantry was vanquished, yet his cavalry completely overthrew Neoptolemus, and captured all his baggage. He also caught the phalanx of the enemy when disordered by its victory, and forced it to surrender at discretion, and swear allegiance to himself. Neoptolemus fled with a few followers and joined Kraterus and Antipater, by whom an embassy had been sent to Eumenes to offer him the peaceful enjoyment of his government if he would join them, and likewise a large accession of territory and force, on condition that he would cease to regard Antipater with dislike and would not become an enemy to his friend Kraterus. To these overtures Eumenes answered that he had long hated Antipater, and was not likely to begin to love him now, when he saw him making war against his own friends, but that he was willing to act as mediator between Kraterus and Perdikkas, if they wished to arrange a fair and honourable peace. He declared that as long as he had breath in his body he would resist all unjust schemes of spoliation, and would rather lose his life than betray the confidence bestowed upon him by Perdikkas.

VI. When Eumenes returned this answer to Antipater, [Pg 135]he was deliberating what was the next step to take, when suddenly Neoptolemus arrived bringing the news of his defeat, and begging for immediate assistance. He wished one of the chiefs to accompany him, but especially Kraterus, declaring that he was so popular with the Macedonians that if they so much as caught sight of his broad-brimmed Macedonian hat, and heard his voice, they would go over to him in a body. Indeed the name of Kraterus had great influence with the Macedonians, and he was their favourite general now that Alexander was dead, for they remembered how steadfast a friend Kraterus had proved to them, and how he had often incurred the anger of Alexander by opposing his adoption of Persian habits, and standing by his countrymen when they were in danger of being neglected and despised by a corrupt and effeminate court. Kraterus accordingly sent Antipater into Cilicia, and himself with the greater part of the army marched with Neoptolemus to fight Eumenes, whom he imagined he should catch unawares, engaged in feasting and celebrating his late victory. It did not argue any very great skill in Eumenes, that he soon became aware of the march of Kraterus to attack him; but to conceal his own weak points, not only from the enemy, but also from his own troops, and actually to force them to attack Kraterus without knowing against whom they fought, appears to me to have been the act of a consummate general. He gave out that Neoptolemus and Pigres were about to attack him a second time, with some Cappadocian and Paphlagonian cavalry. On the night when he intended to start he fell asleep and dreamed a strange dream. He seemed to see two Alexanders, each at the head of a phalanx, preparing to fight one another. Then Athena came to help the one, and Demeter the other. After a hard fight, that championed by Athena was overcome, and then Demeter gathered ears of corn, and crowned the victorious phalanx with them. He at once conceived that this dream referred to himself because he was about to fight for a most fertile land and one that abounded in corn; for at that time the whole country was sown with wheat, as if it were time of peace, and the fields promised an abundant harvest. He was confirmed [Pg 136]in his idea of the meaning of his dream when he heard that the watchword of the enemy was 'Athena,' with the countersign 'Alexander.' Hearing this, he himself gave the word 'Demeter,' with the countersign 'Alexander,' and ordered all his soldiers to crown themselves and adorn their arms with ears of wheat. He was often tempted to explain to his officers who it was against whom they were about to fight; but in spite of the inconvenience of such a secret, he decided finally to keep it to himself.

VII. He was careful not to send any Macedonians to attack Kraterus, but entrusted this duty to two divisions of cavalry, which he placed under the command respectively of Pharnabazus the son of Artabazus and Phœnix of Tenedos. These he ordered, as soon as they saw the enemy, to charge at full speed, and not to give them time for any parley, or to send a herald; for he was grievously afraid that if the Macedonians recognized Kraterus they would desert to him. He himself formed three hundred of the best of his cavalry into a compact mass with which he proceeded towards the right, to engage the detachment under Neoptolemus. The main body, as soon as it had passed a small hill, came in sight of the enemy and at once charged at full gallop. Kraterus at this broke out into violent abuse of Neoptolemus, saying that he had been deceived by him about the Macedonians who were to have deserted. However, he called upon those about him to quit them like men, and advanced to meet the horsemen.

The shock was terrible. Their spears were soon broken, and the fight was continued with swords. Kraterus proved no unworthy successor of Alexander, for he slew many and often rallied his troops, until a Thracian rode at him sideways and struck him from his horse. No one recognized him as he lay on the ground except Gorgias, one of the generals of Eumenes, who at once dismounted and kept guard over him, although he was grievously hurt and almost in the death-agony.

Meanwhile Eumenes encountered Neoptolemus. Each had a long-standing grudge against the other; but it chanced that in the first two charges which took place they did not see one another. The third time they recog[Pg 137]nized one another, and at once drew their daggers and rode together with loud shouts of defiance. With their reins flowing loose they drove their horses against one another like two triremes, and each clutched at the other as he passed, so that each tore the helmet from the other's head, and burst the fastenings of the corslet upon his shoulder. Both fell from their horses, and wrestled together in deadly strife on the ground. As Neoptolemus strove to rise, Eumenes struck him behind the knee, and leaped upon his own feet, but Neoptolemus rested upon his other knee, and continued the fight until he received a mortal stab in the neck. Eumenes through the mortal hate which he bore him at once fell to stripping him of his armour and abusing him, forgetting that he was still alive. He received a slight stab in the groin, but the wound frightened Eumenes more than it hurt him, as the hand that dealt it was almost powerless. Yet when Eumenes had finished despoiling the corpse he found that he was severely cut about the arms and thighs, in spite of which he remounted his horse, and rode to the other side of the battle-field, where he thought the enemy might still be offering resistance. Here he heard of the death of Kraterus, and rode up to where he lay. Finding that he was still alive and conscious, Eumenes dismounted, and with tears and protestations of friendship cursed Neoptolemus and lamented his hard fate, which had forced him either to kill his old friend and comrade or to perish at his hands.

VIII. This victory was won by Eumenes about ten days after his former one. He gained great glory from this double achievement, as he appeared to have won one battle by courage and the other by generalship. Yet he was bitterly disliked and hated both by his own men and by the enemy, because he, a stranger and a foreigner, had vanquished the most renowned of the Macedonians in fair fight. Now if Perdikkas had lived to hear of the death of Kraterus, he would have been the chief Macedonian of the age; but the news of his death reached the camp of Perdikkas two days after that prince had fallen in a skirmish with the Egyptians, and the enraged Macedonian soldiery vowed vengeance against Eumenes. [Pg 138]Antigonus and Antipater at once declared war against him: and when they heard that Eumenes, passing by Mount Ida where the king[171] used to keep a breed of horses, took as many as he required and sent an account of his doing so to the Masters of the Horse, Antipater is said to have laughed and declared that he admired the wariness of Eumenes, who seemed to expect that he would be called upon to give an account of what he had done with the king's property. Eumenes had intended to fight a battle on the plains of Lydia near Sardis, because his chief strength lay in his cavalry, and also to let Kleopatra[172] see how powerful he was; but at her particular request, for she was afraid to give umbrage to Antipater, he marched into Upper Phrygia, and passed the winter in the city of Kelainæ. While here, Alketas, Polemon, and Dokimus caballed against him, claiming the supreme command for themselves. Hereupon Eumenes quoted the proverb, "No one reflects that he who rules must die."

He now promised his soldiers that in three days he would give them their pay, and accomplished this by selling the various fortified villages and castles in the neighbourhood to them, all of which were full of human beings to sell for slaves, and of cattle. The officers who bought these places from Eumenes were supplied by him with siege-artillery to take them, and the proceeds of the plunder were set off against the arrears of pay due to the soldiers. This proceeding made Eumenes very popular with his army, indeed, when a proclamation was distributed in his camp by contrivance of the enemy, in which a reward of a hundred talents and special honours were offered to the man who would kill Eumenes, the Macedonians were greatly enraged, and determined that a body-guard of one thousand men, of the best families in Macedonia, should watch over his safety day and night. The soldiers obeyed him with alacrity and were proud to receive from his hands the same marks of favour which kings are wont to bestow upon their favourites. Eumenes even took upon himself to give away purple hats and [Pg 139]cloaks, which is accounted the most royal present of all by the Macedonians.

IX. Success exalts even mean minds, and men always appear to have a certain dignity when in high station and power; but the truly great man proves his greatness more by the way in which he bears up against misfortunes and endures evil days, as did Eumenes. He was defeated by Antigonus in Southern Cappadocia by treachery, but when forced to retreat he did not allow the traitor who had betrayed him to make good his escape to Antigonus, but took him and hanged him on the spot. He managed to retreat by a different road to that on which the enemy were pursuing, and then suddenly turning about, encamped on the battle-field of the day before. Here he collected the dead bodies, burned them with the timber of the houses in the neighbouring villages, and raised separate barrows over the remains of the officers and the men—monuments of his hardihood and presence of mind which excited the admiration of Antigonus himself when he again passed that way. The two armies were still sometimes so near each other, that Eumenes once had an opportunity of making himself master of the whole of the enemy's baggage, which would have enriched his troops with an immense booty. He feared that the possession of such wealth would render them eager to quit his toilsome and perilous service, and sent secret warning under the pretext of private friendship to Menander, the general who had been left in charge of the baggage, and enabled him to withdraw into an unassailable position. This seemingly generous action excited the gratitude of the Macedonians, whose wives and children it had saved from slavery and dishonour, till Antigonus pointed out to them that Eumenes had spared them only that he might not encumber himself.[173] X. After this, Eumenes, who was being constantly pursued by a superior force, recommended the greater part of his men to return to their homes. This he did either because he was anxious for their safety, or because he did not wish to drag about with him a force which was too small to fight, and too large to move with swiftness and [Pg 140]secrecy. He himself took refuge in the impregnable fortress of Nora, on the borders of Cappadocia and Lycaonia, with five hundred horse and two hundred foot soldiers, and dismissed from thence with kind speeches and embraces, all of his friends who wished to leave the fortress, dismayed by the prospect of the dreary imprisonment which awaited them during a long siege in such a place. Antigonus when he arrived summoned Eumenes to a conference before beginning the siege, to which he answered, that Antigonus had many friends and officers, while he had none remaining with him, so that unless Antigonus would give him hostages for his safety, he would not trust himself with him. Upon this Antigonus bade him remember that he was speaking to his superior. "While I can hold my sword," retorted Eumenes, "I acknowledge no man as my superior." However, after Antigonus had sent his cousin Ptolemæus into the fortress, as Eumenes had demanded, he came down to meet Antigonus, whom he embraced in a friendly manner, as became men who had once been intimate friends and comrades. They talked for a long time, and Eumenes astonished all the assembly by his courage and spirit; for he did not ask for his life, and for peace, as they expected, but demanded to be reinstated in his government, and to have all the grants which he had received from Perdikkas restored to him. The Macedonians meanwhile flocked round him, eager to see what sort of man this Eumenes was, of whom they had heard so much; for since the death of Kraterus no one had been talked of so much as Eumenes in the Macedonian camp. Antigonus began to fear for his safety; he ordered them to keep at a distance, and at last throwing his arms round the waist of Eumenes conducted him back through a passage formed by his guards to the foot of the fortress.

XI. After this Antigonus invested the place with a double wall of circumvallation, left a force sufficient to guard it, and marched away. Eumenes was now closely besieged. There was plenty of water, corn, and salt in the fortress, but nothing else to eat or to drink. Yet he managed to render life cheerful, inviting all the garrison in turn to his own table, and entertaining his guests with [Pg 141]agreeable and lively conversation. He himself was no sturdy warrior, worn with toil and hardships, but a figure of the most delicate symmetry, seemingly in all the freshness of youth, with a gentle and engaging aspect. He was no orator, but yet was fascinating in conversation, as we may partly learn from his letters. During this siege, as he perceived that the men, cooped up in such narrow limits and eating their food without exercise, would lose health, and also that the horses would lose condition if they never used their limbs, while it was most important that, if they were required for a sudden emergency, they should be able to gallop, he arranged the largest room in the fort, fourteen cubits in length, as a place of exercise for the men, and ordered them to walk there, gradually quickening their pace, so as to combine exercise with amusement. For the horses, he caused their necks to be hoisted by pulleys fastened in the roof of their stable, until their fore feet barely touched the ground. In this uneasy position they were excited by their grooms with blows and shouts until the struggle produced the effect of a hard ride, as they sprung about and stood almost erect upon their hind legs till the sweat poured off them, so that this exercise proved no bad training either for strength or speed. They were fed with bruised barley, as being more quickly and easily digested.

XII. After this siege had lasted for some time, Antigonus learned that Antipater had died in Macedonia, and that Kassander and Polysperchon were fighting for his inheritance. He now conceived great hopes of gaining the supreme power for himself, and desired to have Eumenes as his friend and assistant in effecting this great design. He sent Hieronymus of Kardia, a friend of Eumenes, to make terms with him. Hieronymus proffered a written agreement to Eumenes, which Eumenes amended, and thus appealed to the Macedonians who were besieging him to decide between the two forms, as to which was the most just. Antigonus for decency's sake had mentioned the names of the royal family of Macedonia in the beginning of his agreement, but at the end of it demanded that Eumenes should swear fealty to himself. Eumenes corrected this by inserting the names of Queen Olympias and all the [Pg 142]royal family, and then took a solemn oath of fealty, not to Antigonus alone, but to Olympias and all the royal house of Macedonia. This form was thought more reasonable by the Macedonians, who swore Eumenes according to it, raised the siege, and sent to Antigonus that he also might swear in the same form as Eumenes. After this Eumenes delivered up all the Cappadocian hostages in Nora, soon collected a force of little less than a thousand men, from his old soldiers who were still roaming about that country, and rode off with them, as he very rightly distrusted Antigonus, who as soon as he heard of what had happened, sent orders to the Macedonians to continue the siege, and bitterly reproached them for allowing Eumenes to amend the form of oath tendered to him.

XIII. While Eumenes was retreating he received letters from the party in Macedonia opposed to Antigonus, in which Olympias begged him to come and take the son of Alexander, whose life was threatened, under his protection; while Polysperchon and Philip, the king, bade him take the command of the army in Cappadocia and make war against Antigonus, empowering him out of the treasure at Quinda to take five hundred talents, as compensation for his own losses, and to make what use he pleased of the remainder for the expenses of the war. He was also informed that orders had been sent to Antigenes and Teutamus the commanders of the Argyraspides, the celebrated Macedonian regiment with the silver shields, to put him in possession of the treasure which they had brought from Susa, and to place themselves with their troops under his command.

Antigenes and Teutamus, on receiving these orders, received Eumenes with all outward manifestations of friendship, but were really full of concealed rage at being superseded by him. He, however, judiciously allayed their wrath by refusing to take the money, which he said he did not need, while as they wore both unwilling to obey and unable to command, he called in the aid of superstition, and declared that Alexander himself had appeared to him in a dream, as when alive, arrayed in the ensigns of royalty, seated in his tent, and despatching affairs of state, and he proposed that they should erect a magnificent [Pg 143]tent, should place a golden throne in the centre, on which should be laid a diadem, sceptre and royal apparel, and that there they should transact business as in the presence of the king. Antigenes and Teutamus willingly agreed to this proposal, which flattered their self-love by seeming to place them on an equality with Eumenes.

As they marched up the country they were met by Peukestas, a friend of Eumenes, and by several other satraps, or provincial governors, who came accompanied by considerable bodies of troops, whose numbers and excellent equipment and discipline gave great encouragement to the Macedonian soldiery.

But these satraps, since the death of Alexander, had become dissolute, licentious, and effeminate princes, with all the vices of Eastern despots. They perpetually intrigued and quarrelled with one another, while they courted the Macedonians by profuse liberality, providing them with magnificent banquets and unlimited wine, until they entirely ruined the discipline of their camp, and led them to meditate choosing their leaders by a popular vote, as is done in republican cities. Eumenes, perceiving that the satraps mistrusted one another, but that they all agreed in hating and fearing himself, and only wanted an opportunity for having him assassinated, pretended to be in want of money, and borrowed large sums from those whom he chiefly suspected of designs against his person, so that he secured the safety of his person by taking other men's money, an object which most people are glad to attain by giving their own.

XIV. While the peace lasted, the Macedonian soldiery willingly listened to the flattering promises of the satraps, each of whom wished to raise a force and make war upon the others; but when Antigonus moved to attack them with a large army, and a real general was imperatively demanded to meet him, then not only the soldiers implicitly obeyed Eumenes, but even those princes who during the peace had affected such airs of independence lowered their tone and each without a murmur proceeded to his appointed duty. When Antigonus was endeavouring to cross the river Pasitigris, none of the confederates except Eumenes perceived his design, but he boldly with[Pg 144]stood him, and in a pitched battle slew many men, filled the stream with corpses, and took four thousand prisoners. And also, when Eumenes fell sick, the Macedonians clearly proved that they knew that the others could give them banquets and fair promises, but that he alone could lead them to victory.

When the army was in Persia, Peukestas magnificently entertained all the soldiers, giving each man a victim for sacrifice, and thought that by this liberality he had quite won their hearts; but a few days afterwards, when they came into the presence of the enemy, Eumenes happened to be ill, and was being carried in a litter apart from the noise of the march in order to obtain rest. As the army gained the crest of some low hills they suddenly saw the enemy's troops marching down into the plain below. As soon as they saw the head of the column, with its gilded arms flashing in the sun, and the elephants with their towers and purple trappings, ready for instant attack, the Macedonians halted, grounded their arms, and refused to proceed until Eumenes should put himself at their head, plainly telling their officers that they dared not risk a battle without him for their leader. Eumenes at once came to the front at full speed in his litter, of which he caused the curtains on both sides to be drawn back, while he waved his hand to them in delight. They, in return, greeted him in the Macedonian fashion by shouts and the clash of their arms, and at once took up their shields and levelled their lances with a loud cry, challenging the enemy to come and fight them, for they now had a general to lead them on.

XV. Antigonus, who had learned from prisoners that Eumenes was sick and travelling in a litter, imagined that it would not be difficult to overcome the others, and therefore hastened his march, hoping to bring on a battle while Eumenes was still unable to command. When, however, as he rode along the enemy's line he observed their admirable order and arrangement, he hesitated to attack. At last he perceived the litter proceeding from one wing to the other. Then, with a loud laugh, as was his habit when joking with his friends, he exclaimed, "It is that litter, it seems, that is manœuvring against us." [Pg 145]Saying this, he at once withdrew his forces and encamped at some little distance. The army of Eumenes, however, soon afterwards, needing refreshment and repose, forced their generals to place them in cantonments for the winter in the district of Gabiene. These were so scattered, that the whole army was spread over a distance of a thousand stades (or a hundred and twenty-five English miles). Antigonus, hearing this, marched suddenly to attack them by a very difficult road, on which no water was to be found, but which nevertheless was very short and direct. He hoped to fall upon the enemy while scattered in their winter quarters, and defeat them before their generals could rally them into a compact mass. But as he marched through a desert region his army met with strong winds and bitter cold, so that the men were forced to light large fires to warm themselves, and these gave notice of their arrival to the enemy; for the natives who inhabited the mountains near the line of Antigonus's march, when they saw the numerous fires lighted by his troops, sent messengers on swift camels to tell Peukestas what they had observed. He was much alarmed at the news, and, noticing that the rest of the satraps shared his fears, proposed to retreat to the opposite extremity of the province, where they might at least reassemble a part of their force before the enemy came up. Eumenes, however, calmed their fears by promising that he would stop the progress of Antigonus, and prevent his coming to attack them until three days after they expected him. His counsels prevailed, and he at once despatched messengers to call the troops together out of their winter quarters, and collect all the available force, while he himself with the other generals rode to the front, and selecting a spot which was plainly visible to those crossing the desert, ordered fires to be lighted at intervals, as though an army were encamped along the frontier awaiting the attack of Antigonus. The latter, observing the heights covered with watch-fires, was filled with rage and mortification, imagining that the enemy must long ago have known his plans. Fearing to fight with his wearied troops against men who were fresh and had been living in comfort, he turned aside from the desert, and refreshed his army [Pg 146]among some neighbouring villages. When, however, he saw no enemy, or any signs of a hostile army being near, and learned from the natives that no troops had been seen by them, but only a large number of fires, he perceived that he had been out-manœuvred by Eumenes, and marched forward in anger, determined to settle their disputes by a pitched battle.

XVI. Meanwhile the greater part of the army of Eumenes had assembled, and, admiring his stratagem, declared that he alone was fit to be their leader. This so vexed the officers in command of the Argyraspids, Antigenes, and Teutamus, that they determined to make away with him, and they held a council with most of the satraps and officers of the army to determine how best they might rid themselves of him. They all agreed that it would be wisest to make use of his talents in the approaching battle, and immediately after the battle to assassinate him. This result of their deliberations was at once betrayed to Eumenes by Eudamus, the officer in command of the elephants, and Phædimus, not from any love they bore to him, but through fear of losing the money which they had lent him. Eumenes thanked them for their kindness, and afterwards observed to the few friends whom he could trust, that he was living amongst a herd of savage beasts. He withdrew to his tent, made his will, and destroyed all his private papers, not wishing after his death to involve any one in danger. After having made these arrangements, he thought of allowing the enemy to win the victory, or of escaping through Armenia and Media into Cappadocia. He came to no decided resolution while his friends were present, but merely discussed the various chances which presented themselves to his versatile intellect, and then proceeded to array his troops in order of battle, uttering words of encouragement to them all, whether Greek or barbarian, while he himself was received with cheerful and confident shouts by the Argyraspids, who bade him be of good cheer, as the enemy never could abide their onset. These men were the oldest of the soldiers of Philip and Alexander, and had remained unconquered in battle up to that time, although many of them were seventy and none of them were less than sixty [Pg 147]years old. They now called out, as they moved to attack the troops of Antigonus, "Ye are fighting against your fathers, ye unnatural children." Charging with fury, they broke down all opposition, for no one could stand before them, though most of the enemy died where they stood. On this side Antigonus was utterly defeated, but his cavalry were victorious; and through the base and unsoldierly conduct of Peukestas the whole of the baggage fell into his hands, by his own great presence of mind and the nature of the ground. This was a vast plain, not dusty, and yet not hard, but like a sea-beach, composed of a light loose sand, covered with a salt crust. Upon this the trampling of so many horses and men soon raised a cloud of dust through which no object could be seen, as it whitened the whole air and dazzled the eyes. Through this Antigonus dashed unnoticed, and made himself master of the baggage, together with the wives and children of the army of Eumenes.

XVII. When the battle was over, Teutamus at once sent to offer terms for the recovery of the baggage. As Antigonus promised that he would deliver everything up to the Argyraspids, and that their wives and children should be kindly treated, if Eumenes were placed in his hands, the Macedonians were treacherous and wicked enough to resolve to deliver him alive into the hands of his enemies. With this intent they drew near to him, on various pretexts, some lamenting their loss, some encouraging him because of the victory he had won, and some preferring charges against the other generals. Suddenly they fell upon him, snatched away his sword, and bound his hands. When Nikanor was sent to conduct him to Antigonus, he asked, while he was passing through the ranks of the Macedonians, to be permitted to address them, not with any intention of begging his own life, but that he might clearly point out to them what was to their own advantage. Silence was enforced, and Eumenes, standing on a hillock, held forth his fettered hands, and spoke as follows:—"Basest of Macedonians, could Antigonus ever have erected such a monument of your disgrace as you have set up yourselves by surrendering your general to him? Is it not shameful for you, who have [Pg 148]conquered in the battle, to acknowledge yourselves defeated because of your baggage, as though victory lay more in money than in arms, so that you should ransom your baggage by delivering up your general? I indeed am now being carried off captive, an unconquered man, who has overcome his foes, but has been ruined by his friends; but I beseech you in the name of the Zeus that protects armies, and the gods who watch over the true keeping of oaths, kill me here with your own hands; for I shall be slain by you no less when I am put to death in the enemy's camp. Antigonus cannot complain of this action of yours, for he wishes to receive Eumenes dead, and not alive. If you are chary of your own hands to do the deed, one of mine will suffice if you will loose it from its bonds. Or if you will not trust me with a sword, then cast me, bound as I am, to be trampled on by the elephants. If you will act thus I will acquit you of all blame, and will declare that you have dealt with your general as became honourable men."

XVIII. When Eumenes had spoken thus, all the army was grieved and lamented his fate, but the Argyraspids called out that he must be carried away, and no attention paid to his talk; for, they said, it mattered little what fate befel a pestilent fellow from the Chersonese, who had involved the Macedonians in endless wars and troubles, but that it was not to be borne that the bravest of the soldiers of Philip and Alexander, after their unheard-of exploits, should in their old age be deprived of the fruits of their toils and be forced to depend upon charity, or that their wives should pass a third night in the enemy's camp. They at once hurried him away. When he reached the enemy's quarters, Antigonus, fearing that he would be crushed to death by the crowd (for not a man remained in the camp), sent ten of the strongest elephants, and many Medes and Parthians, armed with spears, to keep off the press from him. He himself could not bear to see Eumenes, because they had once been friends and comrades; and when he was asked by those who had charge of his person how they were to treat him, answered, "Like an elephant, or a lion!" After a while he felt compassion for his sufferings, and ordered his heavy chains to be [Pg 149]removed, appointed an attendant to anoint his person, and allowed his friends to have free access to him and supply him with provisions. A long debate took place for several days about the fate of Eumenes, in which Nearchus, a Cretan, and the young Demetrius, pleaded earnestly for him, while the other generals all opposed them and pressed for his execution. It is said that Eumenes himself inquired of his jailer, Onomarchus, what the reason was that Antigonus, having got his enemy into his power, did not put him to death quickly or else set him free honourably. When Onomarchus insultingly answered that it was not then, but in the battle-field that he ought to have shown how little he feared death, Eumenes retorted, "I proved it there also; ask those whom I encountered; but I never met a stronger man than myself." "Since then you have now met with a stronger man than yourself," said Onomarchus; "why cannot you patiently await his pleasure?"

XIX. When, therefore, Antigonus made up his mind to put Eumenes to death, he ordered him to be kept without food. He lingered thus for two or three days; but as the camp was suddenly broken up, men were sent to despatch him. Antigonus restored his body to his friends, and permitted them to burn it and collect the ashes in a silver urn to be carried to his wife and children. The death of Eumenes was quickly avenged by Heaven, which stirred up Antigonus to regard the Argyraspids with abhorrence, as wicked and faithless villains. He placed them under the command of Sibystius, the governor of Arachosia, and gave him orders to employ them, by small parties at a time, upon services which would ensure their destruction, so that not one of them should ever return to Macedonia, or behold the Grecian sea.

FOOTNOTES:

[170] Trebisond.

[171] Alexander.

[172] Plutarch tells us nothing of how Kleopatra came to Sardis. See Thirlwall's 'History of Greece,' chap. lvii.

[173] Thirlwall's 'History,' chap. lvii.


[Pg 150]

COMPARISON OF SERTORIUS AND EUMENES.

The above are all the particulars of the lives of Eumenes and Sertorius which have come down to us, and which appear worth recording. When we come to compare them, we find that each was an exile from his native country, and commanded a numerous army of foreign troops, although Sertorius enjoyed the great advantage of an undisputed command, while Eumenes always had to contend with many competitors for the first place, which nevertheless he always obtained by his brilliant exploits. Sertorius was eagerly followed by men who were proud to obey him, but Eumenes was only obeyed out of self-interest, by men who were incompetent to lead. The Roman ruled the tribes of Lusitania and Iberia, who had been long before conquered by the Romans, while the Kardian led the Macedonians, when fresh from the conquest of the world. Yet Sertorius was always looked up to as a wise man and a consummate captain, whereas Eumenes was despised as a mere quill-driver before he fought his way to the rank of general; so that Eumenes not only started with less advantages, but met with much greater difficulties, before he attained to distinction. Moreover, Eumenes throughout his whole career was constantly opposed by open enemies, and constantly had to make head against secret plots and intrigues; whereas Sertorius was at first opposed by none of the officers under his command, and at the very last only by a few. The one had for his object merely to conquer his enemies, while the other, after winning a victory, was obliged to defend himself against the jealousy of his friends.

[Pg 151]II. Their military achievements are pretty equally balanced; although Eumenes was naturally fond of war and tumults, while Sertorius was of a quiet and peaceful disposition. Thus it happened that Eumenes, rather than dwell in comfortable and honourable retirement, passed his whole life in war, because he could not be satisfied with anything short of a throne; while Sertorius, who hated war, was forced to fight for his own safety against foes who would not allow him to live in peace. Antigonus would have made use of Eumenes as an officer with pleasure, if the latter would have laid aside his designs upon the throne of Macedonia; but Pompeius and his party would not so much as allow Sertorius to live, although his only wish was to be at rest.

From this it resulted that the one of his own free will went to war to obtain power, while the other was forced against his will to obtain power in order to repel attacks.

The one died by an unexpected stroke, while the other long looked for death, and at last even wished for it. In the first this shows a noble and generous spirit, not to distrust his friends; while the latter seems rather to argue weakness of purpose, for though Eumenes had long intended to fly, yet he did not, and was taken. The death of Sertorius did not disgrace his life, for he met at the hands of his friends with that fate which none of his enemies could inflict upon him; but Eumenes, who could not escape before he was taken prisoner, and yet was willing to live after his capture, made a discreditable end; for by his entreaties to be spared, he proved that his enemy had conquered not merely his body but also his spirit.


[Pg 152]

LIFE OF AGESILAUS.

Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of Lacedæmon, after a glorious reign, left one son, Agis, by a noble lady named Lampito, and a much younger one, named Agesilaus, by Eupolia, the daughter of Melesippides. As by the Spartan law Agis was the next heir, and succeeded to the throne, Agesilaus was prepared for the life of a private man, in that severe Spartan school by which obedience is instilled into the youth of that country. For that reason it is said that the epithet of 'man-subduing' is applied to Sparta by the poet Simonides, because the Spartan customs render the citizens well behaved, and amenable to discipline, like horses who are broken to harness early in life. The direct heirs to the throne are not subjected to this training; but in the case of Agesilaus it happened that when he began to rule he had previously been taught to obey. This rendered him by far the most popular of the kings of Sparta, because, in addition to the haughty spirit that became a king, he had learned to sympathize with the people over whom he ruled.

II. Agesilaus was an early and intimate friend of Lysander, as they were both placed as boys in the same herd or troop for the purposes of discipline. It was then that Lysander learned to admire the moderation and self-restraint of Agesilaus, who, although he was ambitious and high-spirited, with a most vehement and passionate desire to be first in every kind of competition, was yet of a manageable and easily ruled disposition, very sensitive to reproach, and far more afraid of blame than of toils or dangers. The misfortune of his lame leg was almost unnoticed, partly from the robust vigour of his frame, and also from his own cheerful acknowledgment of this defect, being always the first to joke about it. He sought by [Pg 153]these means to remedy his lameness, while his daring spirit never allowed it to prevent his undertaking the most dangerous and laborious adventures. We have no record of his appearance, for he himself never would consent to have his portrait taken, and even when dying begged that no statue or painting of him should be taken. We are, however, told that he was of small and mean stature, but that his lively and cheerful temper, even in the most trying situations, and the absence of anything harsh and overbearing in his manners, made him more popular than many younger and handsomer men even in extreme old age. The historian Theophrastus informs us that the mother of Agesilaus was a very small woman, and that the Ephors had fined Archidamus, on that special ground, for marrying her. "She will not bring forth kings to rule us," said they, "but kinglets."

III. During the reign of Agis, Alkibiades arrived in Lacedæmon as an exile, having made his escape from the army in Sicily, and, after a short sojourn, was universally believed to be carrying on an intrigue with the king's wife, Timaea, insomuch that Agis refused to recognize her child as his own, but declared that Alkibiades was its father. The historian Douris tells us that Timaea was not altogether displeased at this imputation, and that when nursing the child among her attendants she was wont to call it Alkibiades instead of Leotychides. The same authority states that Alkibiades himself declared that he seduced Timaea, not out of wantonness, but with the ambitious design of placing his own family upon the throne of Sparta. In consequence of this, Alkibiades, fearing the wrath of Agis, left Sparta, and the child was always viewed with suspicion by Agis, and never treated as his own son, until in his last illness the boy by tears and entreaties prevailed upon him to bear public witness to his legitimacy. But after the death of Agis, Lysander, the conqueror of Athens, who was the most important man in Sparta, began to urge the claims of Agesilaus to the throne, on the ground that Leotychides was a bastard, and therefore excluded from the succession. Many of the other citizens eagerly espoused the cause of Agesilaus, because they had been brought up in his company, and [Pg 154]had become his intimate friends. There was, however, one Diopeithes, a soothsayer, who was learned in prophetic lore, and enjoyed a great reputation for wisdom and sanctity. This man declared that it was wrong for a lame man to become king of Lacedæmon, and quoted the following oracle:—

"Proud Sparta, resting on two equal feet,
Beware lest lameness on thy kings alight;
Lest wars unnumbered toss thee to and fro,
And thou thyself be ruined in the fight."

In answer to this, Lysander argued that the oracle really warned the Spartans against making Leotychides king; for the god was not likely to allude to actual lameness, which might not even be congenital, but might arise from some accidental hurt, as disqualifying any one for the office of king, but rather meant by a "lame reign," the reign of one who was not legitimate, and not truly descended from Herakles. Agesilaus also said that Poseidon bore witness to the illegitimacy of Leotychides; for Agis was said to have been cast out of his bed-chamber by an earthquake, after which he abstained from approaching his wife, on religious grounds, for a period of more than ten months, at the end of which Leotychides was born.

IV. Having been raised to the throne on those grounds, Agesilaus at the same time acquired the large property left by the late king Agis, as Leotychides was declared illegitimate and driven into exile. As his own mother's family were respectable, but very poor, he distributed half this property among them, thus making sure of their good will and favour, and removing any jealousy which they might feel at his elevation. Moreover, as Xenophon tells us, he gained the greatest influence by always deferring to the wishes of his country, and thus was really enabled to act exactly as he pleased. The whole power of the state was at that time vested in the Ephors and the Senate of Elders, of whom the Ephors are elected every year, while the Elders sit for life. These two bodies were intended as a check upon the power of the kings, who would otherwise have been absolute, as has been explained in the Life of Lykurgus. Between these [Pg 155]magistrates and the kings there was generally a bad understanding; but Agesilaus adopted an opposite line of conduct. He never attempted to oppose or thwart the Ephors or the Senate, and even showed a marked deference to them, referring the initiative of all state affairs to them, hurrying into their presence when summoned, and rising from his royal throne whenever they appeared, while he presented each senator, on his election, with a cloak and an ox, to congratulate him on joining the Senate. Thus he appeared to exalt the power of the Ephors and to court their favour, but he himself was by far the greatest gainer, as his own personal influence was greatly increased, and the power of the crown much strengthened by the general good will which he inspired.

V. In his dealings with his fellow-citizens he is more to be praised as an enemy than as a friend; for he would not act unjustly to injure his enemies, but he sometimes disregarded justice in the interests of his friends. He was of too generous a nature to refrain from applauding even his enemies when they deserved it, but could not bear to reproach his friends for their faults, which he delighted to share with them, and to extricate them from the consequences, for he thought nothing disgraceful if done to serve a friend.[174] He was also ever ready to forgive and [Pg 156]assist those with whom he had been at variance, and thus won all hearts, and attained to a true popularity. The Ephors indeed, perceiving this, imposed a fine upon him, alleging as a reason for it that he was attaching the Spartans to his own person instead of to the State. For just as physical philosophers tell us that if the principle of strife and opposition were removed, the heavenly bodies would stand still, and all the productive power of nature would be at an end, so did the Laconian lawgiver endeavour to quicken the virtue of his citizens by constructing a constitution out of opposing elements, deeming that success is barren when there is none to resist, and that the harmonious working of a political system is valueless if purchased by the suppression of any important element. Some have thought that the germ of this idea can be traced in Homer,[175] for he would not have represented Agamemnon as rejoicing when Achilles and Odysseus quarrel 'with savage words,' had he not thought that some great public benefit would arise from this opposition and rivalry of the bravest. But to this one cannot altogether agree; for party strife, if carried to excess, proves most dangerous and ruinous to all communities.

VI. Shortly after Agesilaus had been raised to the throne he received news from Asia that the Persian king was preparing a large army with which he intended to drive the Lacedæmonians into the sea. Upon hearing this, Lysander was very eager to be sent out again to conduct affairs in Asia, in order that he might be able to assist his own friends and partizans, whom he had appointed as governors to many of the cities in that country, but who had mostly been forcibly expelled by the citizens for their insolent and tyrannical conduct. He therefore urged Agesilaus to undertake a campaign in Asia as the champion of Greece, and advised him to land upon some distant part of the coast, so as to establish himself securely before the arrival of the Persian army. At the same time he despatched instructions to his friends in Asia, to send to Lacedæmon, and demand Agesilaus as their [Pg 157]general. In a public debate upon the subject, Agesilaus agreed to conduct the war if he were furnished with thirty Spartans to act as generals, and to form a council of war. He also demanded a force of ten thousand picked men of the Neodamodes, or enfranchised Helots, and six thousand hoplites, or heavy armed troops, from the allied cities in Greece. By the active co-operation of Lysander all this was quickly agreed upon, and Agesilaus was sent out with a council of thirty Spartans, in which Lysander at once took the lead, not merely by his own great name and influence, but by reason of his intimacy with Agesilaus, through which it was supposed that this campaign would raise him to more than kingly power. While the army was being assembled at Geræstus, Agesilaus himself proceeded to Aulis with his friends, and while sleeping there, he appeared in a dream to hear a voice saying: "O king of the Lacedæmonians, since no one has ever been commander-in-chief of all the Greeks, save you and Agamemnon alone, it is fitting that you, since you command the same troops, start from the same place, and are about to attack the same enemy, should offer sacrifice to the same goddess to whom he sacrificed here before setting out." Upon this there, at once, occurred to the mind of Agesilaus the legend of the maiden who was put to death on that occasion by her own father, in obedience to the soothsayers; but he did not allow himself to be disturbed by this omen, but arose and told the whole dream to his friends, observing that it was his intention to pay all due honour to the goddess Artemis, but not to imitate the barbarous conduct of Agamemnon. He now proceeded to hang garlands upon a hind, and ordered his own soothsayer to offer it as a sacrifice, disregarding the claims of the local Bœotian priest to do so. The Bœotarchs, however, heard of this, and were greatly incensed at what they considered an insult. They at once despatched a body of armed men to the spot, who forbade Agesilaus to offer sacrifice there, contrary to the ancestral customs of the Bœotians, and cast off the victim from the altar where it lay. After this Agesilaus sailed away in great trouble of mind, both from the anger he felt towards the [Pg 158]Thebans, and from the evil omen which had befallen him, as he feared that it portended the failure of his Asiatic campaign.

VII. On his arrival at Ephesus, he was much offended by the great power and influence possessed by Lysander, whose ante-chamber was always crowded, and who was always surrounded by persons desirous of paying their court to him. They evidently thought that although Agesilaus might be nominally in command of the expedition, yet that all real power and direction of affairs was enjoyed by Lysander, who had made himself feared and respected throughout Asia, beyond any other Greek commander, and had been able to benefit his friends and crush his enemies more effectually than any one had previously done. As all this was still fresh in the memory of all men, and especially as they perceived the extreme simplicity and courteousness of Agesilaus's manners and conversation, and observed, too, that Lysander was still as harsh, rude, and imperious as before, they all looked up to him alone as the virtual commander.

The other Spartan members of the council were deeply dissatisfied at finding that Lysander treated them rather as though he were king and they were merely there to ratify his decrees, than as their colleague with powers no more extensive than their own; while Agesilaus himself, who though he was above feeling any jealousy of the honours paid to Lysander, yet was ambitious and covetous of honour, began to fear that if any brilliant success should be achieved, the credit of it would be given to Lysander alone. He therefore proceeded to oppose all Lysander's plans, and if he knew that Lysander was interested in any enterprise, he took care to put it off and neglect it, while he successively rejected the petitions of every person in whom he knew Lysander to take an interest. In judicial decisions also he invariably acquitted those whom Lysander wished to punish, and condemned to pay heavy fines those whom he endeavoured to serve. As this took place so frequently that it could not be attributed to chance, but to a systematic purpose, Lysander was forced to warn his partizans that his intervention was an injury [Pg 159]and not a benefit to them, and that they must desist from their obsequious attentions to him, and address themselves directly to the king.

VIII. As these remarks seemed intended to place the king's policy in an invidious light, Agesilaus determined to humble him still further, and appointed him his carver. He then said aloud in the hearing of many persons, "Let them now go and pay their court to my carver." Vexed at this insult, Lysander remonstrated with him, saying, "Truly, Agesilaus, you know how to degrade your friends." "Ay, to be sure," answered he, "those among them who want to appear greater than I am."[176] "Perhaps," replied Lysander, "you have spoken the truth, and I have not acted rightly. Bestow on me, however, some post in which I may be usefully employed without wounding your feelings."

Upon this, Lysander was despatched on a mission to the Hellespont, where he found means to gain over a Persian noble named Spithridates, who had received some offence from Pharnabazus, the satrap of that province. Lysander induced this man to join Agesilaus with all his property, and with a regiment of two hundred horse; yet he himself did not forget his quarrel, and for the rest of his life assiduously plotted to remove the succession to the throne of Sparta from the two royal families, and to throw it open to all Spartans alike. It is indeed probable that he would have raised an important commotion in Sparta, had he not been slain in an expedition in Bœotia. Thus do ambitious men do more harm than good in a state, unless they have an unusual power of self-restraint. Lysander no doubt acted very offensively, and made a very unreasonable display of his pride; yet Agesilaus might have discovered some better method of correcting the faults of so great a man. Indeed, in my opinion they were both equally blinded by the same passion for personal aggrandizement, so that the one forgot the power of his prince, and the other could not bear with the shortcomings of his friend.

IX. Tissaphernes was at first afraid of Agesilaus, and began to treat with him about setting free the Greek [Pg 160]cities on the Ionian coast from the power of the king of Persia. Afterwards, however, he imagined that the force at his disposal justified him in breaking off these negotiations, and he declared war, to the great delight of Agesilaus. Great expectations had indeed been formed in Greece of the army of Agesilaus, and it was thought a strange thing that ten thousand Greeks under Xenophon should march through Persia to the sea, and defeat the king of Persia's troops as often as they pleased, while Agesilaus, the commander of the Lacedæmonians, the leading people in Greece, who were all-powerful both by sea and land, should accomplish nothing. He now revenged himself on the faithless Tissaphernes for his perjury by an equal piece of deceit, and gave out that he was about to march into Karia. When, however, the Persian army was assembled there, he proceeded north-wards to Phrygia, where he took many cities, and gained much plunder, pointing out to his friends that although to solemnly plight one's word and then to break it is wrong, yet that to out-manœuvre one's enemies is not only lawful, but profitable and glorious. Being, however, deficient in cavalry, and warned by the omen of a victim being found with an imperfect liver, he retired to Ephesus, and there collected a cavalry force, giving rich men the alternative of either serving themselves in his army, or of furnishing a horse soldier instead. Many preferred to do so, and Agesilaus soon possessed a force of warlike cavalry in the place of worthless foot soldiers; for those who did not wish to serve personally hired men who were willing to fight, and those who could not ride hired those who could. Just so did Agamemnon act very wisely in receiving a valuable mare, and thereby allowing a rich man to purchase his discharge from military service. Agesilaus now gave orders that the heralds who conducted the sale of captives by auction, should strip them of their clothes, and put them up for sale in a state of perfect nudity. Their clothes were sold separately, and the Greek soldiers laughed heartily at the white and soft skins, which never had felt the sun or wind, displayed by these Asiatics, and began to feel contempt for such effeminate adversaries. Agesilaus himself, pointing [Pg 161]first to the captives themselves, and then to their clothes and other property, observed, "These are the men with whom you have to fight, and these are the things you fight for."

X. When the season for active operations returned he announced his intention of marching into Lydia, not meaning thereby to deceive Tissaphernes; but Tissaphernes deceived himself, for he distrusted Agesilaus on account of his former stratagem. He therefore concluded that it was Agesilaus's real intention to invade Karia, especially as he was weak in cavalry, which could not act in that province. When, however, Agesilaus, as he had announced, marched into the level country near Sardis, Tissaphernes was obliged to hurry thither with all speed; and by means of his cavalry he cut off many stragglers from the Greek army. Agesilaus now perceived that the enemy's infantry had not come up, while he had all his troops in hand. He at once determined to fight, and having formed his cavalry and light-armed troops into one mixed body he ordered them to advance at once and attack the enemy, while he led on the heavy infantry in person. The Persians were routed, and the Greeks, following up their victory, took the enemy's camp with great slaughter. This victory not only enabled them to plunder the king's territories undisturbed, but also gave them the satisfaction of hearing that Tissaphernes, a bad man, and one for whom all the Greeks felt an especial hatred, had at length met with his deserts. Immediately after the battle the king of Persia sent Tithraustes to him, who caused him to be beheaded. Tithraustes now begged Agesilaus to make peace and leave the country, and offered him money if he would do so. Agesilaus answered that he had no power to make peace or war, but that such propositions must be referred to the authorities at home; while as to money he said that he preferred enriching his soldiers to enriching himself, and that among the Greeks it was not considered honourable to receive bribes, but rather to take plunder from their enemies. Nevertheless, wishing to oblige Tithraustes, because he had avenged Greece upon that common enemy of all, Tissaphernes, he removed his army into Phrygia, [Pg 162]receiving a sum of thirty talents from Tithraustes for the maintenance of his soldiery.

During his march he received a despatch from the government of Sparta, appointing him to the command of the naval as well as of the military forces in Asia. He was now at the zenith of his fame and the greatest man of his age, as Theopompus truly observes; yet he had more reason to be proud of his virtue than of his power. He was thought, however, to have committed an error in placing Peisander in command of the fleet, disregarding the claims of older and more experienced men, and preferring the advancement of his wife's brother to the interests of his country.

XI. Having established his army in the province ruled by Pharnabazus, he not only found abundance of provisions, but also was able to amass much booty. He marched as far as the borders of Paphlagonia, and gained the alliance of Kotys,[177] the king of that country.

Spithridatos, ever since he had revolted from Pharnabazus, had constantly accompanied Agesilaus, together with his very handsome son, named Megabates, of whom Agesilaus was greatly enamoured, and a fair daughter. Agesilaus persuaded King Kotys to marry this girl, and received from him a force of one thousand horsemen, and two thousand light troops, called peltasts. With these he returned into Phrygia, and laid waste the country of Pharnabazus, who dared not meet him in the field, and feared to trust himself in any of his fortresses, but hovered about the country, taking his valuable property with him, and keeping his place of encampment as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, however, at last found an opportunity to attack him, and, with Herippidas the Spartan, took his camp and all his property. On this occasion Herippidas acted with great harshness in ordering all the plunder to be given up to be sold by auction, according to Greek usage. He forced the barbarian allies [Pg 163]to disgorge their booty, and searched for all that had been captured in so offensive a manner that Spithridates, in disgust at his conduct, at once went off to Sardis, taking with him the entire Paphlagonian force.

We are told that Agesilaus was terribly chagrined at this. He felt vexed at losing a good friend in Spithridates, and losing, too, a large force with him, while he was ashamed of the character for meanness and avarice which this miserable squabble would gain for Sparta, especially as he had always prided himself on showing a contempt for money both in politics and in private life.

XII. After this, Pharnabazus was desirous of conferring with him, and a meeting was arranged between them by a friend of both, Apollophanes of Kyzikus. Agesilaus arrived first, and sitting down upon some thick grass under the shade of a tree, awaited the coming of Pharnabazus. Presently Pharnabazus arrived, with soft rugs and curiously-wrought carpets, but on seeing Agesilaus simply seated on the ground, he felt ashamed to use them, and sat down on the ground beside him, although he was dressed in a magnificent robe of many colours. They now greeted one another, and Pharnabazus stated his case very fairly, pointing out that he had done much good service to the Lacedæmonians during their war with Athens, and yet that his province was now being laid waste by them. Seeing all the Spartans round him hanging down their heads with shame, and not knowing what to answer because they knew that what Pharnabazus said was true, Agesilaus said: "We Spartans, Pharnabazus, were formerly at peace with your king, and then we respected his territory as that of a friend. Now we are at war with him, and regard all his property as that of an enemy. Now as we see that you still wish to belong to the king, we very naturally endeavour by injuring you to injure him. But from the day on which you shall declare that you will be a friend and ally of the Greeks rather than a slave of the king of Persia, you may regard this fleet and army and all of us, as the guardians of your property, of your liberty, and of all that makes life honourable and enjoyable." In answer to this, Pharnabazus said: "If the king shall send any other general, [Pg 164]and put me under him, I will join you. But if he places me in command, I will cheerfully obey him, and will fight you and do you all the mischief in my power."

Agesilaus was struck by the high-minded tone of this reply, and at once rose and took him by the hand, saying, "Would to God, Pharnabazus, that such a man as you might become our friend rather than our enemy."

XIII. As Pharnabazus was retiring with his friends, his son stayed behind, and running up to Agesilaus said with a smile, "Agesilaus, I make you my guest,"[178] and gave him a fine javelin which he carried in his hand.

Agesilaus gladly accepted this offer, and, delighted with the engaging manners and evident friendship of the young man, looked round for some suitable present, and seeing that the horse of his secretary Idæus was adorned with fine trappings, took them off and gave them to the boy. Agesilaus never forgot the connection thus formed between them, but in after days, when the son of Pharnabazus was impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, he welcomed him to the Peloponnese, and provided him with protection and a home. He even went so far as to employ his influence in favour of an Athenian youth to whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This boy had outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic stadium, and was consequently refused leave to compete in that race. Upon this the Persian made a special application to Agesilaus on his behalf; and Agesilaus, willing to do anything to please his protégé, with great difficulty and management induced the judges to admit the boy as a competitor. This, indeed, was the character of Agesilaus, disinterested and just in all matters except in furthering the interests of his friends, in which case he seems to have hesitated at nothing. A letter of his to Idrilus, the Karian, runs as follows: "If Nikias be innocent, acquit him; if he be guilty, acquit him for my sake; but in any case acquit him." Such was Agesilaus in most cases where his friends were concerned; although [Pg 165]in some few instances he allowed expediency to prevail over affection, and sacrificed his personal friend to the general advantage, as, for example, once, when owing to a sudden alarm the camp was being hurriedly broken up, he left a sick friend behind in spite of his passionate entreaties, observing as he did so, that it is hard to be wise and compassionate at the same time. This anecdote has been preserved by the philosopher Hieronymus.

XIV. Agesilaus was now in the second year of his command in Asia, and had become one of the foremost men of his time, being greatly admired and esteemed for his remarkable sobriety and frugality of life. When away from his headquarters he used to pitch his tent within the precincts of the most sacred temples, thus making the gods witnesses of the most private details of his life. Among thousands of soldiers, moreover, there was scarcely one that used a worse mattress than Agesilaus. With regard to extremes of heat and cold, he seemed so constituted as to be able to enjoy whatever weather the gods might send. It was a pleasant and enjoyable spectacle for the Greek inhabitants of Asia to see their former tyrants, the deputy governors of cities and generals of provinces, who used to be so offensively proud, insolent, and profusely luxurious, now trembling before a man who walked about in a plain cloak, and altering their whole conduct in obedience to his curt Laconian sayings. Many used to quote the proverb of Timotheus, that "Ares alone is king, and Hellas fears not the power of gold."

XV. The whole of Asia Minor was now excited, and ripe for revolt. Agesilaus established order[179] in the cities on the coast by mild measures, without either banishing or putting to death any of the citizens, and next determined to advance farther, and transfer the theatre of war from the Ionic coast to the interior. He hoped thus to force the Persian king to fight for his very existence, and for his pleasant palaces at Susa and Ecbatana, and at any [Pg 166]rate to keep him fully employed, so that from henceforth he might have no leisure or means to act as arbitrator between the Greek states in their disputes, and to corrupt their statesmen by bribes. At this crisis, however, there arrived the Spartan Epikydides. He announced that Sparta was involved in an important war with Thebes and other Greek states, and brought an imperative summons from the ephors to Agesilaus to return at once and assist his countrymen at home.

"O Greeks, that will upon yourselves impose
Such miserable, more than Persian woes."

It is pitiable to think of the malevolence and ill-will which produced this war, and arrayed the states of Greece against one another, putting a stop to such a glorious career of conquest at its very outset, exchanging a foreign for a civil war, and recalling the arms which were being used against the Persians to point them at Grecian breasts. I cannot agree with the Corinthian, Demaratus, when he says that those Greeks who did not see Alexander seated upon the throne of Darius lost one of the most delightful spectacles in the world. I think they would have been more likely to weep when they reflected that this conquest was left for Alexander and the Macedonians to effect, by those Greek generals who wasted the resources of their country in the battles of Leuktra and Koronea, Corinth and Mantinea. Still, nothing is more honourable to Agesilaus than the promptitude with which he withdrew from Asia, nor can we easily find another example of straightforward obedience and self-sacrifice in a general. Hannibal was in great difficulties and straits in Italy, and yet yielded a very unwilling obedience when summoned home to protect Carthage, while Alexander merely sneered at the news of the battle between Agis and Antipater, observing, "It appears, my friends, that while we have been conquering Darius here, there has been a battle of mice in Arcadia."

Well then does Sparta deserve to be congratulated on the love for her and the respect for her laws which Agesilaus showed on this occasion, when, as soon as the despatch reached him, he at once stopped his prosperous [Pg 167]and victorious career, gave up his soaring hopes of conquest, and marched home, leaving his work unfinished, regretted greatly by all his allies, and having signally confuted the saying of Phæax the son of Erasistratus, that the Lacedæmonians act best as a state, and the Athenians as individuals. He proved himself indeed to be a good king and a good general, but those who know him most intimately prized him more as a friend and companion than as either a king or a soldier.

The Persian gold coins bore the device of an archer: and Agesilaus as he broke up his camp observed that he was being driven out of Asia by ten thousand archers, meaning that so many of these coins had been distributed among the statesmen of Athens and Thebes, to bribe them into forcing those countries to go to war with Sparta.

XVI. He now crossed the Hellespont and proceeded through Thrace. Here he did not ask leave of any of the barbarian tribes to traverse their country, but merely inquired whether they would prefer him to treat them as friends or as enemies during his passage. All the tribes received him in a friendly manner and escorted him through their land, except the Trallians,[180] to whom it is said that Xerxes himself gave presents, who demanded from Agesilaus a hundred talents of silver and a hundred female slaves for his passage. He answered, "Why did they not come at once and take them;" and immediately marched into their country, where he found them strongly posted, and routed them with great slaughter.

He made the same enquiry, about peace or war, of the King of Macedonia, and on receiving the answer that he would consider the question, "Let him consider," said he, "but let us march in the meanwhile." Struck with admiration and fear at his daring, the king bade him pass through as a friend. On reaching the country of Thessaly, he found the Thessalians in alliance with the [Pg 168]enemies of Sparta, and laid waste their lands. He sent however Xenokles and Skythes to Larissa, the chief town in Thessaly, to arrange terms of peace. These men were seized upon by the Thessalians and cast into prison, at which the army was greatly excited, thinking that Agesilaus could do no less than besiege and take Larissa. He, on the other hand, said that he valued the lives of either of these two men more than all Thessaly, and obtained their release by negotiation. This ought not to surprise us in Agesilaus, for when he heard of the great battle at Corinth where so many distinguished men fell, and where though many of the enemy perished the Spartan loss was very small, he showed no signs of exultation, but sighed heavily, and said, "Alas for Greece, that she should by her own fault have lost so many men, who if they were alive could conquer all the barbarians in the world."

The Thessalian tribe of the Pharsalians[181] now attacked his army, upon which he charged them with five hundred horse, and having routed them erected a trophy near Mount Narthakius. Agesilaus took great pride in this victory, because in it he had defeated the Thessalian horsemen, supposed to be the best in Greece, with cavalry disciplined by himself in Asia.

XVII. He was here met by Diphridas the Ephor, who brought him orders to invade Bœotia immediately. Although he had intended to make more extensive preparations, he thought it right at once to obey, and informed his friends that the day for which they had marched all the way from Asia would soon be at hand. He also sent for a reinforcement of two moras[182] from the army at Corinth. The Lacedæmonium government at home, also, wishing to do him honour, made proclamation that whosoever would might enrol himself to serve the King. All eagerly gave in their names, and from them the ephors selected fifty of the strongest, whom they sent to Agesilaus as a body-guard. He now marched through [Pg 169]Thermopylæ, crossed the friendly country of Phokis, and entered Bœotia near Chæronea. While encamped there, he observed that the sun was eclipsed and became crescent-shaped, and at the same time came the news of the defeat and death of Peisander in a great sea-fight off Knidus, against Pharnabazus and Konon the Athenian. Agesilaus was naturally grieved both at his brother-in-law's death and at the disaster which had befallen Sparta, but as he feared to damp the courage of his soldiers on the eve of battle, he ordered the messengers to spread the contrary intelligence, that the Spartans had been victorious in the sea-fight, and he himself appeared with a garland on his head, offered sacrifice as though he had heard good news, and distributed portions of the meat to his friends, as presents of congratulation.

XVIII. Proceeding on his march through Bœotia he reached Koroneia, where he came into the presence of the enemy, and arrayed his forces for battle, placing the men of Orchomenos[183] on the left wing, while he led the right in person. In the army of the allies the Thebans formed the right, and the Argives the left wing. Xenophon informs us that this battle was the most furiously contested one that ever was known. He himself was an eye-witness of it, as he had served with Agesilaus during his Asiatic campaign, and had accompanied him on his return to Europe. The first shock was not very severe, as the Thebans easily overthrew the Orchomenians, while Agesilaus with equal ease routed the Argives. When, however, each of these victorious bodies heard that their left was hard pressed and retiring, they at once ceased from following up their success and halted where they stood. Agesilaus might now easily have won a partial victory, by allowing the Thebans to pass back again through his own lines and attacking them as they did so. Instead of this, his fierce spirit led him to form his troops in close order and attack them front to front. The Thebans fought with no less courage, and a terrible battle raged all along the line, but most fiercely at the point where the chosen body-guard of fifty men fought [Pg 170]round the Spartan king. The courage of these men saved the life of Agesilaus, for they recklessly exposed themselves in his defence, and by their exertions, although they could not prevent his being severely wounded, yet by receiving on their bodies through their shields and armour many blows which were intended for him, they succeeded in dragging him from where he had fallen among the enemy, and formed a bulwark around him, slaying many of the enemy, but with great loss to themselves.

The Lacedæmonians, unable to force back the Thebans, were at length compelled to open their ranks, and let them pass through, which at first they had scorned to do. They then assailed them on the flanks and rear as they passed. Yet they could not boast of having conquered the Thebans, who drew off and rejoined their comrades on Mount Helikon, with the proud conviction that in the battle they at any rate had not been defeated.

XIX. Agesilaus, although suffering from many wounds, refused to go to his tent before he had been carried on men's shoulders round the army, and had seen all the dead brought off the field of battle. He gave orders that some Thebans who had taken refuge in a neighbouring temple should be dismissed unharmed. This was the temple of Athena Itonia, and before it stands a trophy, erected by the Bœotians under Sparton, many years before, in memory of a victory which they had won over the Athenians under Tolmides, who fell in that battle.

Next morning Agesilaus, wishing to discover whether the Thebans would renew the contest, ordered his soldiers to crown themselves with garlands, and the flute-players to play martial music while a trophy was erected in honour of the victory. When the enemy sent to ask for a truce for the burial of their dead, he granted it, and having thus confirmed his victory, caused himself to be carried to Delphi. Here the Pythian games were being celebrated, and Agesilaus not only took part in the procession in honour of the god, but also dedicated to him the tithe of the spoils of his Asiatic campaign, which amounted to one hundred talents.

On his return home, he was loved and admired by all his fellow-countrymen for his simple habits of life; for he did [Pg 171]not, like so many generals, return quite a different man, corrupted by foreign manners, and dissatisfied with those of his own country, but, just like those who had never crossed the Eurotas, he loved and respected the old Spartan fashions, and would not alter his dining at the public table, his bath, his domestic life with his wife, his care of his arms, or the furniture of his house, the doors of which we are told by Xenophon, were so old that it was thought that they must be the original ones put up by Aristodemus. Xenophon also tells us that the kanathrum of his daughter was not at all finer than that of other children.

A kanathrum is a fantastic wooden car, shaped like a griffin or an antelope, in which children are carried in sacred processions. Xenophon does not mention the name of Agesilaus's daughter, and Dikæarchus is much grieved at this, observing that we do not know the name either of the daughter of Agesilaus or of the mother of Epameinondas; I, however, have discovered, by consulting Lacedæmonium records, that the wife of Agesilaus was named Kleora, and that she had two daughters, named Eupolia and Prolyta. His spear also may be seen at the present day in Sparta, and differs in no respect from that of any other Lacedæmonium.

XX. Perceiving that many of his countrymen bred horses, and gave themselves great airs in consequence, he induced his sister Kyniske to enter a four-horse chariot for the race at Olympia, to prove to them that the winning of this prize depends not upon a man's courage, but upon his wealth, and the amount of money which he spends upon it. As Xenophon the philosopher was still with him, he advised him to send for his sons and educate them in Lacedæmon, that they might learn the most important of all lessons, to command and to obey.

Lysander was now dead, but Agesilaus found still existing an important conspiracy against himself, which Lysander had set on foot when he returned from Asia. Agesilaus now eagerly undertook to prove what Lysander's true character had been; and having read amongst the papers of the deceased that speech which Kleon of Halikarnassus wrote for him, treating of reforms [Pg 172]and alterations of the constitution, which Lysander meant some day to address to the people of Sparta, he wished to make it public. However, one of the senators, after reading the speech, was alarmed at the plausible nature of the argument which it contained, and advised Agesilaus not to dig Lysander out of his grave, but rather to bury the speech with him. This advice caused Agesilaus to desist from his project. He never openly attacked his political enemies, but contrived to get them appointed generals and governors of cities. When they displayed their bad qualities in these posts and were recalled to take their trial he used to come forward as their friend and by his exertions on their behalf make them his active partisans instead of his enemies, so that before long he succeeded in breaking up the party which was opposed to him, and reigned alone without any rival; for the other king, Agesipolis, whose father had been an exile, and who was himself very young, and of a mild and unassuming temper, counted for nothing in the state. Agesilaus won over this man also, and made a friend of him; for the two kings dine at the same phiditium, or public table, when they are at Sparta. Knowing Agesipolis, like himself, to be prone to form attachments to young men, he always led the conversation to this subject, and encouraged the young king in doing so; for these love affairs among Lacedæmonians have in them nothing disgraceful, but produce much modest emulation and desire for glory, as has been explained in the Life of Lykurgus.

XXI. Being now the most powerful man in Sparta, Agesilaus obtained the appointment of admiral of the fleet for Teleutias, his half-brother; and thereupon making an expedition against Corinth, he made himself master of the long walls by land, through the assistance of his brother at sea. Coming thus upon the Argives, who then held Corinth, in the midst of their Isthmian festival, he made them fly just as they had finished the customary sacrifice, and leave all their festive provision behind them. Upon this the Corinthian exiles[184] who were with [Pg 173]him begged him to preside over the games, but this he refused to do, ordering them to celebrate the festival, while he took care that they did so without interruption. After he was gone the Argives returned, and celebrated the Isthmian games over again. Some of the winners on the former occasion now won the prize again, while others were defeated. Agesilaus observed that the Argives by this act confessed themselves to be cowards, if they set so high a value on presiding at the games, and yet did not dare to fight for it. With regard to such matters he used to think that a middle course was best, and he always was present at the choruses and games at Sparta, taking great interest in their management, and not even neglecting the races for boys and for girls; but of some other matters in which most men were interested he seemed to be entirely ignorant. For instance Kallipides, who was esteemed the finest tragic actor in Greece, once met him and spoke to him, after which he swaggered along amongst his train, but finding that no notice was taken of him, he at length asked, "Do you not know me, O king?" Agesilaus at this looked carefully at him, and enquired, "Are you not Kallipides the player?" for so the Lacedæmonians name actors. Again, when he was invited to hear some one imitate the nightingale he answered, "I have heard the original."

Menekrates the physician, after having succeeded in curing some cases of sickness which were thought to be desperate, was given the title of Zeus, and used to use this appellation on all occasions in a foolish manner. He even went so far as to write to Agesilaus in the following terms, "Menekrates Zeus wishes King Agesilaus health." To this he answered, "King Agesilaus wishes Menekrates more sense."

XXII. While he was encamped in the temple of Hera, near Corinth, watching the soldiers disposing of the captives which they had taken, ambassadors came from Thebes to treat for peace with him. He always had borne a grudge against that city, and thinking that this would be a good opportunity to indulge his hatred, he pretended neither to see nor to hear them [Pg 174]when they addressed him. But he soon paid the penalty of his insolence; for before the Thebans left him news was brought that an entire mora had been cut to pieces by Iphikrates. This was the greatest disaster which had befallen the Spartans for many years; for they lost a large number of brave and well-equipped citizens, all heavy-armed hoplites, and that too at the hands of mere mercenary light troops and peltasts. On hearing this Agesilaus at first leaped up to go to their assistance; but when he heard that they were completely destroyed, he returned to the temple of Hera, and recalling the Bœotian ambassadors, bade them deliver their message. But they now in their turn assumed a haughty demeanour, and made no mention of peace, but merely demanded leave to proceed to Corinth. At this, Agesilaus in a rage answered, "If you wish to go there to see your friends rejoicing over their success, you will be able to do so in safety to-morrow." On the next day he took the ambassadors with him, and marched, laying waste the country as he went, up to the gates of Corinth, where, having thus proved that the Corinthians dared not come out and resent his conduct, he sent the ambassadors into the city. As for himself, he collected the survivors of the mora, and marched back to Lacedæmon, always starting before daybreak, and encamping after sunset, that he might not be insulted by the Arcadians, who bitterly hated the Lacedæmonians and enjoyed their discomfiture. After this at the instance of the Achæans he crossed over into Akarnania with them, where he obtained much plunder, and defeated the Akarnanians in battle. The Achæans now begged him to remain, and so prevent the enemy from sowing their fields in the winter; but he answered that he should do exactly the reverse, because, if the enemy next year had a good prospect of a harvest, they would be much more inclined to keep the peace than if their fields lay fallow. And this opinion of his was justified by the result; for as soon as the Akarnanians heard that another campaign was threatened, they made peace with the Achæans.

XXIII. Konon and Pharnabazus, after their victory in the sea-fight at Knidus, had obtained command of the [Pg 175]seas and began to plunder the coast of Laconia, while the Athenian walls likewise were restored, with money supplied by Pharnabazus for that purpose.

These circumstances disposed the Lacedæmonians to make peace with the king of Persia. They consequently sent Antalkidas to Tiribazus to arrange terms, and most basely and wickedly gave up to the king those Greek cities in Asia on behalf of which Agesilaus had fought. Antalkidas, indeed, was his enemy, and his great reason for concluding a peace on any terms was, that war was certain to increase the reputation and glory of Agesilaus. Yet when some one reproached Agesilaus, saying that the Lacedæmonians were Medising,[185] he answered, "Nay, say, rather, the Medes (Persians) are Laconising."

By threats of war he compelled those Greek states who were unwilling to do so to accept the terms of the peace, especially the Thebans; for one of the articles of the peace was, that the Thebans should leave the rest of Bœotia independent, by which of course they were greatly weakened. This was proved by subsequent events. When Phœbidas, in defiance of law and decency, seized the Kadmeia, or citadel of Thebes, in time of peace, all Greeks cried shame on him, and the Spartans felt especial annoyance at it. The enemies of Agesilaus now angrily enquired of Phœbidas who ordered him to do so, and as his answers hinted at Agesilaus as having suggested the deed, Agesilaus openly declared himself to be on Phœbidas's side, and said that the only thing to be considered was, whether it was advantageous to Sparta or not; for it was always lawful to render good service to the state, even impromptu and without previous orders. Yet in his talk Agesilaus always set a high value upon justice, calling it the first of all virtues; for he argued that courage would be useless without justice; while if all men were just, there would be no need of courage. When he was informed, "The pleasure of the [Pg 176]great king is so-and-so," he was wont to answer, "How can he be greater than I, unless he be juster?"—thus truly pointing out that justice is the real measure of the greatness of kings. When the king of Persia sent him a letter during the peace, offering to become his guest[186] and friend, he refused to open it, saying that he was satisfied with the friendship existing between the two states, and that while that lasted he required no private bond of union with the king of Persia. However, in his actions he was far from carrying out these professions, but was frequently led into unjust acts by his ambition. In this instance he not only shielded Phœbidas from punishment for what he had done at Thebes, but persuaded Sparta to adopt his crime as its own, and continue to hold the Kadmeia, appointing as the chiefs of the garrison Archias and Leontidas,[187] by whose means Phœbidas made his way into the citadel.

XXIV. This at once gave rise to a suspicion that Phœbidas was merely an agent, and that the whole plot originated with Agesilaus himself, and subsequent events confirmed this view; for as soon as the Thebans drove out the garrison and set free their city, Agesilaus made war upon them to avenge the murder of Archias and Leontidas, who had been nominally polemarchs, but in reality despots of Thebes. At this period Agesipolis was dead, and his successor Kleombrotus was despatched into Bœotia with an army; for Agesilaus excused himself from serving in that campaign on the ground of age, as it was forty years since he had first borne arms, and he was consequently exempt by law. The real reason was that he was ashamed, having so lately been engaged in a war to restore the exiled popular party at Phlius, to be seen now attacking the Thebans in the cause of despotism.

There was a Lacedæmonium named Sphodrias, one of the faction opposed to Agesilaus, who was established as Spartan governor of the town of Thespiæ, a daring and ambitious man, but hot-headed, and prone to act without due calculation. This man, who longed to achieve distinction, and who perceived that Phœbidas had made a [Pg 177]name throughout Greece by his exploit at Thebes, persuaded himself that it would be a much more glorious deed if he were to make himself master of the Peiræus, and so by a sudden attack cut off the Athenians from the sea. It is said that this attempt originated with the Bœotarchs, Pelopidas and Mellon, who sent emissaries to Sphodrias to praise and flatter him, and point out that he alone was capable of conducting so bold an adventure. By this language, and an affectation of sympathy with Lacedæmon, these men at length prevailed on him to attempt a most unrighteous deed, and one which required considerable boldness and good fortune to ensure its success. Daylight, however, overtook Sphodrias before he had crossed the Thriasian plain, near Eleusis. All hope of surprising Peiræus by a night attack was now gone, and it is said, also, that the soldiers were alarmed and terror-stricken by certain lights which gleamed from the temples at Eleusis. Sphodrias himself, now that his enterprise had so manifestly failed, lost heart, and after hurriedly seizing some unimportant plunder, led his men back to Thespiæ. Upon this an embassy was sent from Athens to Sparta to complain of the acts of Sphodrias; but on the arrival of the ambassadors at Sparta they found that the government there were in no need of encouragement from without to proceed against Sphodrias, for they had already summoned him home to be tried for his life. Sphodrias durst not venture to return to Sparta, for he saw that his fellow-countrymen were angry with him and ashamed of his conduct towards the Athenians, and that they wished rather to be thought fellow-sufferers by his crime than accomplices in it.

XXV. Sphodrias had a son, named Kleonymus, who was still quite a youth, and who was beloved by Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus. He now assisted this youth, who was pleading his father's cause as best he might, but he could not do so openly, because Sphodrias belonged to the party which was opposed to Agesilaus. When, however, Kleonymus came to him, and besought him with tears and piteous entreaties to appease Agesilaus, because the party of Sphodrias dreaded him more than any one else, the young man, after two or three days' hesitation, [Pg 178]at length, as the day fixed for the trial approached, mustered up courage to speak to his father on the subject, telling him that Kleonymus had begged him to intercede for his father.

Agesilaus was well aware of his son's intimacy with Kleonymus, which he had never discouraged; for Kleonymus promised to become as distinguished a man as any in Sparta. He did not on this occasion, however, hold out to his son any hopes of a satisfactory termination of the affair, but said that he would consider what would be the most fitting and honourable course to pursue. After this reply, Archidamus had not the heart to meet Kleonymus, although he had before been accustomed to see him several times daily. This conduct of his plunged the friends of Sphodrias into yet deeper despair of his cause, until Etymokles, one of the friends of Agesilaus, in a conference with them, explained that what Agesilaus really thought about the matter was, that the action itself deserved the greatest censure; but yet that Sphodrias was a brave energetic man, whom Sparta could not afford to lose.

Agesilaus used this language out of a desire to gratify his son, and from it Kleonymus soon perceived that Archidamus had been true to him in using his interest with his father; while the friends of Sphodrias became much more forward in his defence. Indeed Agesilaus was remarkably fond of children, and an anecdote is related of him, that when his children were very little he was fond of playing with them, and would bestride a reed as if it were a horse for their amusement. When one of his friends found him at this sport, he bade him mention it to no one before he himself became the father of a family.

XXVI. Sphodrias was acquitted by the court; and the Athenians, as soon as they learned this, prepared for war. Agesilaus was now greatly blamed, and was charged with having obstructed the course of justice, and having made Sparta responsible for an outrage upon a friendly Greek state, merely in order to gratify the childish caprice of his son. As he perceived that Kleombrotus was unwilling to attack the Thebans, he himself invaded Bœotia, disregarding the law under which on a former occasion he had pleaded exemption from military service on account of his [Pg 179]age. Here he fought the Thebans with varying success; for once, when he was being borne out of action wounded, Antalkidas observed to him, "A fine return you are getting from the Thebans for having taught them how to fight against their will." Indeed, the military power of the Thebans at that time was at its height, having as it were been exercised and practised by the many campaigns undertaken against them by the Lacedæmonians. This was why Lykurgus of old, in his three celebrated rhetras, forbade the Lacedæmonians to fight often with the same people, lest by constant practice they should teach them how to fight. Agesilaus was also disliked by the allies of the Lacedæmonians, because of his hatred of Thebes and his desire to destroy that state, not on any public grounds, but merely on account of his own bitter personal dislike to the Thebans. The allies complained grievously that they, who composed the greater part of the Lacedæmonium force, should every year be led hither and thither, and exposed to great risks and dangers, merely to satisfy one man's personal pique. Hereupon we are told that Agesilaus, desiring to prove that this argument about their composing so large a part of the army was not founded on fact, made use of the following device:—He ordered all the allies to sit down in one body, and made the Lacedæmonians sit down separately. Next he gave orders, first that all the potters should stand up; and when they had risen, he ordered the smiths, carpenters, masons, and all the other tradesmen successively to do so. When then nearly all the allies had risen to their feet, the Spartans all remained seated, for they were forbidden to learn or to practise any mechanical art. At this Agesilaus smiled, and said, "You see, my men, how many more soldiers we send out than you do."

XXVII. On his return from his campaign against the Thebans, Agesilaus, while passing through Megara, was seized with violent pain in his sound leg, just as he was entering the town-hall in the Acropolis of that city. After this it became greatly swelled and full of blood, and seemed to be dangerously inflamed. A Syracusan physician opened a vein near the ankle, which relieved the pain, but the flow of blood was excessive, and could [Pg 180]not be checked, so that he fainted away from weakness, and was in a very dangerous condition. At length the bleeding stopped, and he was conveyed home to Lacedæmon, but he remained ill, and unable to serve in the wars for a long time.

During his illness many disasters befel the Spartans both by land and by sea. Of these, the most important was the defeat at Tegyra, where for the first time they wore beaten in a fair fight by the Thebans. The Lacedæmonians were now eager to make peace with all the Greek cities, and ambassadors from all parts of Greece met at Sparta to arrange terms. Among them was Epameinondas, a man who was renowned for his culture and learning, but who had not hitherto given any proof of his great military genius. This man, perceiving that all the other ambassadors were sedulously paying their court to Agesilaus, assumed an independent attitude, and in a speech delivered before the congress declared that nothing kept the war alive except the unjust pretensions of Sparta, who gained strength from the sufferings of the other states, and that no peace could be durable unless such pretensions were laid aside, and Sparta reduced to the equality with the rest of the cities of Greece.

XXVIII. Agesilaus, observing that all the representatives of the Greek states were filled with admiration at this language, and manifested strong sympathy with the speaker, enquired whether he thought it right and just that the cities of Bœotia[188] should be left independent.

[Pg 181]Epameinondas quickly and boldly enquired in answer, whether he thought it right to leave each of the towns in Laconia independent. At this Agesilaus leaped to his feet in a rage, and asked him to state clearly whether he meant to leave Bœotia independent. As Epameinondas in reply merely repeated his question, as to whether Agesilaus meant to leave Laconia independent, Agesilaus became furious, eagerly seized the opportunity to strike the name of Thebes out of the roll of cities with whom peace was being made, and declared war against it. He ratified a treaty of peace with the other Greek cities, and bade their representatives begone, with the remark, that such of their disputes as admitted of settlement must be arranged by peaceful negotiation, and such as could not must be decided by war; but that it was too much trouble for him to act as arbitrator between them in their manifold quarrels and disagreements.

Kleombrotus, the other Spartan king, was at this time in the Phokian territory at the head of an army. The Ephors now at once sent orders to him to cross the Theban frontier, while they assembled a force from all the allied cities, who were most reluctant to serve, and objected strongly to the war, yet dared not express their discontent or disobey the Lacedæmonians. Many sinister omens were observed, which we have spoken of in the life of Epameinondas, and Prothous the Laconian openly opposed the whole campaign; yet Agesilaus would not desist, but urged on the war against Thebes, imagining that now, when all the other states were standing aloof, and Thebes was entirely isolated, he had a more favourable [Pg 182]opportunity than might ever occur again for destroying that city. The dates of this war seem to prove that it was begun more out of ill-temper than as a consequent of any definite plan; for the peace was ratified in Lacedæmon with the other cities on the fourteenth of the month Skirophorion; and on the fifth of the next month, Hekatombæon, only twenty days afterwards, the Spartans were defeated at Leuktra. A thousand Lacedæmonians perished, among them Kleombrotus the king, and with him the flower of the best families in Sparta. There fell also the handsome son of Sphodrias, Kleonymus, who fought before the king, and was thrice struck to the ground and rose again before he was slain by the Thebans.

XXIX. In spite of the unparalleled disaster which had befallen the Lacedæmonians, for the Theban victory was the most complete ever won by one Greek state over another, the courage of the vanquished is nevertheless as much to be admired as that of the victors. Xenophon remarks that the conversation of good and brave men, even when jesting or sitting at table, is always worth remembering, and it is much more valuable to observe how nobly all really brave and worthy men bear themselves when in sorrow and misfortune. When the news of the defeat at Leuktra arrived at Sparta, the city was celebrating the festival of the Gymnopædia, and the chorus of grown men was going through its usual solemnity in the theatre. The Ephors, although the news clearly proved that all was lost and the state utterly ruined, yet would not permit the chorus to abridge its performance, and forbade the city to throw off its festal appearance. They privately communicated the names of the slain to their relatives, but they themselves calmly continued to preside over the contest of the choruses in the theatre, and brought the festival to a close as though nothing unusual had occurred. Next morning, when all men knew who had fallen and who had survived, one might see those whose relations had been slain, walking about in public with bright and cheerful countenances: but of those whose relatives survived, scarce one showed himself in public, but they sat at home with the women, as if mourning for the dead; or if any [Pg 183]one of them was forced to come forth, he looked mournful and humbled, and walked with cast-down eyes. Yet more admirable was the conduct of the women, for one might see mothers receiving their sons who had survived the battle with silence and sorrow, while those whose children had fallen proceeded to the temples to return thanks to the gods, and walked about the city with a proud and cheerful demeanour.

XXX. Yet, when their allies deserted them, and when the victorious Epameinondas, excited by his success, was expected to invade Peloponnesus, many Spartans remembered the oracle about the lameness of Agesilaus, and were greatly disheartened and cast down, fearing that they had incurred the anger of Heaven, and that the misfortunes of the city were due to their own conduct in having excluded the sound man from the throne, and chosen the lame one; the very thing which the oracle had bidden them beware of doing. Nevertheless, Agesilaus was so powerful in the state, and so renowned for wisdom and courage, that they gladly made use of him as their leader in the war, and also employed him to settle a certain constitutional difficulty which arose about the political rights of the survivors of the battle. They were unwilling to disfranchise all these men, who were so numerous and powerful, because they feared that if so they would raise a revolution in the city. For the usual rule at Sparta about those who survive a defeat is, that they are incapable of holding any office in the state; nor will any one give them his daughter in marriage; but all who meet them strike them, and treat them with contempt. They hang about the city in a squalid and degraded condition, wearing a cloak patched with pieces of a different colour, and they shave one half of their beards, and let the other half grow. Now, at the present crisis it was thought that to reduce so many citizens to this condition, especially when the state sorely required soldiers, would be an absurd proceeding; and consequently, Agesilaus was appointed lawgiver, to decide upon what was to be done. He neither altered the laws, nor proposed any new ones, but laid down his office of lawgiver at once, with the remark, that the laws must be allowed to sleep for that [Pg 184]one day, and afterwards resume their force. By this means he both preserved the laws, retained the services of the citizens for the state, and saved them from infamy. With the intention of cheering up the young men, and enabling them to shake off their excessive despondency, he led an army into Arcadia. He was careful to avoid a battle, but captured a small fort belonging to the people of Mantinea, and overran their territory; thus greatly raising the spirits of the Spartans, who began to pluck up courage, and regard their city as not altogether ruined.

XXXI. After this, Epameinondas invaded Laconia with the army of the Thebans and their allies, amounting in all to no less than forty thousand heavy-armed soldiers. Many light troops and marauders accompanied this body, so that the whole force which entered Laconia amounted in all to seventy thousand men. This took place not less than six hundred years after the Dorians had settled in Lacedæmon; and through all that time these were the first enemies which the country had seen; for no one before this had dared to invade it. Now, however, the Thebans ravaged the whole district with fire and sword, and no one came out to resist them, for Agesilaus would not allow the Lacedæmonians to fight against what Theopompus calls 'such a heady torrent of war,' but contented himself with guarding the most important parts of the city itself, disregarding the boastful threats of the Thebans, who called upon him by name to come out and fight for his country, since he was the cause of all its misfortunes, because he had begun the war.

Agesilaus was also distracted by the disorderly and excited state of the city itself, for the old men were in an agony of grief, resentment, and wounded honour, while the women could not be kept quiet, but were wrought to frenzy, by hearing the cries of the enemy, and seeing the fires which they lighted. He also suffered much at the thought of his own dishonour; for when he had ascended the throne, Sparta was the greatest and most powerful city in Greece, and now he beheld her shorn of all her glories, and his favourite boast, that no Laconian woman had ever seen the smoke of an enemy's fire [Pg 185]rendered signally untrue. We are told that when some Athenian was disputing with Antalkidas about the bravery of their respective nations, and saying, "We have often chased you away from the Kephissus," Antalkidas answered, "Yes, but we have never had to chase you away from the Eurotas." This is like the answer made by some Spartan of less distinction to an Argive, who said, "Many of you Spartans lie buried in Argive soil," to which he replied, "But none of you are buried in Laconia."

XXXII. We are told at this time Antalkidas was one of the Ephors, and became so much alarmed that he sent his family away to the island of Kythera. Agesilaus, when the enemy attempted to cross the river and force their way into the city, abandoned most part of it, and drew up his forces on the high hills in the centre. At that time the river Eurotas was in high flood, as much snow had fallen, and the excessive cold of the water, as well as the strength of the stream, rendered it hard for the Thebans to cross. Epameinondas marched first, in the front rank of the phalanx; and some of those who were present pointed him out to Agesilaus, who is said to have gazed long at him, saying merely, "O thou man of great deeds."

Epameinondas was eager to assault the city itself, and to place a trophy of victory in its streets; but as he could not draw Agesilaus into a battle, he drew off his forces, and again laid waste the country. Meanwhile, in Lacedæmon itself, a body of two hundred men, of doubtful fidelity, seized the Issorium, where the temple of Artemis stands, which is a strong and easily defensible post. The Lacedæmonians at once wished to attack them, but Agesilaus, fearing that some deep-laid conspiracy might break out, ordered them to remain quiet. He himself, dressed simply in his cloak, unarmed, and attended only by one slave, went up to the two hundred, and, in a loud voice, told them that they had mistaken their orders; that they had not been ordered to go thither, nor yet to go all together in a body, but that some were to be posted there, pointing to some other place, and the rest elsewhere in the city. They, hearing his commands, were delighted, [Pg 186]imagining that their treason was undiscovered, and immediately marched to the places which he indicated. Agesilaus at once occupied the Issorium with troops which he could trust, and in the ensuing night seized and put to death fifteen of the leaders of the two hundred. Another more important conspiracy was betrayed to him, whose members, full Spartan citizens, were met together in one house to arrange revolutionary schemes. At such a crisis it was equally impossible to bring these men to a regular trial, and to allow them to carry on their intrigues. Agesilaus therefore, after taking the Ephors into his confidence, put them all to death untried, though before that time no Spartan had ever been executed without a trial.

As many of the Periœki and helots who had been entrusted with arms escaped out of the city and deserted to the enemy, which greatly disheartened the Spartans, he ordered his servants to visit the quarters of these soldiers at daybreak every morning, and wherever any one was gone, to hide his arms, so that the number of deserters might not be known.

We are told by some historians that the Thebans left Laconia because the weather became stormy, and their Arcadian allies began to melt away from them. Others say that they spent three entire months in the country, and laid nearly all of it waste. Theopompus relates that when the Bœotarchs had decided to leave the country, Phrixus, a Spartan, came from Agesilaus and offered them ten talents to be gone, thus paying them for doing what they had long before determined to do of their own accord.

XXXIII. I cannot tell, however, how it was that Theopompus discovered this fact, and that no other historian mentions it. All writers agree, nevertheless, in declaring that at this crisis Sparta was saved by Agesilaus, who proved himself superior to party-spirit and desire of personal distinction, and steadily refused to risk an engagement. Yet he never was able to restore the city to the glorious and powerful condition which it had previously held, for Sparta, like an athlete who has been carefully trained throughout his life, suddenly broke down, and [Pg 187]never recovered her former strength and prosperity. It is very natural that this should have happened, for the Spartan constitution was an excellent one for promoting courage, good order, and peace within the city itself; but when Sparta became the head of a great empire to be maintained by the sword, which Lykurgus would have thought a totally useless appendage to a well-governed and prosperous city, it utterly failed.

Agesilaus was now too old for active service in the field, but his son, Archidamus, with some Sicilian mercenary troops which had been sent to the aid of the Spartans by the despot Dionysius, defeated the Arcadians in what was known as the 'Tearless Battle,' where he did not lose one of his own men, but slew many of the enemy. This battle strikingly proved the weakness of the city, for in former times the Spartans used to regard it as such a natural and commonplace event for them to conquer their enemies, that they only sacrificed a cock to the gods, while those who had won a victory never boasted of it, and those who heard of it expressed no extravagant delight at the news. When the Ephors heard of the battle at Mantinea, which is mentioned by Thucydides in his history, they gave the messenger who brought the tidings a piece of meat from the public dining-table, as a present for his good news, and nothing more. But now, when the news of this battle reached Sparta, and Archidamus marched triumphantly into the town, all their accustomed reserve broke down. His father was the first to meet him, weeping for joy. After him came the senate, and the elders and women flocked down to the river side, holding up their hands to heaven and giving thanks to the gods for having put away the undeserved reproach of Sparta, and having once more allowed her to raise her head. It is said, indeed, that the Spartans before this battle were so much ashamed of themselves, that they dared not even look their wives in the face.

XXXIV. The independence of Messenia had been restored by Epameinondas, and its former citizens collected together from all quarters of Greece. The Lacedæmonians dared not openly attack these men, but they felt angry with Agesilaus, because during his reign they [Pg 188]had lost so fine a country, as large as Laconia itself, and as fertile as any part of Greece, after having enjoyed the possession of it for so many years. For this reason Agesilaus refused to accept the terms of peace offered by the Thebans. He was so unwilling to give up his nominal claim to Messenia, although he had practically lost that country, that instead of recovering it he very nearly lost Sparta as well, as he was out-manœuvred by Epameinondas. This happened in the following manner. The people of Mantinea revolted from the Thebans, and solicited aid from the Lacedæmonians. When Epameinondas heard that Agesilaus was marching thither at the head of an army, he eluded the Mantineans by a night march from Tegea, invaded the Lacedæmonium territory, and very nearly succeeded in avoiding the army of Agesilaus and catching Sparta defenceless. However, Euthynus of Thespiæ, according to Kallisthenes, or, according to Xenophon, a certain Cretan warned Agesilaus of his danger, upon which he at once sent a mounted messenger to the city with the news, and shortly afterwards marched thither himself. Soon the Thebans appeared, crossed the Eurotas, and assaulted the city with great fury, while Agesilaus, old as he was, defended it with all the spirit and energy of youth. He did not, as on the former occasion, consider that caution would be of any service, but perceived that reckless daring alone could save Sparta. And by incredible daring he did then snatch the city from the grasp of Epameinondas, and set up a trophy of victory, having afforded to the women and children the glorious spectacle of the men of Lacedæmon doing their duty on behalf of the country which reared them. There, too, might Archidamus be seen in the thick of the fight, displaying the courage of a man, and the swiftness of a youth, as he ran to each point where the Spartans seemed likely to give way, and everywhere with a few followers resisted a multitude of the enemy. I think, however, that Isidas, the son of Phœbidas, must have been most admired both by his own countrymen and even by the enemy. He was remarkably tall and handsome, and was just of the age when boyhood merges into manhood. Naked, without either clothes or armour, [Pg 189]having just been anointing himself at home, he rushed out of his house, with a sword in one hand and a spear in the other, ran through the front ranks, and plunged among the enemy, striking down all who opposed him. He received not a single wound, either because the gods admired his bravery and protected him, or else because he appeared to his foes to be something more than man. After this exploit we are told that the Ephors crowned him for his bravery, and fined him a thousand drachmas for having fought without his shield.

XXXV. A few days afterwards was fought the battle of Mantinea, where, just as Epameinondas was carrying all before him and urging his troops to pursue, Antikrates the Lacedæmonium met him and wounded him, according to Dioskorides with a spear, while the Lacedæmonians to this day call the descendants of Antikrates Machairones, that is, children of the sword, as though he struck him with a sword. Indeed, they regarded Antikrates with such a love and admiration, because of the terror which Epameinondas had struck into their hearts while he was alive, that they decreed especial honours and presents to be bestowed upon him, and granted to his descendants an immunity from taxes and public burdens which is enjoyed at the present day by Kallikrates, one of the descendants of Antikrates.

After this battle and the death of Epameinondas the Greek states made peace between one another. When, however, all the other states were swearing to observe the peace, Agesilaus objected to the Messenians, men, he said, without a city, swearing any such oath. The rest, however, raised no objections to the oath of the Messenians, and the Lacedæmonians upon this refused to take any part in the proceedings, so that they alone remained at war, because they hoped to recover the territory of Messenia. Agesilaus was thought an obstinate and headlong man, and insatiable of war, because he took such pains to undermine the general peace, and to keep Sparta at war at a time when he was in such distress for money to carry it on, that he was obliged to borrow from his personal friends and to get up subscriptions among the citizens, and when he had much better have allowed the state some [Pg 190]repose and watched for a suitable opportunity to regain the country; instead of which, although he had lost so great an empire by sea and land, he yet insisted on continuing his frantic and fruitless efforts to reconquer the paltry territory of Messenia.

XXXVI. He still further tarnished his glory by taking service under the Egyptian Tachos. It was thought unworthy of a man who had proved himself the bravest and best soldier in Greece, and who had filled all the inhabited world with his fame, to hire himself out to a barbarian rebel, and make a profit of his great name and military reputation, just like any vulgar captain of mercenaries. If, when more than eighty years old, and almost crippled by honourable wounds, he had again placed himself at the head of a glorious crusade against the Persian on behalf of the liberties of Greece, all men would have admired his spirit, but even then would not entirely have approved of the undertaking; for to make an action noble, time and place must be fitting, since it is this alone that decides whether an action be good or bad. Agesilaus, however, cared nothing for his reputation, and considered that no service undertaken for the good of his country would be dishonourable or unworthy of him, but thought it much more unworthy and dishonourable to sit uselessly waiting for death at home. He raised a body of mercenary troops with the money furnished by Tachos, and set sail, accompanied, as in his former expedition, by thirty Spartan counsellors.

When he landed in Egypt, the chief generals and ministers of King Tachos at once came to pay their court to him. The other Egyptians also eagerly crowded to see Agesilaus, of whom they had heard so much. When, however, they saw only a little deformed old man, in mean attire, sitting on the grass, they began to ridicule him, and contemptuously to allude to the proverb of the mountain in labour, which brought forth a mouse. They were even more astonished when, of the presents offered to him, he accepted flour, calves, and geese, but refused to receive dried fruits, pastry, and perfumes. When greatly pressed to accept of these things, he ordered them to be given to the helots. Yet we are told [Pg 191]by Theophrastes that he was much pleased with the flowering papyrus, of which garlands are made, because of its neat and clean appearance, and he begged for and received some of this plant from the king when he left Egypt.

XXXVII. When he joined Tachos, who was engaged in preparing his forces for a campaign, he was disappointed in not receiving the chief command, but being merely appointed to lead the mercenary troops, while Chabrias the Athenian was in command of the fleet, Tachos himself acting as commander-in-chief. This was the first vexatious circumstance which occurred to Agesilaus; and soon he began to feel great annoyance at the vainglorious swaggering tone of the Egyptian king, which nevertheless he was obliged to endure throughout the whole of a naval expedition which they undertook against the Phœnicians, during which he suppressed his feelings of disgust as well as he could until at last he had an opportunity of showing them. Nektanebis, the cousin of Tachos, and the commander of a large portion of his force, revolted, and caused himself to be proclaimed King of Egypt. He at once sent to Agesilaus begging for his assistance, and he also made the same proposals to Chabrias, offering them great rewards if they would join him.

Tachos, hearing of this, also began to supplicate them to stand by him, and Chabrias besought Agesilaus to remain in the service of Tachos, and to act as his friend. To this, however, Agesilaus answered, "You, Chabrias, have come here on your own responsibility, and are able to act as you please. I was given by Sparta to the Egyptians as their general. It would not become me, therefore, to make war against those whom I was sent to aid, unless my country orders me to do so." After expressing himself thus, he sent messengers to Sparta, with instructions to depreciate Tachos, and to praise Nektanebis. Both these princes also sent embassies to the Lacedæmonians, the one begging for aid as their old friend and ally, the other making large promises of future good-will towards them. After hearing both sides, the Spartans publicly answered the Egyptians, that Agesilaus would [Pg 192]decide between them, and they sent him a private despatch, bidding him to do what was best for Sparta. Hereupon Agesilaus and the mercenaries left Tachos, and joined Nektanebis, making the interests of his country the pretext for his extraordinary conduct, which we can hardly call anything better than treachery. However, the Lacedæmonians regard that course as the most honourable which is the most advantageous to their country, and know nothing of right or wrong, but only how to make Sparta great.

XXXVIII. Tachos, deserted by the mercenaries, now fled for his life; but another claimant of the throne arose in the district of Mendes, and made war against Nektanebis with an army of one hundred thousand men. Nektanebis, in his talk with Agesilaus, spoke very confidently about this force, saying that they were indeed very numerous, but a mere mixed multitude of rustic recruits, whom he could afford to despise. To these remarks Agesilaus answered, "It is not their numbers, but their ignorance which I fear, lest we should be unable to deceive them. Stratagems in war consist in unexpectedly falling upon men who are expecting an attack from some other quarter, but a man who expects nothing gives his enemy no opportunity to take him unawares, just as in wrestling one cannot throw one's adversary if he stands still."

The Mendesian soon began to intrigue with Agesilaus, and Nektanebis feared much that he might succeed in detaching him from himself. Consequently, when Agesilaus advised him to fight as soon as possible, and not prolong the war against men who were indeed inexperienced in battle, but who were able, from their enormous numbers, to raise vast entrenchments and surround him on every side, he took the exactly opposite course, and retired to a strongly fortified city, of great extent, viewing Agesilaus with suspicion and fear. Agesilaus was grieved at this, but, feeling ashamed to change sides a second time and so completely fail in his mission, he followed Nektanebis into his fortress.

XXXIX. When the enemy advanced and began to build a wall round the city, Nektanebis, fearing the consequences of a siege, was eager to fight, as were also the Greeks, for [Pg 193]they were very short of provisions. Agesilaus, however, opposed this design, for which he was heartily abused by the Egyptians, who called him a traitor and the betrayer of their king. He paid but little attention to their slanders, but watched for an opportunity to effect the project which he had conceived. This was as follows:—The enemy were digging a trench round the city, with the intention of completely isolating the garrison and starving it out. When then the two ends of this trench, which was to surround the city, had nearly met, Agesilaus towards evening ordered the Greeks to get under arms, and, proceeding to Nektanebis, said, "Young man, this is our opportunity. I would not say anything about it before, lest the secret should be divulged. But now the enemy themselves have secured our position by digging this enormous trench; for the part of it which is completed will keep off their superior numbers from us, while upon the ground which still remains unbroken we can fight them on equal terms. Come now, prove yourself a man of courage, charge bravely with us, and save both yourself and your army. Those of the enemy whom we first attack will not be able to resist our onset, and the rest will not be able to reach us because of the trench."

Nektanebis was surprised at the ingenuity of Agesilaus, placed himself in the midst of the Greeks, and charging with them gained an easy victory. Having once established an ascendancy over the mind of Nektanebis, Agesilaus now proceeded to use the same trick again with the enemy. By alternately retreating and advancing he led them on until he had enticed them into a place between two deep canals. Here he at once formed his troops on a front equal to the space between the canals, and charged the enemy, who were unable to use their numbers to outflank and surround him. After a short resistance they fled. Many were slain, and the rest completely dispersed.

XL. This victory secured the throne of Egypt for Nektanebis. He now showed great esteem for Agesilaus, and begged him to remain in Egypt during the winter. Agesilaus, however, was anxious to return home and assist in the war which was going on there, as he knew that Sparta was in great want of money, and was paying a force of [Pg 194]mercenary troops. Nektanebis escorted him out of the country with great honour, giving him many presents, and the sum of two hundred and thirty talents of silver to be used in meeting the expenses of the war. As it was winter, and stormy weather, Agesilaus did not venture to cross the open sea, but coasted along the shores of Libya, as far as a desert spot known as the Harbour of Menelaus, where he died, in the eighty-fourth year of his age, and having been king of Sparta for forty-one years, during thirty of which he was the greatest and most powerful man in Greece, having been looked upon as all but the king of the whole country, up to the time of the battle of Leuktra.

It was the Spartan custom, in the case of citizens who died in foreign countries, to pay them the last rites wherever they might be, but to take home the remains of their kings. Consequently the Spartan counsellors enveloped the body in melted wax, as they could not obtain honey, and took it home to Lacedæmon.

Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, succeeded him on the throne, and his posterity continued to reign until Agis, the fifth in descent from Agesilaus, was murdered by Leonidas, because he endeavoured to restore the ancient discipline of Sparta.

FOOTNOTES:

[174] This passage has been admirably paraphrased by Grote, 'History of Greece,' Part II. ch. lxxiii.:—

"Combined with that ability and energy in which he was never deficient, this conciliatory policy ensured him more real power than had ever fallen to the lot of any king of Sparta—power, not merely over the military operations abroad, which usually fell to the kings, but also over the policy of the state at home. On the increase and maintenance of that real power, his chief thoughts were concentrated; new dispositions generated by kingship, which had never shown themselves in him before. Despising, like Lysander, both money, luxury, and all the outward show of power, he exhibited, as a king, an ultra-Spartan simplicity, carried almost to affectation in diet, clothing, and general habits. But like Lysander, also, he delighted in the exercise of dominion through the medium of knots or factions of devoted partizans, whom he rarely scrupled to uphold in all their career of injustice and oppression. Though an amiable man, with no disposition to tyranny and still less to plunder, for his own benefit—Agesilaus thus made himself the willing instrument of both, for the benefit of his various coadjutors and friends, whose power and consequence he identified with his own." See also infra, ch. xiii. et al.

[175] We see here the beginning of that tendency of the Neoplatonic school to find a sanction for all their theories in some perversion of the plain meaning of Homer's words.

[176] Compare Life of Lysander, ch. xxiii.

[177] In Sintenis's text of Plutarch this prince's name is spelt as above. Xenophon, however, in his Life of Agesilaus, spells it Otys; and this reading has been adopted by Grote. It must be remembered that Xenophon was probably an eye-witness of the proceedings which he records, and that Plutarch lived several centuries later.

[178] The Greek word here translated "guest" is explained by Liddell and Scott, s.v., to mean "any person in a foreign city with whom one has a treaty of hospitality for self and heirs, confirmed by mutual presents and an appeal to Ζεὺς ξένιος."

[179] He sought to compose the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the Lysandrian Dekarchies, or governments of ten, in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much as possible the infliction of death or exile.—Grote, part ii. ch. lxxiii.

[180] Nothing is known of this tribe. There is a city, Tralles, in Asia Minor, which Clough conjectures may possibly have been connected with them. Liddell and Scott speak of "Trallians" as "Thracian barbarians employed in Asia as mercenaries, torturers, and executioners."

[181] The people living about Pharsalia.

[182] Mora, a Spartan regiment of infantry. The number of men in each varied from 400 to 900, according as the men above 45, 50, &c., years were called out.

[183] The most aristocratic city in Bœotia, now allied with the Spartans. During the Theban supremacy it was utterly destroyed.